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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 “There is no honorable way to kill, no gentle way to destroy.  
There is nothing good in war, except its ending."  
Abraham Lincoln 
"Negotiation and discussion are the greatest weapons we have for promoting peace and 
development." 
Nelson Mandela 
Since the end of the Cold War, 121 armed conflicts have taken place across the globe, 
with 94 percent of these conflicts taking an intrastate nature and only one third of them reaching 
an agreement between factions (Harbom, Högbladh, & Wallensteen, 2006; Högbladh, 2011). 
While many of these have had at least some attempt at negotiation, even partial but aborted 
agreements at times, the parties involved in civil conflicts have often refused to hold talks or, 
when talks occurred, were more likely to remove themselves from the negotiation table at 
arbitrary stages during discussions and resume fighting. Scholars still question, however, what 
brings parties to negotiate in the first place. Specifically, the timing and conditions lending 
themselves to negotiation have long been questions for policy-makers and scholars. This study 
aims to provide an improved understanding of the conditions leading to negotiation during civil 
conflicts by focusing on especially difficult negotiation issues in particular. In other words, a 
systematic analysis of what makes the parties to civil conflict decide to negotiate is presented. 
By doing so, it is hoped to identify resolutions for long-lasting hostilities and to thereby 
contribute to world peace.  
Fisher, et al. (1981), in their well-known assessment Getting to Yes: Negotiating an 
Agreement Without Giving In have argued that this is an era of negotiation and that all 
individuals are negotiators in their daily lives. Employees discuss raises with their employers, 
consumers bargain over the price of a car or house, governments (such as the United States, 
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Iran, and other global powers) come to deals over nuclear weapons. These are all negotiations, 
and any negotiation can be delayed or negatively impacted in international contexts. The 
question remains, however, why are negotiation difficulties so frequent when it comes to civil 
conflicts? Why do some conflicts experience negotiations but not others? Why does a 
government negotiate with one group but not with the others? What are the conditions that 
prepare the ground for negotiations between parties during civil conflicts?  
Most of the existing scholarship on conflict resolution has focused on the cost of 
conflicts and wars, concluding that as the cost of combat increases the parties increasingly 
prefer to settle rather than continuing in aggression since the cost may continue to mount every 
day. However, the arguments presented here are derived from the costs and benefits of 
negotiation in its various forms in hopes of answering the questions above. Kaplow (2015) was 
the first to mention that negotiation itself might inflict costs and benefits to parties engaged in 
civil conflicts. Earlier, while examining international wars, Ghosn (2010) also observed that 
negotiation may be associated with some costs and benefits. However, there seems to have 
been few studies conducted which concern the possible costs and benefits of a negotiation, 
while others only consider negotiation as a costless decision. Regardless, Kaplow (2015) 
argued that parties involved in civil wars often do not negotiate when they perceive such 
negotiation as being costly. Several measurements of the costs and benefits derived during 
negotiation were then presented by Kaplow, including the fear of losing external and/or internal 
support, the risk of granting legitimacy to the other side, and the difficulty of finding a reliable 
partner with whom to negotiate. Building on this insight and further theoretical premises to be 
discussed, this current study uses several additional measurements (such as terrorism, the role 
of third parties, characteristics of the governments or insurgent groups involved, political 
ideologies of the participants, and the government`s respect or lack thereof for human rights) 
to capture with a large dataset the costs and benefits of negotiation more thoroughly in civil 
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conflict contexts.  It is argued that the manner in which negotiations are perceived by the parties 
involved in civil conflicts, as well as what benefits and costs they may incur, influences the 
ultimate negotiation decision, a factor referred to here as “the negotiation calculation”1 of 
parties in civil conflict. 
1.1. Statement of the Problem  
Over years, scholars have focused on civil war settlement, third party mediation and 
guarantees, and the duration of peace (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Pearson & Lounsbery, 2009; 
Walter, 2002). Focus has been mostly on “successfully negotiated settlements” as a type of 
conflict termination rather than the negotiation process itself (Pearson et al, 2011). The extant 
literature fails to explain the conditions for negotiation as a process, a gap which this 
dissertation aims to fill by exploring the conditions leading to negotiation during various stages 
of conflict. Without such, the existing scholarship would fail to explain why the parties 
involved decided to negotiate in the first place. It is believed that any negotiation attempt, at 
any stage of the conflict, may be a sign of the willingness of the parties to discuss the issues 
regarding the conflict further. Therefore, it is imperative to isolate and examine the 
circumstances of negotiation attempts, regardless of their implementation or success.  
However, the failure or success of prior talks do matter and may influence the prospect of future 
talks and therefore must still be accounted for. Therefore, while focusing on the decision to 
initiate negotiations assists in explaining what brings parties to the reconciliation table, 
examining different types and levels of negotiation that occur separately throughout the 
conflict, regardless of their success or failure, enables understanding of the negotiation 
calculation as a process during the conflict where certain conditions are present and/or absent.  
                                                 
 
1 The term was first coined by Kaplow (2015) as “the negotiation calculus”. 
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Another pitfall obvious in the literature is the assumption by most studies and scholars 
that negotiation is a costless choice, which thus influences their treatment of the subject. These 
studies further assume that when parties engaged in civil conflict face a choice between war 
and peace, they are faced with a costly lottery with the dichotomous option of either fighting 
or settling (Fearon, 1995). As a result, only a few studies have examined the influencers which 
facilitate the decision to hold talks during civil conflicts (Pillar, 1983; Bapat, 2005; Thomas, 
2014). Even in these studies and despite fighting being associated with costs (such as a 
deteriorating economy, war weariness, causalities and deaths, and political party extinction for 
examples) in them, the decision to settle is still presumed to carry no cost at all. This study 
challenges that assumption by arguing that negotiation is somewhat associated with costs and 
benefits as well. Further, the perception of the costs and benefits of the negotiation from both 
government and insurgent perspectives may include differing factors.  
Overall, current research on the determinants of negotiations during civil wars fails to 
address this dialogue as a process and to account for the influence of the negotiation calculation 
itself. While this dissertation understands negotiation as a process, it specifically examines the 
initiation of negotiations during civil conflicts, seeking to illuminate the significance of the 
perception of the costs and benefits of negotiation has on bringing (and keeping) parties into 
peace talks.  
1.2. The Nature and Significance of the Research 
If consideration of the costs and benefits associated with negotiating during civil 
conflicts is neglected, biased knowledge on the determinants of negotiation is the inevitable 
result. This work highlights the fact that negotiation is not a costless choice. Rather, the parties 
to civil conflict, under certain conditions, perceive negotiation as costly while at other times 
believe it to be to their benefit. Therefore, this dissertation provides eight measurements 
(reputation, legitimacy, valid spokesman, external pressure, terrorism, foreign military 
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intervention, human rights, and mediation) for assessing the perceived costs and benefits of 
civil conflict negotiation.  It is important to note that this research is merely an attempt to 
conceptualize the possible indicators for the occurrence of negotiation during civil conflicts at 
a theoretical level so that researchers and analysts can give meaning to the correlation between 
the indicators and the practical occurrences of negotiation. For instance, if an insurgent group 
relied heavily on terrorism-based engagement, such as assassination of a political figure, a 
suicidal attack targeting civilians, or hostage taking, in a given year, the “cost of war” 
explanation would predict an increased probability of negotiation resulting from potential 
increases in costs, such as during a hurting stalemate, or an increase in the group`s “power to 
hurt” that coincides with a decrease in the government`s power to retaliate such damage 
(Zartman, 1993; Thomas, 2014). However, this dissertation asserts that while government`s 
“no negotiation with terrorists” posture typically holds true, they are more likely to negotiate 
with certain terrorist groups more-so than others. Accordingly, this study distinguishes between 
terrorist groups in regard to their constituent and target audiences. Therefore, it is argued that 
governments would be less likely to negotiate with groups who target civilian populations than 
those who do not. Similarly, governments would be relatively more likely to negotiate with 
groups who provide public goods and services (such as healthcare, food, security, and 
education) than those who do not provide any of these. The logic behind these assumptions is 
that while it is true that governments would be unwilling to negotiate with terrorists because 
they would appear weak and acquiescing to terrorism, this would be even truer if a government 
negotiated with a terrorist group that had a negative constituency and negative target reputation. 
In other words, the government would fear that such a negotiation could potentially harm its 
public image and thus undermine its popular support. Therefore, it is argued that some features 
of terrorist groups may be associated with positive reputations such as providing public goods 
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and services, and these features therefore might lower the cost of negotiation with them by their 
government opponents.  
It is should be noted that while back-channel negotiations or secret talks between parties 
are not coded in this study, any formal talks involving both parties participatory in the conflict 
and concerning conflict-related issues (such as ceasefires, exchange of prisoners, or the 
creation of humanitarian zones) are included as negotiations in this analysis. Pruitt (2005) 
argues that not all negotiations are formal, and most formal negotiations are preceded by 
informal talks, secret talks, two-way channels, and shuttle diplomacy. However, the reason 
secret talks are not included here is because the data selected use open source information and 
do not access reliable information on these underground meetings. Although including these 
cases into datasets would be ideal, it is believed that the use of overt negotiations would be 
adequate for assessing the goals of this study. While the dissertation is unable to bring in 
informal prior talks in civil conflicts for the aggregate data analysis, it provides insights into 
these covert talks in the case studies.  
Urlacher (2011) argues that not all negotiation attempts are carried out in “good faith.” 
Therefore, there are other motivations beyond merely reaching an agreement.  For example, 
parties may initiate a so-called negotiation in order to buy time, gain legitimacy, recover, or 
obtain international attention. However, while the data analysis does not allow consideration 
of these possibilities, an attempt is made to grasp the intentions of parties when negotiating and 
to take these into consideration as case studies. Further, it is important to note that even if a 
negotiation attempt is not undertaken in good faith, the cost-benefit calculation for the 
negotiation as made by the involved parties would still hold true.  
On the other hand, although a civil war may have continued for many years, not every 
year of the conflict is necessarily bloody or even deadly. Cases have been observed where there 
have been no, or very few, combat-related deaths during a given year. In this case, one may 
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argue that the parties would prefer a continuation of status quo and have no intention of seeking 
a resolution or agreement since the costs of experiencing the war are not onerous and the 
benefits of their negotiating its completion are not as apparent.   
It is important to understand how government and insurgent groups perceive the option 
of negotiation under different conditions. Their preferences may change as the conflict evolves, 
since the government is likely to reject legitimizing the insurgents by negotiating with them in 
the beginning, only to later, as the course of the war progresses, reassess the relative valuation 
of such talks for example (DeRouen & Bercovitch, 2008). However, if predictions are based 
only on the cost of war, the perceived value of negotiation itself is not being considered. With 
this type of thinking, researchers will continue to fail at explaining what brings parties to 
negotiations and why they are motivated to engage in such dialogue. If the costs and benefits 
of negotiation are omitted from the study, the whole picture of how the parties involved in civil 
conflict assess their choices cannot be seen.    
It should be noted that throughout this dissertation, use of the term “war” is generally 
avoided in favor of the term “conflict.” There are two important reasons for the selection of 
this verbiage. First, existing scholarship (Small & Singer, 1982; Gleditsch et al., 2002) offers 
a variety of thresholds for defining a “civil war,” while simultaneously limiting other 
researchers to a certain set of cases. For example, one of the most common thresholds for a 
civil war is 1,000 battle-related deaths. When this threshold is used, a number of cases that this 
dissertation aims to consider and explain would be missed. Second, this threshold of 1000 
battle-related deaths is used by this study only to differentiate between low-level and high-level 
conflicts but not to segregate lower-level conflicts from the aggregate dataset. Therefore, the 
term “civil conflicts” was chosen for priority usage in order to encompass any conflict which 
causes 25 or more combat-related deaths.   
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This study, differing from existing examinations of negotiations during civil conflicts, 
will contribute to the field of conflict resolution and peace research in several ways. First, the 
study provides six additional measures for assessing the costs and benefits of negotiation 
theory, first coined by Kaplow (2015), in order to better understand the concept. Second, unlike 
previous studies, this assessment differentiates insurgent groups based on their reliance on 
terrorism and typical terrorist activities. In this way the study aims to demarcate a line between 
militarized insurgent groups and those that employ terrorist tactics against civilians (as well as 
within the terrorist groups) based on their activities. Except for a single study, Thomas (2014), 
there has been no effort exerted to explain this distinction. However, offering variation among 
terrorist groups based on their activities is even beyond the scope of that study. While 
commentators have noted a tendency by governments to not engage in formal negotiations with 
"terrorists" (and a tendency by said governments to label their opponents, at least initially, as 
"terrorists"), such distinction that would enable researchers to distinguish terrorist groups based 
on their individual characteristics has not yet been pursued in studies on negotiation decisions.  
Thus, this approach is a promising contribution to the field. Lastly, while most studies focus 
on the government`s agency in making negotiation decisions, this study attempts to examine 
the negotiation calculus from the perspective of both sides. Accordingly, the study explains the 
indicators suggestive of a propensity for negotiation by indicating how these are costs or 
benefits to both sides.  
1.3. The Negotiation Puzzle in Civil Conflicts 
 Negotiating during civil conflicts seems to be a complicated puzzle. Such conflicts, by 
their inherent nature, encompass obstacles that inhibit peaceful negotiations. Scholars often 
emphasize that intrastate are different from international wars, given that there are different 
issues at stake. Zartman (1993) argues that intrastate conflicts seem to be more durable than 
interstate ones, having the ability to last for decades without arriving at either a victorious or 
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negotiated solution. Other scholars have identified impediments to negotiations during civil 
conflicts, pointing to various factors such as the lack of trust between the parties involved and 
the commitment problem, the attributed legitimacy of the actors involved, the problem of a 
reliable spokesman, indivisibility of the issues, the actions of spoilers, and information 
asymmetry among others (Walter, 1997; Walter, 2002; Powell, 2006; Zartman, 1995; Powell, 
2002; Kaplow, 2015; Iklé, 1971; Pillar, 1983; Steadman, 1997; Regan and Aydin, 2006; 
Findley, 2013).  
 Bapat (2005) adds another dilemma to the puzzle. He argues that the relatively rare 
occurrence of negotiation during civil conflicts is due to the unwillingness of governments to 
negotiate during an early stage in the fighting and the unwillingness of insurgents to negotiate 
at later stages. In the beginnings of a conflict governments see full victory as a better option 
since the insurgent faction is relatively weak and therefore they use all their resources to 
suppress the uprising. However, if the insurgency manages to survive and continue the conflict, 
they gain strength and thus tend to refuse talks despite being more amenable to the idea of 
negotiating during the early years of the conflict.  
 On the other hand, the Prospect Theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
presents another obstacle to bargaining and negotiation. Quattrone and Tversky (1988) further 
argue that loss aversion, which is defined as the tendency of individuals to prefer the avoidance 
of losses over accepting equivalent gains, plays a key role in negotiations because it prevents 
the involved parties from reaching an agreement as a result of its leading them to resist making 
concessions to each other.  McDermott (2009), considering the Prospect Theory, argues that 
“each side will want the other to give up twice as much land, or twice as many weapons, in 
order to experience the bargain as fair” (p.95). From this perspective, one can see why it is 
difficult to reach a successful resolution to a civil conflict negotiation, given that the starting 
point of each actor is to give up only half of what they are willing to take from their adversary. 
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In essence, the problem seems to be that each actor`s “goal is to give up as little as possible, 
while obtaining as much as possible” (McDermott, 2009, p. 87). 
1.4. Research Objectives: The Negotiation Calculation 
 To solve the puzzle and lay out the conditions that overcome barriers to negotiation 
during civil conflicts, relying on the Uppsala Conflict Database for information on the timing 
and circumstances of negotiation processes, this study utilizes logistic analysis along with four 
case studies in order to highlight the conditions which make negotiation a more favorable 
alternative than fighting for the parties involved in civil conflicts. Focus is placed on the 
conditions prior to negotiations when parties assess the utility of such engagement for their 
cause in relation to the futility or prospect of continued fighting. Simply, it is argued that the 
perceived costs and benefits of negotiating, in proportional relationship to the perceived costs 
and benefits of fighting, affect each parties` assessment of the conflict. As a result the 
“negotiation calculation” of parties to civil conflicts, which is hidden in the perception of the 
actors (i.e. government and insurgent group), is proposed. Similarly, Kim and Mesquita (1995) 
argues that decision makers` behaviors can be predicted by understanding their perception of 
the circumstance during conflicts.  
In seeking to grasp the negotiation calculus thoroughly and to formulate clearer 
hypotheses, this study relies on two major theories of decision-making: Expected Utility and 
Prospect Theory. While the former has been very dominant in the field of international relations 
with its normative explanations and predictive power, the latter, as a psychological model of 
decision-making, provides additional insights into the negotiation process during civil 
conflicts. Although many scholars have incorporated the Prospect Theory into theoretical 
models within specific subfields of political science such as international conflict, bureaucratic 
politics, bargaining, and negotiation studies, it has not previously been given much attention 
generally (McDermott, 2004; Levy, 1996; Levy, 1997; McDermott, 2009).  
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Due to the complexity and nature of this study, the two theories are used as 
complementary to each other. Moreover, it is important to note that the format of a dissertation 
is not suited to test these theories broadly, and it therefore is not in the goal of this study`s 
empirical findings to support or reject the validity of the two theories. Extant scholarship has 
already used experimental or game theoretical models to test the validity of expected utility 
theory (De Mesquita, 1980; 1983; 1988; Bennett & Stam, 2000; Rabin, 2000). Prospect Theory, 
used mostly for individual level decision-making and experimental models, has also been 
shown to be more influential for grasping the perceptions of individuals. For conflict studies, 
these theories help to understand the decisions of actors and delineate assumptions about the 
process of decision-making in order to formulate hypotheses and theories (For further 
discussion of the rational choice model and prospect theory, see Levy (1997)). While testing 
the validity of these theories has been and must be the purview of other studies, the assumptions 
of the hypotheses proposed in the following section and the theoretical framework of the study 
have been based on the tenets proposed by both expected utility and prospect theory.  
In some sense the main argument of this study, that the costs and benefits of negotiation 
influence its occurrence and nature, could be likened to the expected utility theory presented 
by Bueno de Mesquita (1983) which attempts to explain causes of wars by focusing on how 
political leaders calculate utility. Similarly, it is argued here that when negotiations are less 
costly than continued fighting, the involved parties are more likely to engage in negotiations. 
However, when parties see negotiation as being costly, especially in relation to the costs of the 
war itself, they are less likely to participate in talks. Therefore, the cost or benefit of negotiation 
could be more salient for one party in comparison to the other(s). Presumably, if both sides 
consider negotiation to be costly relative to continued fighting, then the likelihood of talks 
occurring would be low.  If the two sides judge negotiation costs to be low, however, talks 
become a more likely occurrence that becomes more so as war costs mount. In the event that 
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the parties diverge in their cost assessments, negotiation may still be possible but might require 
that the “pot be sweetened” by the involvement of a third party.  Accordingly, warring parties’ 
perception of the cost or benefit of negotiation versus fighting will make negotiations with 
them either more or less likely. It is therefore important to note that these calculations may 
consistently correlate with the types of parties involved.  For example, some assessments may 
weigh more than others for insurgent groups as compared to governments.  
However, since the Expected Utility theory gives every probability and utility equal 
weight, it may fall short of understanding the negotiation calculation which is shaped by the 
actors` perceptions (Levy, 1997). This is where the Prospect Theory is useful for giving more 
insight into and capacity for modeling the perceptions of specific actors. Moreover, in a civil 
conflict situation, it is extremely difficult to determine the utility for given decisions since 
“costs and benefits are not measured only in absolute terms, but in relative ones as well” 
(McDermott, 2009, p.92).  
 Prospect Theory is, in essence, a behavioral model of individual decision-making under 
risk and has important implications for negotiation situations (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). To begin with, Prospect Theory claims that humans are more 
sensitive to changes in their assets than to their net assets held, and therefore they assess the 
changes as gains or losses from their respective reference point, which is typically their current 
situation (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Moreover, the theory asserts that people tend to over-
value prospective losses in relation to similar gains, and while they seek risks in the face of 
losses they become risk-averse for gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This phenomenon is 
known as loss aversion. What this means is that individuals would prefer avoiding losses over 
acquiring comparable gains; that is to say, they will risk more to maintain their current situation 
(status quo) than to make further gains.  
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Therefore, in consideration of loss aversion during a negotiation situation, the risk 
factor may be the prospective threat of losing a given value which can take the form of many 
things such as money, security, power, or human lives (McDermott, 2009, p.91). Alternatively, 
in a civil conflict, the value could also be reputation, external support, regime survival, internal 
cohesion, or credibility among others. This human tendency can also be interpreted as 
concession aversion during a possible armed conflict negotiation (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1995). As for the cost-benefit analysis of negotiations, parties to civil conflict “treat the costs 
of moving away from the status quo as losses and the benefits of moving away from the status 
quo as gains, and then overweight the former relative to the latter” (Levy, 1997, p.90). As such, 
parties to civil conflicts may see the concession as losses. For instance, when a government is 
at war with multiple insurgent groups, it might see every concession to an insurgent group as 
a loss (referring to the deviation from its current status quo and deriving a possible reputation 
as a concession-prone government) and therefore would be unwilling to negotiate.   
 Another implication of the Prospect Theory for negotiations is the framing effect. In an 
experiment conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), the authors observed that the change 
in the frame of a situation influences individuals’ preferences between options although all the 
parameters remain the same. In the experiment, the respondents were asked to choose between 
two options in response to an outbreak of an Asian disease. The respondents` answers varied 
based on whether the options were presented in terms of how many people would live or how 
many people would die even though the number of people who would be saved or killed and 
the probability of each case would remain the same across all of the options.  Therefore, how 
a negotiation is framed would change the perception of parties involved in civil conflict.  
If the negotiation is framed as risky, it would be treated as a cost by the parties involved 
and they would be unwilling to negotiate.  Meanwhile, if framed as a key opportunity, the 
negotiation would be seen as a benefit and the parties would be more willing to negotiate. Third 
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parties may play a key role in framing the conflict. Neale and Bazerman (1985) argue that third 
party involvement might increase the probability of negotiations by helping the parties to frame 
the conflict in more acceptable ways. Accordingly, the parties` perceived cost of negotiation 
may decrease in the presence of a neutral third party or mediator, and in return, the probability 
of the parties holding peace talks increases; the opposite might occur if an outside sponsor or 
intervener objects to negotiations and reassures or even spurs the allied party about continuing 
the fight.    
Overall, by basing the arguments of this study on the assumptions embedded in 
expected utility theory and prospect theory, a negotiation calculus can be proposed in which 
parties to civil conflicts assess their respective risk-perceptions, costs (losses), and benefits 
(gains). By doing so, the study attempts to understand the conditions necessary for negotiations 
to occur in various forms and circumstances of civil conflicts. Moreover, as an attempt to fill 
chasms that exist in the existing scholarship, negotiated settlements are not studied as a conflict 
termination but rather focus is placed on all negotiations which occur at any stage of a conflict. 
1.5. Definitions of Terms 
 Before considering the research questions and hypotheses of this study, it is necessary 
to clarify some terms used within it. The definitions below are derived from the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program, which is also the main data source utilized in the dissertation. 
1. Armed conflict: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory 
where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths (see item 8 in the 
definitions) a year” (Gleditsch, et al., 2002; Allansson, Melander, & Themner, 2017; 
Themner, 2011). 
2. Party: “A government of a state or any opposition organization or alliance of 
organizations. UCDP distinguishes between primary and secondary parties” (Ibid.). 
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a. Primary Parties: “Primary parties are those that form an incompatibility (see 
item 7) by stating incompatible positions. At least one of the primary parties is 
the government of a state” (Ibid.). 
b. Secondary Parties: “Secondary parties are states that enter a conflict with 
troops to actively support one of the primary parties. The secondary party must 
share the position of the primary party it is supporting in the incompatibility 
(see item 7)” (Ibid.).  
c. Third Parties: “A third party is a party that is involved in either helping the 
warring parties to regulate the incompatibility, the conflict behaviour or to 
regulate other conflict issues and work as an intermediary between the two” 
(Ibid.). 
d. Government: “the party controlling the capital of a state” (Ibid.). 
e. Opposition Organization: “Any non-governmental group of people having 
announced name for their group and using armed force to influence the outcome 
of the stated incompatibility (see item 7)” (Ibid.). 
f. Dyad: “A dyad consists of two conflicting primary parties. At least one of the 
primary parties must be the government of a state. In intrastate conflicts, the 
nongovernmental primary party includes one or more opposition 
organization(s)” (Ibid.).  
3. State: “A state is an internationally recognised sovereign government controlling a 
specific territory or an internationally unrecognised government controlling a specified 
territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized 
sovereign government previously controlling the same territory” (Ibid.).  
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4. Terrorism/Terrorist Attack: “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence 
by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, 
coercion, or intimidation” (GTD Advisory Board, 2017). 
5. Insurgents: The terms “insurgent group” and “insurgents” are used for 
“oppositions/opposition groups.” Inclusion of a group as “insurgent group” is based on 
whether it is listed in the UCDP Armed Conflict Database.  
6. Terrorists: The term “terrorists” and “terrorist groups/organizations” are used for the 
groups that are listed in the GTD (GTD Advisory Board, 2017). 
7. Incompatibility: “The stated general incompatible positions. The incompatibility, as 
stated by the parties, must concern government and/or territory” (Themner, 2011). 
a. Incompatibility concerning government: “Incompatibility concerning type of 
political system, the replacement of the central government, or the change of its 
composition” (Ibid.). 
b. Incompatibility concerning territory: “Incompatibility concerning the status of 
a territory, e.g. the change of the state in control of a certain territory (interstate 
conflict), secession or autonomy (internal conflict)” (Ibid.) 
8. Battle Related Deaths: “Counted as battle-related deaths is the use of armed force 
between warring parties in a conflict dyad, be it state-based or non-state, resulting in 
deaths.”  The UCDP uses a 25 battle-related death threshold per year in order for a dyad 
to be considered active. 
9. Negotiation: “Negotiations are talks that are held between at least two of the warring 
parties in a state-based conflict. To be classified as negotiations talks have to be 
connected to one or more issues related to the armed conflict, such as ceasefires, an 
exchange of prisoners, or the incompatibility” (UCDP). 
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1.6. Research Questions 
This study addresses and answers the following set of questions:  
1. Under what conditions are parties of various civil conflict types more likely to 
negotiate? 
2. What do the parties in civil conflicts take into account when assessing the costs and 
benefits of both conflict and negotiation? 
3. Which specific costs and benefits of negotiation seem to be most compelling under 
certain specific circumstances? For example, where acts of “terrorism” are or are not 
involved? 
4. Why do some governments negotiate with one insurgent group but not with others?  
Why do some governments refuse to negotiate, and under what circumstances? 
Conversely, why do some insurgents negotiate with governments, and under what 
circumstances? 
5. How do these varying conditions across and within warring dyads affect the 
assessments of the parties (government and insurgent group) about negotiating and 
about resumption or continuation of fighting?  
The first research question has been studied previously by many scholars, and various 
conditions and causes have been identified. However, while this study supplements the prior 
studies and fills in gaps that the literature fails to explain, it seeks a different, more nuanced, 
answer than these studies by specifically considering the impact of negotiation costs and 
benefits on negotiations. Although the argument that these have an impact on the negotiation 
process has been addressed previously by Kaplow (2015), this study extends it by adding 
additional measurements and more detailed explanations as well as expanding the available 
dataset with the help of case studies. Furthermore, although the data used in this study do not 
allow to capture what the parties to civil conflict negotiated in a given negotiation period, case 
18 
 
 
 
 
studies will provide more insight into what was negotiated, such as ceasefire, prisoner 
exchange, or conflict settlement.  
The second research question results from the lack of a specific measurement or costs-
benefits of negotiation calculation in the field. Given that only a few scholars (Bercovitch & 
Jackson, 2001; Ghosn, 2010; Kaplow, 2015) have raised the question of the costs and benefits 
of negotiation, the existing scholarship suffers from a lack of understanding on how 
negotiations may carry costs or benefits for the respective parties in civil conflicts.  
The third question aims to fill another knowledge gap as there has not been much effort 
previously to differentiate terrorism and insurgency in the context of civil conflicts. Although 
scholars, such as Sambanis (2008) and Findley and Young (2012), have attempted to 
differentiate terrorism and civil wars from each other, they have not offered explanations for 
how the difference would affect negotiation initiations or outcomes in the conflicts. There 
seems to have been only one study, Thomas (2014), which attempts to explain the affect 
terrorism has on gaining concessions from governments in the context of civil wars. Yet, since 
Thomas (2014) focuses only on the number of terrorists attacks in a given period of time as an 
independent variable to explain the number of concessions extracted from governments, the 
study does not offer much in the way of explanation as to how the characteristics of a terrorist 
group would influence the government`s perception and calculation of negotiating with them.  
When it comes to negotiation, most studies focus either solely on insurgents or 
terrorists, with only limited efforts to explain terrorism and coverage of civil war in a single 
study. However, this dissertation will contribute to this body of literature by differentiating 
between insurgents and "terrorists" while simultaneously showing how governments respond 
to various terrorist activities in terms of negotiating during a period of civil conflict and 
focusing on the unique characteristics of the terrorist organizations.  
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The last two questions are the result of the need for dyadic analysis in order to gain a 
better understanding of negotiation in civil conflicts since it takes at least two to negotiate. 
While previous research on conflict settlement has focused on country level analysis, more 
recent studies have called researchers` attention to dyads (Walter, 2002; Licklider, 1995; 
Thomas, 2014; Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2009). With the fourth and fifth research 
questions, the study seeks a dyadic understanding of negotiation during civil conflicts. By 
doing so, this study explains how the characteristics of government and insurgent groups play 
a role in their calculations of the costs and benefits of negotiating.  
1.7. Hypotheses 
Departing from the extant scholarship, this dissertation hypothesizes that negotiation 
inherently (and as defined by the parties) carries some benefits and costs. When the sides 
involved evaluate their decision to fight or negotiate, they do not simply rely on the cost of 
conflict as scholars mainly assume, but also account for the costs and benefits of the prospective 
talks. Accordingly, due to the fear of losing public support or damaging its reputation, a 
government may see negotiating with an insurgent group as costly at times, particularly when 
the group relies heavily on terrorist activities such as attacking civilians or forcefully recruiting 
children. However, at other times, governments may leave openings for possible negotiations 
with an insurgent group such as when the group has a legally recognized political party. In such 
case, negotiations could seem less costly than fighting due to the presence of a "legitimate" or 
authoritative negotiating partner. Moreover, it is not always the government who decides to 
initiate negotiations or not as insurgent groups themselves may see open talks with "evil" 
governments as politically dangerous in terms of support by their own constituents. Therefore, 
this study looks at the negotiation calculation from the perspective of both sides. Also, the 
dissertation puts forward hypotheses in the form of “negotiation is more/less likely to happen” 
because it gives researchers the flexibility to interpret the probability of negotiations occurring 
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for each of the given indicators (Pruitt, 2005). Examining whether the parties to a civil conflict 
might perceive the negotiation as costly, the following hypotheses have been suggested:  
Hypothesis 1: Reputation  
Negotiation becomes less likely to happen as the government perceives potential fights 
with additional insurgent groups.  
This hypothesis derives from the idea that governments do not want to be perceived as 
concession-prone (Walter, 2002). The government, therefore, may understand negotiation with 
an insurgent or a terrorist group as a loss of status quo (loss of reputation). Given that most of 
the time governments are not willing to grant legitimacy to any insurgent group, a possible 
negotiation already poses a cost for the government. Therefore, every additional insurgent 
group involved increases the perceived cost of negotiation in the eyes of the government. This 
is because governments may be concerned that other insurgent groups would demand the same 
(or similar) privileges granted to the first insurgents with which the government comes to terms. 
As a result, the government would be more likely to adopt loss aversion behavior in the 
presence of multiple groups. In other words, when there are more than one insurgent group in 
a state, any type of negotiation with an insurgent group might mean, for the government, that 
it is sending signals of weakness to them. This hypothesis may be termed the “reputation 
hypothesis” as the government makes it about its own “reputation” when there are additional 
factors still at play. Therefore, governments may perceive negotiation as being costly when 
they are fighting with multiple actors. 
Hypothesis 2: Legitimacy 
Negotiation is more likely to happen if the insurgent group is connected to a legal 
political party or faction or has been in existence a relatively long time. 
Legitimacy of the actors has been pointed to as the biggest impediment to negotiation 
during civil conflicts (Zartman, 1993; Walter, 2002; Bapat, 2005). Most of the time, 
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governments do not recognize insurgent groups as legitimate actors for initiating a talk with, 
often labeling them as terrorists, traitors, and criminals. Therefore, it is safe to assume that 
negotiation with an insurgent group poses a cost to the government due to legitimacy issues. 
However, is this the case for all civil conflicts? This dissertation asserts that painting all 
insurgent group with the same brush would lead us to flawed conclusions. Therefore, it is 
argued that some groups may appear more legitimate than others, and this, in turn, would 
decrease the perceived cost of negotiation by governments. Two ways are therefore suggested 
for an insurgent group to be considered as somewhat legitimate, or at least a de facto one. First, 
if the insurgent group is linked to a legal or proto-legal (seeking representation) political party, 
the group can represent its goals and demands more clearly through non-violent means rather 
than having to resort to the use of arms. As the government might see the insurgent`s message 
more clearly under these conditions than it would on the battlefield, the legitimacy of the 
insurgent group would increase in the eyes of the government. Therefore, governments may 
perceive negotiation with insurgent groups who are linked to a legal political party as less costly 
than others. Second, insurgent groups can sometimes gain de facto legitimacy in the eyes of 
the public or other states, even though the government of the host state does not recognize 
them. The long existence of insurgent groups may be another one of the indicators of de facto 
legitimacy. In simple terms, in these cases, the insurgent group is present whether it is accepted 
or not. Therefore, governments can neither further ignore the existence of the group nor its 
legitimacy. By this, the problem of legitimacy is an issue that negotiation during a civil conflict 
must overcome, and its perceived cost to the government therefore decreases. Thus, this 
hypothesis is referred to as the “legitimacy hypothesis.” 
Hypothesis 3: Valid Spokesman 
Negotiation is more likely to occur if the insurgent group has a known representative 
who speaks for them.   
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Finding a representative of the group(s) in order to initiate talks is a prerequisite for any 
sort of negotiation (Zartman, 1995). By definition, negotiation requires at least two parties to 
consider the confrontational issues. While on the government`s side there are official(s) who 
can speak with authority for the government, it is not always easy to identify a representative 
for an insurgent group, even if the government is eager to settle a conflict through negotiation 
(Cunningham, 2013). Not all insurgent groups are the same, as stated previously, and some are 
more structured than others. As such, it is easier for governments to initiate peace talks with an 
insurgent group when said group has a leader or some sort of hierarchical structure. Therefore, 
governments perceive such negotiation as less costly when the insurgent group has a valid 
spokesman to speak for them.  
On the other hand, a valid spokesman not only overcomes the issue of a representative 
for the insurgents, but also resolves the credibility problem to a degree. Accordingly, during 
civil conflicts, governments are concerned that insurgents might renege on their promises at 
any point of the negotiation process. Therefore, in negotiations with insurgent groups which 
have strong leaderships, governments may assume an increased likelihood of receiving what 
has been agreed on more than with other groups which have no representative to speak for 
them. Ergo, the cost of negotiation in the presence of a strong leader of the insurgent groups 
seems less costly to the government. The name of this hypothesis is the “valid spokesman 
hypothesis.”    
Hypothesis 4: External Pressure 
Hypothesis 4a: Governments are more likely to negotiate if the insurgent group has a 
transnational constituency or actually receives foreign assistance.   
Hypothesis 4b: Insurgents are less likely to negotiate when they receive external 
military support. 
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Zartman (1995) argues that very few intrastate wars are purely internal. This is to say 
that the government, the insurgent group, or both, receive external support during the conflict. 
This support might extend from military assistance to financial support or even diplomatic 
influence. In this dissertation, the insurgents` external support (its transnational links) is of 
more concern because civil conflicts are often seen as asymmetric conflicts where, without the 
help of outside support, the insurgents may be weaker than the government in terms of factors 
such as military capability, financial power, and legitimacy. However, as Zartman (1995) 
argues, they often receive help from outside.  
On the other hand, there may be different interpretations of external support in the 
context of negotiation. Therefore, it is argued that external pressure for negotiations could go 
two ways. First, the insurgent groups which have a transnational constituency can bring 
international pressure through the influence of diaspora groups in order to encourage the 
government to negotiate or make concessions. In the presence of outside pressure to solve the 
issues regarding the conflict being directed toward the government, the regime may desire 
meeting the demands of the outsiders and come to see negotiation (or making some 
concessions) as being less costly than fighting. For instance, Turkey may serve as an example 
of this phenomenon. Kurdish diaspora groups throughout Europe have pressured Turkey, via 
the European Union (EU), to improve living conditions for the Kurdish people in Turkey. Since 
2001, the country has thus implemented some kinds of democratic reforms in order to meet the 
EU`s candidacy requirements.  These include legalizing use of the Kurdish language in public, 
allowing Kurdish TV and radio broadcasts, and providing access to Kurdish language courses. 
More importantly, in 2009, the AK party (the current governing party in Turkey) initiated a 
democratic opening known as the “Kurdish opening,” which allowed for dialogue with the 
PKK (Ciftci & Kula, 2015). This may be interpreted as a tendency by the government to meet 
external demands for the sake of international diplomacy and foreign policy gains they perceive 
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as good. On the other hand, this can result in more counter trends with the recent developments 
regarding to the accession status of Turkey to the EU. After the coup attempt in Turkey in 2016, 
the relationship between the EU and Turkey started to sour due to the EU`s concerns over the 
rule of law in relation to large scale purges and violations of human rights taking place in 
Turkey. As a result, the European Parliament voted for the suspension of Turkey`s EU 
membership status in 2017 (Reuters, 2017).  This development decreases Turkey`s prospect of 
accession to the EU. In parallel to this, Turkey`s willingness to meet democratic standards and 
values decreases as well. Second, the presence of outside support for insurgent groups can 
affect the decision of the negotiations. Insurgent groups desire maintenance of their outside 
support, and therefore cannot make a decision against the external groups` wishes. In such a 
case, the insurgent groups perceive negotiation as a cost which may, in return, cause them to 
lose their external support.  
So, in the first argument, government sees negotiation as less costly because external 
actors are seeking concessions from them. However, in the second hypothesis, the insurgent 
group perceives negotiation as costly because there is a risk that they could no longer enjoy the 
foreign support on which they previously relied if any negotiation attempts threaten such 
support for the insurgent group. In that case, the risk of losing their current status (losing the 
support) may lead to loss aversion. It is important to highlight that while the former looks at 
the negotiation cost from the perspective of the government, the latter takes the insurgent`s 
assessment of the cost into account. Regardless, both represent external pressure even though 
they are leading to different perceptions involved in the negotiation calculation. Therefore, 
these hypotheses are label as “external pressure hypotheses”.     
Hypothesis 5: Terrorism 
Hypothesis 5a: Negotiation is less likely if the insurgent group is terrorism-oriented.  
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Hypothesis 5b: Negotiation is more likely to happen if the terrorism-oriented group 
has built a positive reputation with regard to its constituency by providing public services, such 
as health, school, and media.   
Hypothesis 5c: Negotiation is less likely to happen if the terrorism-oriented group has 
built a negative reputation with regard to its constituency by engaging in some activities such 
as child recruitment, forceful recruitment, and forced funding.  
Hypothesis 5d: Negotiation is less likely to happen if the terrorism-oriented group has 
built a negative reputation with regard to its target audiences by conducting extreme violence 
and targeting children.    
In the literature on conflict resolution, there are no clear distinctions between insurgents 
and terrorist groups when it comes to negotiation, although the general position of governments 
is that they do not concede to terrorists nor negotiate with them, Neumann (2007) argues that 
they often negotiate with them in regarding various issues. However, the question is whether 
there is a type of terrorist group with which governments are more likely to negotiate. Is such 
a distinction among terrorist organizations even possible? Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu (2016) 
respond to this by introducing the Reputation of Terrorist Organizations (RTG) dataset. The 
authors created a measurement for both positive and negative reputation factors of terrorist 
organizations. While some activities of a terrorist organization, such as providing services like 
health, school, and media build a somewhat positive reputation of the group in the eye of its 
constituency (the group of people the terrorist group claims to represent), other activities such 
as abductions, forceful recruitment, and mass killings causes a negative reputation. It is argued 
here that this reputation of the terrorist organization plays a major role in the government`s 
perception of the cost of engaging in negotiations with the organization. Accordingly, as a 
terrorist organization builds a negative reputation in the author-derived scale, it may also 
generate bitter, hostile, anger, and revengeful feelings in the public. Moreover, these negative 
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perception of the public toward the terrorist group would be higher if it conducts extreme 
violence on civilians and children. This raises the cost of negotiation very high for the 
governments since they would neither want to lose their public support nor seem weak for 
acquiescing to terrorists. On the other hand, as a terrorist organization builds a positive 
reputation, it must also become a more legitimate actor, at least for some portion of the public. 
In return, governments may see a negotiation with this terrorist group as less costly.  
Prospect theory places a high importance on how issues are framed (McDermott, 2009). 
Governments may use somewhat more positive frames for a negotiation with a terrorist group 
with positive reputation. At least, they can generate excuses about a more peaceful and united 
society in the absence of violence. With these two hypotheses, the goal is to explain how the 
various actions of terrorist organizations affect the negotiation calculation in the eye of the 
governments. Simply, these are referred to as “terrorism hypotheses.” 
Hypothesis 6: Human Rights  
Negotiation is less likely to happen if the government breaches human rights. 
Along with hypothesis 4b (external pressure), this hypothesis also considers the 
negotiation calculation from the perspective of the insurgent group. There have been few, if 
any, attempts in the literature to include the government`s respect for human rights as an 
indicator of the prospect for negotiation in civil conflicts. Moreover, it is not always the 
government which is not willing to negotiate, there are cases where the government accedes to 
the demand to negotiate and the insurgents forego the chance to negotiate, as seen in Sri Lanka, 
Eritrea, and the Western Sahara (Zartman, 1995). Therefore, how costly or beneficial the 
insurgent group perceives negotiation to be in a given case cannot be neglected. Just as 
governments not to acquiesce to the violent actions of terrorists, argued by Hypothesis 5d 
(terrorism hypothesis), an insurgent group would not ignore the violent and disrespectful 
actions of the government either. Accordingly, the same logic in the terrorism hypotheses can 
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be applied to other insurgent groups. The insurgents would perceive negotiation as less costly 
with a government which has a reasonably good reputation of respect for human rights than 
with a government that has little to no respect for such. While such governments are less likely 
to have civil wars in the first place, “good” does not mean “perfect,” and therefore the scale 
can be consulted in order to identify how the variation in the scale helps explain the decision 
to negotiate. The logic here is that the insurgent groups are concerned about their internal 
cohesion and appeal for constituents. However, in the second scenario, when they initiate any 
form of negotiation with a government disrespectful of human rights, disagreements may arise 
among the members of the group, and the group might therefore lose its internal cohesion and 
external credibility. Moreover, Kahneman and Tversky (1995), argue that when legitimate 
rights are violated or moral outrage is incurred, the loss might be perceived as more 
unacceptable to the parties. Therefore, actions such as human rights violations incurred by the 
government make the insurgents see the loss of negotiating more costly.  
On the other hand, it is not right to expect that all insurgent groups would be equally 
concerned about liberal values (such as human rights). However, the hypothesis would still 
hold true because government observation of human rights can at least be interpreted as a sign 
of a partner reliable during negotiations. In other words, if the negotiation fails and fights begin 
anew (presuming that there is a lull or ceasefire during the negotiations), the members of 
insurgent groups may expect fair trials and justice in the future rather than torture and political 
killings. In essence, the insurgent groups feel they at least have better chances with a respectful 
government than a disrespectful one.  Of course, another reason for the talks in the first place 
can be the cynical one of simply taking the opportunity to rest, rearm, and regroup for the next 
round of fighting. 
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Hypothesis 7: Foreign Military Intervention 
Hypothesis 7a: Negotiation is more likely to happen in the presence of a third party 
intervention.  
Hypothesis 7b: Neutral foreign military intervention will increase the likelihood of 
negotiation compared to biased foreign military intervention. 
Third party states regularly practice foreign military intervention in order to influence 
the evolution of civil wars.  While some scholars have argued that military interventions 
increase the duration of the wars, others have asserted that the direction of military intervention 
plays a major role in determining the probability of negotiation (Regan & Aydin, 2006; Regan, 
2002; Pearson & Baumann, 1988; Pickering & Kisangani, 2006). As such, Pearson and 
Baumann (1988) categorize foreign military interventions into three types: neutral, supportive, 
and hostile.  
Neale and Bazerman (1985), in their experiment consisting of 100 college student 
participants, found that third parties may play a key role in helping the contestants to reframe 
the conflict in a more positive way. This finding might hold true for international and internal 
conflicts as well. However, third parties should be neutral, and their aim should be only to 
resolve the conflict. Moreover, from the perspective of Prospect Theory, McDermott (2009) 
argues that in many situations, since the cost of negotiating is more salient to the parties than 
the cost of walking away, individuals would be more likely to avoid the cost which seemed 
certain to them at the beginning (the cost of negotiation). As a result, they will be more likely 
to walk away rather than to negotiate.  As discussed as the negotiation puzzle in civil conflicts 
above, the parties` lack of trust, commitment, and goodwill to each other are the main obstacles 
in the way of a possible negotiation. Accordingly, such issues are perceived as the cost of 
negotiating by the parties. However, the presence of a neutral third party might lower the cost 
of negotiation by offering at least a guarantee for security in the case of a failed negotiation. 
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As such, the cost of negotiation is initially perceived as certain (unavoidable) by the parties 
and would become less certain because the third party would provide commitment and trust in 
certain benefits during negotiations. In other words, intangibles (like goodwill and trust) which 
are perceived as certain costs by the parties at the beginning would appear as certain benefits 
in the presence of a third party, and thus will increase the likelihood of a negotiation 
(McDermott, 2009). Also, mediators should frame the negotiation as cost-cutting rather than 
taking benefits in light of the insight on loss aversion where individuals tend to overvalue losses 
compared to benefits (Pruitt, 1983; McDermott, 2009). 
In regard to the costs and benefits of negotiation hypothesis, this dissertation argues 
that an unbiased third party would decrease the cost of negotiation for parties to civil conflict 
by granting legitimacy to rebels, preventing the conflict from escalating, and lowering the 
concerns of both parties regarding trust and commitment. In other words, in the presence of a 
neutral foreign military intervention, negotiating would be less costly (including political costs) 
for both parties than continued fighting.    
Hypothesis 8: Mediation  
Negotiations are more likely to occur in the presence of a third party compared to 
conflict episodes where there is no third-party assistance. 
The extant literature puts a great emphasis on the problem of commitment during civil 
strife as an impediment to maintaining resolutions (Walter, 1997, 2002; Fearon, 1995; Kydd, 
2005; Powell, 2006). Commitment problems occur when parties in conflict do not trust each 
other, since both believe that the other side will not comply with the agreement. Walter (2002) 
argues that the commitment problem is one of the most significant problems in civil wars.  
However, mediation may help parties solve their commitment problems and it is more likely 
to have negotiated settlements in the presence of a third party. This can particularly be true due 
to the potential for indirect, or “shuttle,” diplomacy so that the parties do not have to meet at 
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the same table.  Berkovitch and Jackson (2001) define mediation as an extension of 
negotiations where the parties to civil conflict are open to the help of a third party to resolve 
their issues. Mediation can also take a number of forms, ranging from neutral to partisan or 
directive stances, and from “good offices” to a guarantor or brokering status (e.g., rewarding 
the parties for settlement). In this sense, mediations could be considered subsets of negotiations 
for some civil conflicts. Therefore, it is crucial not to rule out the effect third parties and 
mediation have on negotiation. As understood from the literature, third parties may play a role 
in civil conflicts by providing a trustworthy, face-saving, and informative ground for 
negotiations. Moreover, the presence of a third party might change the parties` perception of 
the costs and benefits of negotiation.  
In this dissertation, mediation is considered a factor that would lower the cost of 
negotiation for both party. However, it is important to note that meditation is not the focus of 
this research but since it is difficult to separate negotiation from mediation in many cases, the 
dissertation includes mediation as an independent variable in order to control for its effect.  
1.8. Alternative Explanations  
 The above hypotheses stand for the measurement of the negotiation calculation. 
However, the extant literature has made other arguments on what causes parties to choose 
negotiation over fighting, and is focused highly on either the cost of war or the type of war 
(Blainey, 1988; Fearon, 1995; Mason & Fett, 1996; Walter, 2002; Dukalskis, 2015; Licklider, 
1995; Mason, 1996; Stedman, 1997; Walter, 2002; Dukalskis, 2015).  
The Cost of Conflict 
Although the cost of conflict is not the primary focus of this dissertation, it will still 
make propositions about how the costs of conflict influence the participants` assessment of the 
conflict and the expected utility of negotiation. Expected utility theorists argue that the relative 
costs and benefits of a victory or negotiated settlement affects the parties` decision to fight or 
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negotiate. Parties calculate which direction they would be better off, how long it will take to 
win a victory, how much it will cost, and what the payoffs (or losses) of a negotiation may be 
(Walter, 2002). In other words, the cost of war argument suggests that when the cost of 
continuing to fight is high for the parties involved in civil conflict, they will prefer stopping 
the conflict, or as Zartman (2000) puts it, they will seek a “way out.” This cost is often 
measured by the number of causalities, the years passed since the beginning of the conflict, or 
the occurrence of a military stalemate. In addition to these measurements, some authors have 
lately added a new variable to the cost of war: the administration of a territory by an insurgent 
group (Kaplow, 2015; Dukalskis, 2015). In accordance with the literature, it is expected here 
that the probability of negotiation will be higher when the costs associated with the conflict are 
higher.  
The Type of Conflict 
In addition to the cost of war, the type of war is also controlled for, following the 
footprints of previous studies. Civil wars are mostly fought over the control of governance or 
specified territory (Walter, 2002). Scholars have argued that the issues at stake during a civil 
conflict matters for negotiating peace (Pillar, 1983; Licklider, 1995; Fearon, 2005). This is 
often associated with the indivisibility of issues in civil conflicts. In this sense, there are mixed 
results in the literature. While some argue that territorial issues are easier to resolve (Mason, 
1996; Stedman, 1997), others find that territorial goals may negatively affect the resolution of 
civil conflicts (Walter, 2002; Dukalskis, 2015). As a result, the issue for which the conflict is 
fought has been controlled for by determining whether it is a fight for the control of the 
government or a territory.  
In addition to the issues at stake, the level of violence exerted by the parties involved 
in the civil conflict are controlled for in addition to whether it is an internationalized war with 
the involvement of foreign states. To determine the level of violence, the number of deaths in 
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the conflict for a given year has been relied upon, making use of a 1000 battle-related death 
threshold which is the most accepted criterion for civil wars in previous scholarship that 
determines whether the conflict is a civil war or a low-level conflict. As such, if the conflict 
cannot exceed the 1000 casualty threshold, it will be considered a low-level conflict. By doing 
so, differing from the literature, this study is able to show how the level of violence affects the 
negotiation calculation. As a result, it is argued that low-level conflicts are more likely to 
experience negotiation.  
Moreover, potential differences between intrastate conflicts and internationalized 
intrastate conflicts could be another concern. As far as awareness allows, there has been no 
effort to explain how internationalized conflicts are different from conflicts without any 
external state involvement when it comes to negotiating peace. Therefore, this dissertation 
attempts to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the two 
types of conflict, and this typology is included as a control variable.  
1.9. Main argument  
The costs-benefits of negotiation approach advanced by this study does not directly 
contradict the other existing approaches, such as the cost of war or type of war discussed above. 
These approaches clearly play important roles in participants’ assessment of the conflict. 
However, the existing literature has missed a major point that impacts this negotiation decision 
in civil conflict contexts.  Namely, it paints negotiation decisions as merely the only option left 
after deciding that the cost of war is too high to prevail. However, negotiation itself inherently 
encompasses some costs to parties during civil conflicts, and these costs affect the decision of 
the parties involved. This dissertation names this assessment by the parties as “the negotiation 
calculation.” By providing several factors to measure the costs and benefits of negotiation in 
the eyes of both governments and insurgents, this attempts to conceptualize the drivers of 
negotiations during civil wars as costs or benefits to the parties involved in civil conflict. Also, 
33 
 
 
 
 
to see the effects of the above mentioned factors (such as the cost of war and the type of war), 
these factors have been retested and used as control variables.  
1.10. Dissertation Outline 
The dissertation is structured into six chapters. In this introduction chapter,  the chasms 
in previous negotiation scholarship, the importance of the research questions, the contribution 
of this study, key concepts, the negotiation puzzle in solving civil conflicts, and the theoretical 
framework (by putting forward a set of hypotheses) have been introduced. The following 
chapters in the dissertation are organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 discusses the extant literature on negotiations to set the stage for both 
quantitative and qualitative analyses of this study. First, the chapter draws a bigger picture by 
incorporating interdisciplinary understanding of negotiation. Then, the understanding of 
negotiation is narrowed down to civil conflict settings. Later, how the literature on conflict 
resolution scholarship has treated negotiation as a process and as a type of termination in civil 
conflicts are explained. Next, the chapter goes on to introduce the grand theories of negotiation, 
such as bargaining theory and ripeness theory. Lastly, the suggested indicators of negotiation 
in civil conflicts are presented by collecting them under three categories: the cost of war 
indicators, the type of war indicators and the costs and benefits of negotiation indicators.   
Chapter 3 describes the method and methodology both of the logistic regression and 
case studies. The chapter, first, explain the weaknesses and strengths of the logistic analysis 
and case studies in this study as well as their necessity of importance for the set of research 
question of this dissertation. Next, it describes the population and sample for the aggregate data 
analysis by summarizing all the datasets merged together for this research, namely the Uppsala 
Armed Conflict Database (Gleditsch et al, 2002), the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict 
Dataset (NSA) (Cunningham et al, 2013), the Reputation of Terror Groups dataset (RTG) 
(Tokdemir & Akcinaroglu, 2016), International Military Intervention dataset (IMI) (Pearson & 
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Baumann, 1988; Pickering & Kisangani, 2009), the CIRI Human Rights Data Project 
(Cingranelli, Richards, & Clay, 2014), and Negotiation and Mediation Events dataset 
(Svensson, 2007). Then, the chapter explains the research design of dissertation for the logistic 
analysis and case studies. It concludes with the operationalization of variables in the logistic 
analysis and dataset.  
 Chapter 4 presents the findings of aggregate data analysis and discussion of the 
hypotheses. First, the chapter starts by discussing the summary statistics of aggregate data as 
well as several independence and association tests between the indicator of negotiation and the 
occurrence of negotiation. Next, the chapter continues to present the results of logistic analysis 
in ten models. Then, each model is discussed in details in relation to the respective hypotheses. 
Later, the chapter explains how the warring dyads have been selected for case studies based on 
the results of logistic regression and additional considerations. The chapter lends support to the 
costs and benefits of negotiation explanation. It concludes with a general summary and 
discussion of the results.  
Chapter 5 provides an in-depth explanation of four representative case studies: the 
Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, the Government of India and the Kashmir Insurgents, 
the Government of Colombia and the FARC, and the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. 
The chapter follows the same structure while analyzing all four cases, one by one. First, the 
background of the conflict is introduced. Second, the costs and benefits of negotiation 
explanation is applied to each case. Next, negotiation setting and chances throughout the 
conflict settings are explained. Last, the chapter concludes each case with a discussion part. At 
the end, the chapter gives comparison across the conflict settings and draws general 
conclusions applicable to the other civil conflicts around the world.  
Chapter 6 summarizes the study by reminding the theoretical framework and the design 
and method of the dissertation. Also, findings of both logistic and case study analyses are 
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summarized and discussed. Lastly, based on the findings and limitations of the research, 
recommendations for future studies are made. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 “Peace is not absence of conflict, it is the ability to handle conflict by peaceful means." 
Ronald Reagan 
"Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate." 
John Fitzgerald Kennedy 
In general, negotiation is defined across many fields as discussion among two or more 
disputants who are trying to work out a solution to their problem (Conflict Research 
Consortium-University of Colorado, 2005). Negotiations may occur from personal to corporate 
or even international levels. With this wide range of negotiation types, it has thus been of 
interest to scholars of many varying fields. Carnevale and Pruitt (1992) categorized the study 
of negotiation in all fields into three main traditions. The first tradition consists of early studies 
which are considered merely general advice books for the negotiator as well as more recent 
similar works (de Carlieres, 1716; Nicolson, 1964; Fisher & Ury, 1981; Zartman, 1977; 
Zartman & Berman, 1982; Lewicki, Saunders, Minton, Roy & Lewicki, 2011).  Rational choice 
and game theorists make up the second tradition in negotiation studies, with their mathematical 
and modeling approaches to explaining the actors` behaviors in a negotiation (Shelling, 1960; 
Raiffa, 1982; Roth, 1985). The third tradition is often called behavioral tradition. While it bases 
its theoretical point and explanations on mathematical modeling, it focuses more on describing, 
explaining, and predicting than offering a prescription (Druckman, 1977; Kremenyuk, 2002; 
Pruitt, 2013; Zartman, 1978).   
When it comes to the study of negotiation in the context of world politics, the signs of 
all three traditions are present and the main goal is to explain why states cooperate when they 
do. Bercovitch and Jackson (1997) define negotiation as “a process by which states and other 
actors communicate and exchange proposals in an attempt to agree about the dimensions of 
conflict termination and their future relationship” (p.25-26). It is obvious from the literature 
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that much more effort has been put into explaining the process of negotiation during 
international conflicts rather than intrastate ones (Kremenyuk, 1991; Hopmann, 1996; 
Bercovitch & Jackson, 2001; Zartman, 2007; Ghosn, 2010). While negotiation in civil wars is 
given less attention by scholars, it has been acknowledged by many that intrastate conflicts 
tend to last longer than interstate ones, with intrastate conflicts having the ability to last for 
decades without arriving at a victorious or negotiated solution (Walter, 2002; Zartman, 1993). 
However, there have been many studies attempting to explain civil conflicts and their 
resolutions as well. It should also be noted that in the post-cold war era, there was an apparent 
shift from most civil wars being settled by military victory to a good proportion settled by 
negotiation; however, it is not clear if that is continuing now in ear where the UN cannot act as 
effectively because of recurrent major power conflict on Security Council.  
Accordingly, negotiation studies vary across the field of conflict resolution. What 
scholars of war and peace have suggested about negotiation and how different uses of 
negotiation have been implemented over time in the literature will be discussed below. The 
following section divides the said literature into categories based on their approach to 
negotiation during civil conflicts. Accordingly, the studies which see negotiation as an 
“outcome” of conflict and the studies which consider it as a “process” are discussed first. Later 
in the chapter, two important theories regarding negotiation during civil wars are presented: 
the bargaining theory of war and the ripeness theory. Then, the determinants of negotiation in 
civil conflicts are presented as the cost of war. Lastly, a review of the literature, by collecting 
indicators of negotiation under a new perspective (namely the costs and benefits of 
negotiation), brings the chapter to a conclusion. 
2.1. Negotiation as “Settlement” and “Process” 
The study of negotiation during civil conflicts takes a different path than other fields 
such as communication, psychology, and business among others. This is not only because it 
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occurs at the country or international level and the issues at stake are more complicated, but 
also due to the way scholars treat negotiation in their studies. Most of the research on civil 
conflicts has treated negotiation as merely one possible outcome of a conflict and used it as a 
point of conflict termination. Following this approach, scholars have focused on civil war 
settlement, third party mediation and guarantees, and duration of peace over time (Doyle & 
Sambanis, 2006; Pearson & Lounsbery, 2009; Walter, 2002). As a result, the extant literature 
has been filled with mixed results regarding the question of how parties decide to continue 
fighting or to start negotiations. On the surface, focus has been on negotiated settlements versus 
fighting on to victory or mutual destruction in order to explain the duration of peace or the 
recurrence of conflict. While some have argued that decisive victories are less likely to devolve 
than negotiated settlements, Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel (1996) have found that agreed 
settlements, once attained, provide more stability during the post-conflict period (Fortna, 2004; 
Licklider, 1995; Diehl, Reifschneider, & Hensel, 1996). In the interim, other scholars do not 
observe any significant effect of either type of outcome on the recurrence of violence (Doyle 
& Sambanis, 2000; Walter, 2004).  
Taking negotiation as just an outcome of conflict contradicts, however, with the very 
definition of negotiation presented at the beginning of this chapter. Accordingly, negotiation is 
defined as a serial process of discussions among the involved parties in order to resolve their 
issues, not just an outcome. The general concept of negotiation, therefore, implies a process 
rather than an outcome. In this regard, Pearson et al. (2011) recognize this pitfall in the 
literature by stating that the focus has been mostly on “successfully negotiated settlements” as 
a type of conflict termination rather than negotiation itself as a process.  
Moreover, there have been other serious attempts to dissolve negotiation down into 
multiple stages in order to examine it as a process (Pearson et al., 2011; Findley, 2013; Walter, 
2003; Hopmann, 1996). In this regard, Ghosn (2010) and Findley (2013) argue that it is 
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important to examine negotiation at different stages because the factors that bring parties to the 
negotiation table may be different from those for the success of the negotiation. While Ghosn 
focuses on interstate disputes, Findley extends this argument for the resolution of civil conflicts 
as well. Accordingly, Findley (2013) found different effects as the result of the number of 
actors and stalemates during bargaining at different stages of the peace process. The author 
breaks the peace process into three independent stages, namely “deciding to negotiate,” 
“reaching to an agreement,” and “implementing the agreement.” While Findley (2013) has 
reported a positive effect resulting from being at a stalemate and/or the involvement of more 
actors during stage 1 (decision to negotiate), he also found the opposite pattern at stage 3 
(implementing the agreement).  That is to say, being at a stalemate and with an increased 
number of actors at that point decreases the likelihood of implementing the agreement. The 
study did not show significant results during stage 2 (reaching to an agreement).    
Pearson et al. (2011) emphasize that in most civil conflicts, parties engage in some sort 
of tacit or direct bargaining regardless of the types, conditions, and options of conflict 
settlement. As seen from many cases (such as Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Sudan, Ukraine, 
Myanmar, Turkey, South Africa, and Liberia among others), it is possible for governments and 
insurgent groups to sit down long enough, or to engage intermediaries to explore or 
communicate some form(s) of negotiation. Some would even say that implementing or 
signaling some sort of ceasefire or concession is a form of pre-negotiation. Although 
negotiation does not necessarily lead to peaceful resolution, it is the first step for warring parties 
to take toward a peaceful settlement. As such, one should ask what leads to this variation across 
countries, or more specifically dyads (government and insurgent groups). 
2.2. Grand Theories in Negotiation Studies 
To explain why actors in an interstate or internal conflict agree to negotiate or prefer to 
fight, scholarship has relied heavily on rational choice theory, assuming that actors in a conflict 
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assess their utility and make only decisions which maximize their gains. Under this assumption, 
various arguments and theories of war have been developed over time. However, two of them 
have been given more importance than others: bargaining theory and mutually hurting 
stalemate.  
Bargaining Theory of War 
Bargaining theory can be found in fields other than political science, in particular 
economics. While bargaining in economics concerns a seller and buyer who want to agree on 
a price, and is also the resolution of legal disputes in law, it has many applications in political 
science, ranging from parliamentary dynamics, government formation and legislative rule-
making, to international politics (Cooter & Rubinfeld, 1989; Reiter, 2003). Most studies in 
international politics see both conflict and cooperation as a product of bargaining (Reed & 
Sawyer, 2014). Moreover, in international politics, bargaining is used to explain interstate 
cooperation, security issues, state behaviors, wars, and agreements. In this way the bargaining 
model of war encompasses the beginning, duration, termination, and consequences of war as a 
whole. According to this theory, war itself is part of the bargaining process (Reiter, 2003). 
Thomas Schelling was one of the first proponents of the idea that war is a bargaining 
process. Accordingly, Shelling (1960, 1966) framed war as a bargaining model by using game 
theory before further arguing that “most conflict situations are essentially bargaining 
situations” (1960, p.5) and “war is always a bargaining process…” (1966, p.142). Carl von 
Clausewitz was another supporter of this perspective that views war as bargaining. His thoughts 
on war reflect it as being a whole process of bargaining, and as such Clausewitz described war 
as “politics by other means” (1984, p.87). In this view, war can be seen as an extension of 
accomplishing the political goals of a state. In his own words, Clausewitz in On War (1976) 
explains that “the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can 
never be considered in isolation from their purpose” (as cited in Reiter, 2003).  
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Moreover, many have followed the perspective of war as a bargaining process. These 
scholars have revised this theory, and made contributions to it by the addition of various cases 
and explanations. One such, Blainey (1988), follows the logic of Clausewitz and notes that war 
is a process of determining who is stronger and involves bids and responses to either capitulate 
or resist.  In other words, it is a form of negotiation. Similarly, Pillar (1983) suggests that 
military activity affects the outcome of the conflict more through changes in the other side`s 
expectation than through physical effects.  Both Blainey and Pillar consider war as a form of 
bargaining, or negotiation, which helps the warring parties to decide what is beneficial to them 
in the given information context of the war. By the same token, Bernstein (2012) states that 
“negotiating and war fighting must go hand-in-hand; they are ultimately, and, perhaps 
ironically, two sides of the same political coin” (p.24), implying the notion that each side is 
trying to get the other to concede. However, there are exceptions to this when signals get mixed 
and bombing continues while peace feelers are extended – as in US-North Vietnam failed peace 
overtures.  
To explain negotiations during civil conflicts much of the literature draws from the 
rational perspective, which is also associated with the bargaining studies (Wagner, 2007). The 
idea is that parties choose either to fight or settle going forward based on their expectation from 
each outcome, and that conflict costs (such as battlefield attrition and monetary expenditure) 
condition the decisions (Fearon, 1995). Fearon (1995) argues that political leaders confronted 
with the two options, fighting or negotiation, prior to open conflict make up their minds based 
on their calculation of each outcome. By this perspective, this is the only way to explain why 
wars occur given the fact that wars are costly and risky. On the other hand, peace may also be 
seen risky, and some theorists posit that fear of losses may outweigh prospect of gain 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Quattrone & Tversky, 1988; McDermott, 2009) 
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Similarly, Powell (2002), relying on Rubinstein`s model type (1982) which pictures 
bargaining in international relations as a non-cooperative game, describes bargaining as 
“deciding how to divide the gains from joint action” (Powell, 2002, p.2). According to Powell 
(2002), since each actor in a conflict wants to maximize its gains they will be willing to 
cooperate when acting jointly promises a larger gain. Moreover, Powell (2006) in his model of 
war that considers the cost of the conflict, finds that settling a dispute in a short time is a better 
option for combatants since fighting is damaging and becomes more costly over time.  
On the other hand, Wagner (2000) approaches negotiation from a different perspective 
than both Fearon and Powell by arguing that war itself is a negotiation process. His argument 
runs counter to the idea that decisions and commitments are made primarily before the war has 
begun. Rather, he argues that decisions are mostly made after the initiation of conflict, based 
on the expectation about how the war will end. Wagner criticizes the works by Wittman (1979), 
Blainey (1988), and Fearon (1995) which implicitly or explicitly suggest that war itself is not 
a part of a bargaining process but is an outcome of the costly lottery suggested by Powell 
(1996). Contrary to these studies, Wagner argued that bargaining does not end once the conflict 
erupts but rather continues along its course. According to Wagner, to understand fighting and 
bargaining one needs to understand the process of war, from its outbreak to its termination.  
Overall, the bargaining theory of war is built on Shelling`s and Clausewitz’s view of 
war as a process or manner of bargaining. It derives from a broader theory, rational choice, 
that assumes that actors in a conflict (let it be it a political leader, insurgent group, or state in 
general) act in a way to maximize its gains and while doing so the actor uses the current 
information environment to take into consideration the relative powers of the actors and the 
expected utility of possible outcomes.  
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Ripeness Theory   
Ripeness theory, first developed by Zartman (1989), has been one of the most influential 
concepts in peace and conflict studies and explains when and why the parties to a conflict 
would prefer negotiation over fighting.  According to Zartman, “parties resolve their conflict 
only when they are ready to do so—when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a 
satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly 
predicament” (2001, p.8). He then specifies two necessary conditions which render a conflict 
to be ripe for resolution: mutually hurting stalemate and seeking for a “way out.” Mutually 
hurting stalemate is a situation where both parties have come to believe that they cannot 
practically, or successfully, escalate the conflict in order to achieve their goals at an acceptable 
cost (Zartman, 1993). Therefore, they seek “a way out” of the conflict (Zartman, 2000). In 
other words, this is a situation where the parties are locked in conflict and lose their faith in 
any kind of victory in the face of impending conditions and thus wants to step outside of it for 
a more favorable outcome.  
Similar to bargaining theory, the mutually hurting stalemate bases its theoretical point 
on rational choice theory because it is grounded in the cost-benefit analysis of parties in a 
conflict. From a rational perspective, scholars often mention that parties in a conflict make their 
own assessment of the situation (Zartman, 1989; Zartman, 1993; Zartman, 2000; Fisher & Ury, 
1981; Stedman, 1991). Moreover, Zartman (2001) acknowledges that ripeness is a necessary 
condition for conflict resolution, but not a sufficient one. Accordingly, it is possible to observe 
cases where the conflict has reached to ripeness for resolution; however, political leaders have 
not seized the opportunity.  
When it comes to operationalization of the concept, pinpointing the ripe moments, 
scholars have used various variables over time (Walter, 2002; Findley, 2013). It is important 
to note that “ripeness” or “mutually hurting stalemate” are perceived psychological states of 
44 
 
 
 
 
the actors in conflict, and therefore measuring the concept may be difficult at times. Regan 
(2002) argues that it is a vague concept and thus problematic to analyze empirically since it is 
difficult to pinpoint these moments. However, in order to operationalize the concept, it has 
often been understood as a military stalemate where the fighting capacity of both sides are 
perceived as equal. Zartman argues that being in such a stalemate could carry some costs to the 
parties in conflict.  Therefore, they may seek a resolution to the conflict (Zartman, 2000). 
Accordingly, using military stalemate as an indicator of mutually hurting stalemate, Findley 
(2013) has found that while stalemates encourage negotiations they have less effect on the 
implementation of peace agreements. Moreover, a valid spokesman for each side has been 
identified as another indicator for ripeness. Accordingly, Zartman stresses that “the presence 
of strong leadership recognized as representative of each party and that can deliver that party’s 
compliance to the agreement is a necessary (while alone insufficient) condition for productive 
negotiations to begin, or indeed to end successfully” (2011, p.11). Lastly, Stedman (1991) 
points to the potential of leadership change because of the threat of domestic rivals as a sign of 
subjective perceptions of mutually hurting stalemate for the incumbents. However, it should 
be noted that the possibility of leadership change, in this sense, only takes into consideration 
the internal dynamics of a group (state or insurgent) while not accounting for the threat from 
the enemy.  
Ripeness theory has been criticized by some scholars in several aspects (Pruitt, 1997; 
Pruitt, 2005; Amer, 2007; Walch, 2016). First, it is considered tautological since theory does 
not necessarily specify in practice the ripe moments. It simply cannot be known before the 
resolution has already taken place. Therefore, the theory suggests that “situations are either ripe 
or unripe” (Pruitt, 1997, p.238). Second, while the theory can explain the initiation of 
negotiations, it does not determine the success of the negotiations. Thus, it focuses on only the 
beginning of the process (Walch, 2016). Third, it is seen as a micro level theory. As such, Pruitt 
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argues “it would be richer if the antecedents of ripeness were organized on the basis of some 
broader theory” (1997, p.239). 
Pruitt (1997, 2005) attempts to modify ripeness theory with “readiness theory.” While 
the ripeness theory requires a “mutual” perception of stalemate (or ripeness) in a conflict, 
readiness theory looks at the sides separately. Pruitt defines readiness as “the extent to which 
an individual disputant is interested in negotiation” (2005, p.6). Pruitt, emphasizing that 
ripeness is still primary in readiness, argues that “negotiation will only start if there is some 
degree of readiness on both sides and, hence, some degree of ripeness....The greater the 
readiness and ripeness, the more likely is negotiation to occur” (p.7).  Accordingly, readiness 
theory aims to contribute to ripeness theory in two ways; by looking at the actors separately 
and treating readiness and ripeness as variables instead of a necessary condition. Thus, when 
readiness and ripeness are variables to explain negotiation, it is possible to talk about the 
possibility of negotiation based on the level of readiness and ripeness. This, in return, allows 
researchers to build compensatory hypotheses (Pruitt, 2005).  
Overall, ripeness theory has been widely used in the literature to explain the initiation 
of negotiation in civil conflicts and why some attempts have worked while others have not. 
Although the theory has some limitation, such as pinpointing the ripe moments in a conflict 
situation beforehand, a better understanding and use of the theory comes down to a more 
accurate and effective measure of “ripeness.”   
2.3. The Determinants of Negotiation 
In light of the theories above, the extant literature has suggested various determinants 
of negotiation occurrence during civil conflicts. As a result, it is filled with a mixture of results. 
Scholars have mostly focused on the correlations between the suggested determinants and the 
engagement in negotiation. Simultaneously, these determinants of negotiation have been 
gathered under a broader theoretical framework in order to give meaningful explanation to the 
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correlations in hopes of explaining the causality between the variables. One of the most 
prominent suggestions proposed has been the cost of war. According to this theory, war is 
costly for each party, and as the cost gets higher, parties to a conflict prefer negotiation over 
fighting. This assumption derives from rational choice theory, which assumes the actors will 
choose what is maximizing their gains. Further, it has its theoretical foundation on the ripeness 
theory by assuming that as the cost(s) increase the conflict will be ripe for resolution. Scholars 
have suggested diverse variables to measure the cost of war. Moreover, other indicators of 
negotiation regarding the specific characteristics of civil conflicts (such as conflict over the 
control of a territory versus governance) have been put forward.  
The Cost of Conflict 
Scholars of conflict resolution have translated both the bargaining theory of war and 
Zartman`s mutually hurting stalemate into the cost of war concept. Relying on these two 
theories, the cost of war presumes that as the cost(s) of war gets higher the actors in a civil 
conflict (who are assumed to be rational) will prefer negotiation as a “way out” (as in Zartman`s 
argument) or as a preferable outcome in comparison to the expected futility of ongoing war. 
Scholars have therefore provided various measurements to test the costs of wars, considering 
them to also be determinants of the decision to negotiate.   
Walter`s (2002) prominent study on determining the indicators of negotiation delineates 
some conditions needed for opening or continuing talks, such as the cost of conflict, balance 
of power, domestic political institutions, and divisibility of issues in the conflict. However, she 
puts a great emphasis on the importance of third party involvement as a mediator in particular. 
Many later studies have been constructed on Walter`s insight. Recent studies, however, have 
been taking different approaches and providing new conditions to consider such as the number 
of potential claimants, the intensity of the conflict, the relationship between the disputants, and 
services provided by the insurgent groups (Findley, 2013; Ghosn, 2010; Heger & Jung, 2015). 
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On the other hand, there might be varied cost motives such as the emphasis on regime or 
dynastic survival. Mesquiata and Siverson (1995) assert that political leaders want to maintain 
their hold on to power; therefore, while they decide on going to wars or backing down, they 
assess their ability to keep the power by calculation to what extent the decision would put them 
in opposition to their rivals (both within and outside their political system) and the ability of 
these rivals to take over the power.  
Walter (2002) measures the cost of war by looking at the duration of the conflict in 
relation to the number of battle-related deaths. This is consistent with the “war weariness” 
hypothesis which posits that parties in a long-lasting conflict come to realize that there is a low 
probability of victory and therefore decide to settle by negotiation without necessarily 
achieving their goals in full (Dukalskis, 2015). Similarly, Collier and his colleagues (2004) 
find that the probability of peace increases every year after a seven year conflict period. Doyle 
and Sambanis (2006) have supported this argument by mentioning that long wars are more 
likely to be settled by negotiation because of the increasing perception that the likelihood of 
the victory is low.  
Similarly, Mason and Fett (1996) adapted Wittman`s (1979) model of how interstate 
war ends for their own model of how civil war concludes, arguing that the probability of both 
parties agreeing to a negotiated settlement depends on each side`s estimate of its own 
probability of victory. Their main argument relies on Zartman`s mutually hurting stalemate, 
and the authors put forward that if the probability of victory for one side is high, then the 
probability of a negotiation is low. While assessing the probability of victory for one side, they 
rely on the capacity of the government`s army. Moreover, they are concerned about the 
expected utility of a victory for the government. In that sense, they assess the cost of war only 
in light of the government expecting a victory. The argument is that if the cost of war is high, 
then the government will prefer a negotiated settlement rather than ongoing fighting. While 
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primarily assessing the cost of war, the authors rely on various other factors as well, such as 
the casualty rate and duration of the war.  
The Type of Conflict 
It is important to note that not all civil conflicts are the same. While some are fought 
over territorial disputes, others are primarily for the control of governance. Moreover, it is 
possible to suggest further categorizations of civil conflicts, such as internationalized civil 
conflicts, minor conflicts, and major wars. These types of categories may vary based on the 
definition of a civil conflict and the ultimate aim of the study. However, since the goal of this 
dissertation requires such a typology, what previous literature has suggested for the occurrence 
of negotiation across these cases will be discussed.  
First, the UCDP dataset defines internationalized internal conflicts as “armed conflict 
[which] occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups, with 
intervention from other states in the form of troops” (Pettersson & Wallensteen, 2015). Also, 
the data shows that in 2014, 33% of intrastate conflicts were internationalized in that at least 
one foreign state contributed troops to one or both sides in the conflict. Based on the definition 
and statistics, the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Ukraine, Nigeria, and Syria among others may 
be considered internationalized civil wars. However, there seems to have been no attempt to 
differentiate internationalized civil wars from other civil wars in terms of the probability of a 
negotiation.  
Second, the UCDP makes a distinction among civil wars based on the casualty rate in 
a given year. Accordingly, while internal conflicts with less than 1000 battle-related deaths 
during a year are coded as “minor conflicts,” others with more than 1000 deaths are considered 
as being major wars. In addition to the general lack of knowledge about negotiation in 
internationalized civil wars, the existing literature has not been concerned with what 
differences the level of violence in a civil conflict would have when it comes to negotiation.  
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Therefore, this distinction (as well as internationalized civil conflicts) is included in this 
dissertation.  
Lastly, some scholars have suggested that the indivisibility of the issues at stake in a 
civil conflict make it difficult to resolve (Iklé, 1971; Pillar, 1983; Mason, 1996; Walter, 2002; 
Fearon, 2005; Licklider, 1995). Accordingly, Iklé (1971) argues that in civil wars, since the 
sides are not geographically separable a partition is difficult; therefore, “…one side has to get 
all, or nearly so…” (p.95). Similarly, Pillar (1983) sees negotiation during civil conflicts as less 
practical than in interstate conflicts due to the indivisibility of the issues. According to Pillar, 
“neither side can get most of what it wants without depriving the other of most of what it 
wants…as a result, few civil wars end through negotiations unless they become highly 
internationalized” (p.24).    
Walter (2002) argues that civil conflicts generally are fought over either the control of 
territory and/or governance. The divisibility of both issues seems to be quite difficult. On one 
hand, it could be argued that the insurgency fought over a territory which might be easier to 
resolve with a negotiation because while the political elite make concessions of the territory 
they can still hold on to power (Stedman, 1997). On the other hand, Walter (2002) has found 
that insurgent groups fighting over territory are not more likely to initiate negotiations, which 
has a negative effect on the insurgent`s willingness to sign a treaty. Moreover, Walter has found 
that territorial goals, compared to those of gaining a share of governing power, have a negative 
effect on the willingness of insurgents to come to an agreement. Similarly, Dukalskis (2015) 
concludes that the insurgent groups which administer a territory in Burma are unlikely to sign 
a cease-fire agreement with the government. According to the author, the reason is that 
insurgent groups controlling an area are more likely to be long-lived and it is likely they have 
invested more human and financial resources in the given area; therefore, they would be less 
willing to sign a cease-fire. This is especially true if the insurgency relies on natural resources 
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or contraband for their support, and therefore the insurgent group will be less likely to negotiate 
(Dukalskis, 2015).  
Some scholars have paid attention to the role of ethnicity during a civil conflict 
(Licklider, 1995; Sambanis, 2001; Fearon, 2005). Sambanis (2001), relying on Horowitz`s 
(1985) theoretical perspectives on ethnic violence, thus categorizes civil conflicts into two 
major categories: identity wars (ethnic and religious wars) and non-identity wars. Licklider 
considers this distinction as well, and argues that ethnically motivated conflicts are more 
difficult to resolve. Mason (1996) stresses that territorial issues are easier to divide than identity 
issues (such as ethnicity), therefore, separatist wars are more likely to be settled through a 
negotiation than ethnic wars.  
2.4. Seeing the Indicators under a New Theory: Costs and Benefits of Negotiation 
Up until the study by Kaplow (2015), many have treated negotiation as a costless choice 
where parties to civil conflict decide to negotiate based on the cost of war or some other 
characteristic of the conflict. However, Kaplow (2015) argues that negotiation itself has costs 
and benefits. For instance, a government would consider negotiation with an insurgent group 
as costly if there were multiple insurgent groups in the country. This is partly because, if the 
government was to grant legitimacy to a group or make concessions for the sake of a 
negotiation attempt, other groups would seek the same privileges as the insurgent group with 
which the government is negotiating. As a result, the government would be seen as concession-
prone. 
Among existing studies, the most pronounced indicators of negotiation occurring 
during civil conflicts are the cost of war and the type of the conflict. However, recent work has 
called scholars` attention to the costs and benefits of negotiation as well (Kaplow, 2015). 
Although some of the measurements of the costs and benefits of negotiation suggested by 
Kaplow (such as the number of actors, third party assistance, and/or their involvement) have 
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been studied by others as indicators of negotiation under the cost of war theory, placing them 
under the costs/benefits of negotiation umbrella will provide researchers a different perspective 
on the underlying reasons behind negotiations during civil conflicts. Accordingly, the 
following section will address what the extant literature has proposed about the indicators of 
negotiation (suggested by this research as the costs/benefits of negotiation). The literature 
review is designed from the following variables, following the same order the hypotheses have 
been proposed in order to give a clearer understanding of where the theoretical point of this 
dissertation was derived. As such, the literature will be reviewed for every independent variable 
of the study separately.    
Reputation  
Walter (2006) argues that governments do not make concessions to self-determination 
movements when there are multiple potential claimants occupying lands. According to Walter, 
governments are heavily concerned with being perceived as concession-prone. Kaplow (2015) 
applies this same logic to negotiation and shows that governments are less likely to negotiate 
if there is a greater number of potential future claimants (i.e., there might be more than one 
insurgent group in a country), and if the government makes a concession to one of the insurgent 
groups, the others may want the same privileges. Therefore, negotiating with an insurgent 
group becomes more costly for the government due to the possibility of sending weak signals 
to other insurgent groups. The number and type of insurgent groups involved may therefore be 
key indicators of negotiation decisions. Findley (2012) has also included the number of 
insurgent groups in a country as a factor for determining its effect on his three stage negotiation 
model, but he does not consider multiple actors as a cost to reputation but rather argues that 
multiple actors will cause information problems.  
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Legitimacy  
The most pronounced factor in civil wars and intrastate disputes, which is not usually 
seen in international wars, is the non-recognition of opponents (the unwillingness to admit that 
the adversary is legitimate) and that negotiation itself is a potential loss that will entail a 
significant political price (Walter, 2002; Zartman, 1993).  
Unlike interstate wars in which both sides are internationally recognized as legitimate 
governments, intrastate wars are generally fought between a government and an insurgent 
group. Most of the time, governments do not recognize these insurgent groups as legitimate 
actors to be negotiated with and often label them as terrorists and/or criminals (Bapat, 2005). 
This tends to limit the potential for negotiations or certain types of negotiation (e.g., over 
substantive issues vs. ceasefires and prisoner exchanges). Furthermore, such negotiations may 
require face saving mechanisms, such as employment of “shuttle diplomacy” by third parties, 
thus avoiding direct meetings. It may be more likely, therefore, that substantive negotiations 
begin and are more fruitful in interstate than in civil conflicts since the parties recognize each 
other as legitimate actors (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2002). Indeed, Zartman (1995) argues that 
recognition is both the top and bottom line for insurgency.   
 Even though governments insist on not recognizing insurgent groups, these groups can 
gain legitimacy through other means such as their durability in fighting over time or through 
international recognition (Kaplow, 2015). Accordingly, longer-lived groups have a tendency 
to prove their de facto legitimacy by demonstrating staying power. Moreover, some insurgent 
groups have political links, and these parties or outside mediators can be better interlocutors 
for opening negotiations with governments. Therefore, for governments, negotiating with 
political parties seems less costly than negotiating with insurgent groups directly.  While other 
studies have suggested various factors which serve to overcome the problem of legitimacy for 
insurgent groups (such as being longer-lived, internationally recognized, or having a third party 
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available for mediation), this study is the first to suggest the effects of a political extension for 
the insurgent groups (Kaplow, 2015; Walter, 2002). 
Valid Spokesman  
In civil conflicts, governments must decide who speaks for the insurgent group, and 
thus whom to contact, before starting any negotiation attempts. It is a precondition for 
negotiation (Zartman, 1995). Zartman argues that “the presence of strong leadership recognized 
as representative of each party and that can deliver that party’s compliance to the agreement is 
a necessary (while alone insufficient) condition for productive negotiations to begin, or indeed 
to end successfully” (2011, p.11).  
Cunningham (2013) indicates that in most civil conflicts, governments purportedly 
cannot identify a spokesperson with which the government can initiate talks. This problem 
must be overcome prior to being able to hold any form of negotiations. Kaplow (2015) states 
that government wants a spokesperson who has control over the insurgency and can follow 
through with the commitment(s) that have been made.  Moreover, it is safe to assume that a 
representative spokesperson reduces the transaction cost of the negotiation between parties.  
External Pressure 
 In order to break the asymmetrical disadvantage in civil conflicts, insurgents often seek 
to link with an external host state and neighbor (Zartman, 1995). This leads to 
internationalization or trans-nationalization of conflicts as well as potential broadening of the 
negotiation potential so as to involve cross pressures by outsiders.  Zartman argues that few 
internal wars are purely internal. For example, many diaspora groups support combatants in 
civil conflicts financially (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).  
 Kaplow (2015) argues that outside actors exert pressure on parties involved in civil 
conflict in order to influence their negotiation decision. As such, when the parties involved 
start talks which go against the interests or wishes of these outside actors who provide either 
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party with finance or military equipment, there is a risk that the party in question will lose the 
external ally. Therefore, in case the talks fail, there is a risk that the party might not win a 
military victory or a favorable settlement. As a result, the author argues that parties to civil war 
refuse negotiation attempts if they threaten their external support.  
Cunningham (2006), on the other hand, talks about “veto players” who have divergent 
interests in a conflict. According to him, when there are more actors at play, it is more difficult 
to come to an agreement since there are conflicting interests and information asymmetry is 
more accurate. As a result, he argues that civil wars with veto players are more likely to last 
longer than others with two actors.  
Terrorism  
When it comes to negotiating with “terrorists”2, things get increasingly complicated. 
This is because governments do not want to grant legitimacy to, or encourage, terrorist tactics 
by negotiating with those practicing them, and they therefore frequently label insurgent groups 
as terrorists initially (Bapat, 2005). Further, it may not only be the government side that does 
not want to negotiate, the terrorist group maintaining little or no interest in talks also. From the 
government`s point of view, negotiating with terrorists could be against the inherent principles 
of the state and serve to make terrorists stronger and terror tactics more popular. Neumann 
(2007) argues that although democratic countries often state that they never give in to violent 
acts or negotiate with their perpetrators, they often do so on issues ranging from ceasefires to 
prisoner releases. Thus, the more valid statement would be that negotiations are possible in all 
                                                 
 
2 Since governments in civil conflicts tend to label all oppositions as “terrorists” or “criminals,” this typology 
might be confusing at some times. Thus, for the definition of “terrorism” and “terrorists,” this research relies on 
the guidance of Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Accordingly, the groups that are listed in the data are treated 
as “terrorists” and “terrorist organizations,” not based on how the respective government labeled them.  
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situations, and what focus needs to be placed on is the decision when, with whom, for what 
agenda(s), and how to negotiate.  
In civil conflicts, the insurgent group may resort to terrorist activities such as wanton 
attacks on civilians or even develop into an internationally designated terrorist organization. 
At this point, it is important to clarify how terrorism is defined. Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD) defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non‐
state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or 
intimidation” (LaFree & Dugan, 2007). However, it is important to examine how terrorism is 
differentiated from civil wars and other political violence in order to have a better 
understanding of the negotiable situations in civil conflicts. Terrorism does not necessarily 
mean insurgency or civil war, and while terrorism sometimes can grow out of civil wars, not 
all terrorism evolves into civil wars (Sambanis, 2008).  
Terrorist activities rely heavily on public support, and terrorist groups may build either 
a positive or negative reputation in the eyes of the public by various means over time (Findley 
& Young, 2012; Tokdemir & Akcinaroglu, 2016). Terrorist groups which conduct extreme 
attacks on civilians or kidnap children (such as Boko Haram in Nigeria) build a negative 
reputation and may lose public support. In the meantime, a terrorist might provide somewhat 
positive services alongside their violent activities in order to gain the support of specific groups 
(as is the case of Hezbollah that has invested in schools and health facilities in order to generate 
support from Lebanon's Shia community) (Tokdemir & Akcinaroglu, 2016). Although the 
media sometimes use the terms insurgents, rebels, and terrorists interchangeably, it is crucial 
to mark the distinction between them when it comes to civil wars and negotiation. Given that 
terrorist groups develop various strategies, some of which help to build a negative reputation 
and some of which bring a positive reputation and eventually lead to support for their group, 
negotiating with a terrorist group that has a negative reputation may damage the reputation of 
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a state thus causing the government to consider opening less costly talks only with terrorist 
groups that hold a somewhat positive reputation.  
Fortna (2015) argues that the use of terrorism does not help insurgent groups at the 
negotiation table. Further, Fortna finds that rebels using terrorism are less likely to experience 
a negotiated settlement than those who avoid terrorism. Also, they assert that terrorism only 
causes the conflict to last longer and is not useful for rebels to achieve their political goals. 
Fortna adds that terrorism is a more effective tool, however, against democracies than non-
democratic countries. On the other hand, Thomas (2014) through examining civil wars in 
African countries argued that governments are more likely to offer concessions to rebels who 
execute large scale terrorism during civil wars than those who eschew terrorism. Thomas`s 
logic behind this argument is that use of terror displays the insurgent`s “power to hurt,” 
showing how governments are disadvantaged while they are merely responding to terrorism. 
Thomas argues that “governments` violent response to terrorism drives political moderates and 
civilians to extremists, whereas their inability to prevent violence prompts civilians to seek 
protection from non-state actors” (2014, p.816). Further, the author argues that governments 
are disadvantaged when they are responding to terrorism because they seldom are able to target 
those who are responsible for terrorist attacks. Therefore, the author puts forward that terror 
attacks during civil wars increase the probability of possible concession offers by the 
government during negotiations. Thomas`s findings are contrary to Fortna`s study, and names 
this pattern as “rewarding bad behavior.”  As a result, the extant literature presents mixed 
results and arguments as to how the act of terrorism during civil war influences the probability 
of negotiation.  
Human Rights  
The extant literature has not argued anything about the effect a government`s respect 
for human rights has on the probability of negotiation. However, this dissertation takes this 
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matter into consideration based on the following logic. To look at the negotiation calculus from 
the insurgent groups` perspective, this study includes a measure of the human rights index for 
governments. The logic behind this is that just as governments do not consider insurgent groups 
to be legitimate actors for negotiation, there are cases where insurgent groups do not recognize 
governments as legitimate actors. Also, there is good reason to believe this may be the case 
when the government has no respect for human rights, tortures detainees or imprisoned 
individuals, or conducts large scale political imprisonments. In these cases, the insurgent group 
may see negotiating as being costlier than fighting since they cannot rely on the government 
and thus do not recognize its legitimacy due to the government`s disregard for the rights of its 
citizens. 
Third Party Interventions 
There are often third party interventions in civil conflicts, and these take various forms 
such as military, economic, and diplomatic interventions. Conventional wisdom holds that 
outside interventions increase the duration of civil wars (Regan 2000; 2002). However, there 
is contrary evidence in the literature. More importantly, scholars have agreed that the type of 
intervention plays a major role in determining the direction of civil wars, at least in terms of 
the duration of the conflict. Therefore, the influence of military intervention (often referred to 
as foreign military intervention) and diplomatic interventions (also called mediations) should 
be examined separately.    
Scholars assert that the direction of military intervention may be of three kinds: 
supportive, hostile, and neutral (Pearson & Baumann, 1988; Pickering & Kisangani, 2006). 
Supportive and hostile interventions are those which either support the government and oppose 
the rebels, or support the rebels and oppose the government. Neutral (also called unbiased or 
in some cases humanitarian, e.g., evacuation) interventions, however, do not oppose or support 
either side (Lounsbery, 2016).   While Mason, et al. (1999) argues that military intervention on 
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behalf of one side favors negotiated settlement since it increases the cost of the conflict, other 
scholars find that interventions supporting governments provide necessary assistance for 
repressing the rebels and interventions favoring the rebels increase their chances of victory 
(Peksen & Lounsbery, 2012; Gent, 2008). On the other hand, neutral interventions aim to bring 
stability and peace (Peksen & Lounsbery, 2012; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006).  
Scholars also pointed to the difference between multilateral and unilateral military 
interventions (Lounsbery, Pearson, & Talentino, 2011; Regan, Frank, & Aydin, 2009). The 
conventional wisdom holds that multilateral interventions taken under the auspices of the 
United Nations or some other supranational organizations are more influential in endorsing the 
stability and reforms in post-conflict era than are unilateral interventions, due to their 
“humanitarian” nature. Accordingly, Finnemore (1996) argues that multilateral interventions 
are respected as more legitimate than unilateral intervention, especially with the end of Cold 
War. On the other hand, Regan (1998) argues that in this era, most states are reluctant to take 
unilateral actions against civil uprisings, as in the example of Rwandan upheaval in 1994. As 
for the comparison of effectiveness of multilateral and unilateral interventions on improving 
the conditions in the target country, Lounsbery et al. (2011) present mixed results. Accordingly, 
the authors find a negative effect of all military interventions, including both multilateral and 
unilateral actions, on democratization, while they point slightly positive effects on economic 
growth and quality of life. Also, the scholars argue that multilateral interventions or neutral 
interventions have slight superiority over unilateral intervention in endorsing peace and 
stability in the post-conflict era.   
In addition to military intervention, there is extensive emphasis on diplomatic 
interventions or aid to parties in intrastate wars. As such, the extant literature on conflict 
resolution has placed great emphasis on the role of mediation as a conflict management strategy 
(Walter, 2002; Regan & Aydin, 2006; Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; Hamdan & Pearson, 2014). 
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It is seen as a common form of conflict management by many (Bercovitch & Regan 1999; 
Bercovitch & Diehl, 1997). Also, Carnevale and Pruitt (1992) defines mediation as “a variation 
on negotiation in which one or more outsiders ("third parties") assist the parties in their 
discussion” (p.532). In that sense, the literature seems to argue that meditations and 
negotiations during civil conflicts are highly associated.  
Regan and Aydin (2006) argues that just the outbreak of a civil war is a sign of 
disagreement between the government and the opposition. Therefore, it is difficult for them to 
settle the dispute without the help of an outside party. In the literature, mediators play two 
major roles in settling the dispute: first, to break information asymmetry and second, to rule 
out the commitment problem (Regan & Aydin, 2006; Walter, 2002). Accordingly, Regan and 
Aydin (2006) asserts that mediation reduces the asymmetry of information about the 
capabilities and incentives of parties involved in civil conflict. The authors find that even 
though diplomatic interventions (mediations) are effective and strategic tools in conflict 
management, they alter the sequence of events in a civil conflict. Moreover, Walter (2002) 
claims that mediation, by offering guarantees, can overcome the commitment problem which 
is seen as a major predicament to negotiation during civil wars by many scholars (Walter 1997; 
Walter, 2002; Powell, 2006; Mattes & Savun, 2009). On the other hand, other works not only 
focus on mediation attempts, but also the mediator`s neutral and honest role for the success of 
the mediation (Kydd, 2003; Svensson, 2009). Accordingly, Svensson (2009) argues that 
mediators whose primary interest is to end the war are more likely to lead to a peaceful 
agreement than biased mediators whose interests are to protect their protégés. 
2.5. Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter has presented the knowledge of the extant literature on negotiation in civil 
conflicts. The analysis above suggests that scholars have treated negotiation differently: either 
as a conflict termination or as a process. It also indicates that the most pronounced theories in 
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the literature, such as Bargaining Theory and Ripeness Theory, focuses on the cost of conflict 
to explain the occurrence of negotiation. The chapter has attempted to collect the suggested 
indicators of negotiation in the literature under three main groups. The first group consists of 
the indicators which are believed to measure “the cost of conflict”. The second group which 
includes the variables concerning the characteristic of conflict is suggested to account for ‘the 
type of conflict” dimension. Last, the chapter has attempted to gather the literature`s knowledge 
on the dissertation`s suggested indicators as a new theoretical framework: costs and benefits of 
negotiation. Next chapter explains the methods and methodology of this research.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS AND METHODOLOGY 
"If I can`t picture it, I can`t understand it." 
Albert Einstein 
 This study both quantitatively and qualitatively assesses the occurrence of negotiations 
during civil conflicts under given conditions. As indicated in Chapter 2, the extant literature 
lacks insight on how negotiations may carry some costs and benefits to the sides involved. 
Moreover, Chapter 1 highlighted both the critical need for understanding the conditions leading 
to negotiations and the current lack of accurate measurements for the costs and benefits of 
negotiating during civil conflicts.   
  To address the goals of this study, this dissertation has developed a mixed approach 
that supports the descriptive nature of the research. This chapter discusses the overall research 
design, data analysis activities, the population studied, and data collection. Further, the chapter 
highlights methodological issues and limitations the data and methods may encompass.   
3.1. Research Design 
 This dissertation uses a mixed approach, combining both qualitative and quantitative 
methods in order to grasp a thorough understanding of the conditions that prepare the 
foundations for negotiations to occur during civil conflicts. Both methods have their advantages 
and disadvantages. However, quantitative research has been the most commonly used 
assessment method in peace and conflict research for several reasons. First, the available 
datasets on armed conflicts allow researchers to conduct quantitative research more 
conveniently than qualitative research. Second, quantitative research enables researchers to 
generalize results from a larger sample, which is a common goal of peace and conflict 
researchers due to the general lack of understanding in the literature on the causes of peace and 
war. Further, to answer the research questions in this study regarding the conditions needed for 
negotiations, the calculation of the costs and benefits of negotiation (and the differences in the 
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decision to negotiate by warring dyads) calls for a quantitative research design utilizing a large 
collection of data. This is partially due to these questions needing a standard measurement for 
different calculations, behaviors, and characteristics of various governments and insurgent 
groups to be applied in a generalizable way in order to put forward practical political agendas 
and implementable actions for peace and resolution. 
 However, acknowledging that there is no single pathway toward negotiation, it is 
believed that generalization of the negotiation process for all civil conflicts would result in an 
oversimplification of the issue. Therefore, it has been found necessary to conduct four case 
studies as qualitative research in order to gain an understanding of the individual cases while 
comparing them with each other in the hope of explaining the motivations and underlying 
reasons behind negotiations in light of the country`s internal dynamics and critical junctures 
that have occurred along the way.  
Logistic Analysis 
For quantitative analysis this study conducted a logistic regression on secondary 
aggregate data. Relying upon the Armed Conflict Database UCDP/PRIO (Gleditsch et al, 2002) 
as the main data source, it combines several datasets as well in order to account for all 
independent variables (Gleditsch, et al., 2002). Detailed information on the datasets is provided 
in the Data Collection section.  
Since the study has a dichotomous dependent variable, the occurrence of negotiation in 
a given dyad-year, logistic regression is a well-suited method for such analysis. In the logistic 
regression, a set of indicators derived from the literature regarding the negotiation outcome 
was tested. In conflict and peace research, regression is one of the most commonly used 
methods for predicting the outcome since most studies take war and peace as dichotomous 
dependent variables. In this case, however, the presence of negotiation stands for “one,” and 
no negotiation accounts for “zero.” Other scholarship handling similar dependent variables 
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have also made use of the various forms of logistic regression. Accordingly, Heger and Jung 
(2015) rely on logistic regression with their binary dependent variable which shows whether 
the dyad in question has held “talks” in a given year. Similarly, Hultquist (2013) uses 
multinomial logistic regression for his three unordered outcomes: ceasefire, government 
victory, and insurgent victory. On the other hand, Findley (2013) makes use of a nested logit 
regression since the author has an ordered and sequential outcome: “0,” negotiation not started; 
“1,” negotiations held; “2,” agreement reached; and “3,” successful implementation.  
As seen from the extant literature, studies of conflict resolution which have binary or 
sequential dependent variables rely heavily on logistic analysis and its various forms based on 
the research. In the logistic analysis, after the regression is estimated, the results are used to 
predict the probability of the dependent variable’s occurrences. This study used logistic 
regression to estimate the likelihood of the occurrence of negotiation. However, Beck, et al. 
(2000), have questioned the quality of predictions made by a logistic regression, criticizing the 
studies for attempting to test the risk of conflict on a set of indicators. The authors argue that 
most studies using logistic regression limit their focus to the effect of independent variables 
and do not take the prediction seriously. On the other hand, later studies of significance on the 
causes of civil wars did not consider this issue significant (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon, 
2005). Nevertheless, being aware of the possible limitations of logistic regression, this 
dissertation has supplemented the analysis with additional chi-square tests and case studies for 
a more thorough understanding of the phenomena.  
Cross Sectional Analysis 
For the logistic regression, a cross-sectional study was selected over longitudinal or 
time series analyses. This is because cross-sectional study serves best for this study`s interest 
in explaining the conditions needed for negotiation during civil conflicts for a number of 
reasons. First, most of the independent variables (especially regarding the characteristics of 
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governments and insurgent groups) do not show significant variance over time. For instance, a 
longitudinal study which observes the same subject over a period of time would not explain 
the occurrence of a negotiation any more than the cross-sectional study did since most of the 
variables stay the same in a given dyad over time. Second, the nature of the research question 
calls for explanations of the relationship between the occurrence of negotiation and the 
suggested conditions (the hypotheses). As such, the study is not interested in understanding the 
change in conditions over time, or how it has affected the outcome. Therefore, it takes every 
dyad-year as an independent case without concerning the factor of time. Moreover, this 
approach is in line with most of the other studies which have focused on similar research 
questions (Walter, 1997; Walter, 2001; Findley, 2013; Kaplow, 2015).  
Case Study 
Regarding qualitative research, this study has made use of four individual case studies. 
The way cases were selected for the study serves the research`s interest perfectly since it allows 
for comparison among the conditions of negotiation and the dyad groups. With the chosen 
cases studies, this assessment sought to mitigate the pitfalls that the logistic regression had 
failed to explain. In a case study, one of the most crucial elements is to decide how to select 
the cases while also ruling out the risk of a biased analysis. Therefore, in this dissertation, how 
the cases were selected is of utmost importance and is thus explained in detail within the Data 
Analysis section later in the chapter.   
George and Bennett (2005) placed great emphasis on the many advantages of case 
studies over other methods. First, they are beneficial for conceptual validity, which enables 
researchers to measure the indicators in a way that best presents the theoretical concepts. 
Second, since researchers are not limited to a well-defined dataset in case studies they can 
identify additional variables and formulate new hypotheses. Third, case studies are helpful for 
exploring complex causal relations, intricate interaction effects, and path dependencies 
65 
 
 
 
 
(Stardman, 2013). Lastly, Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that case studies help researchers to 
understand the cases which do not act in ways suggested they would by the rules established 
by theory.  
Based on the aforementioned advantages of a case study, it seems to be a great fit for 
this dissertation`s interest. Accordingly, although the indicators of negotiations are measured 
in the dataset, most of them are still conceptual variables. Therefore, it is to the researcher`s 
advantage to give more flexibility to the measurement of the concepts with the assistance of 
in-depth cultural and historical analysis provided by case studies. Moreover, it is difficult to 
explain why some cases did not behave in the way that the study expected.  Therefore, case 
studies have been a great assistance for deriving alternative variables and hypotheses. Also, 
while the logistic regression does not promise any explanation about the causal relationship 
between variables, the causality of the relationship between variables was still able to be 
claimed.   
However, some limitations of case studies have been suggested (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
First, it is not possible to extract a generalization based on a single case study. Second, the 
study may present bias verification since researchers have a tendency to confirm their 
predetermined ideas. Nonetheless, these limitations offer limited to no threat to this 
dissertation. This is because it is not the goal of this dissertation to generalize the idea of a 
specific case study or other cases. The goal is simply to understand why the case itself did go 
in that specific way. Selection of the cases has further ruled out any bias verification because 
this dissertation utilizes four distinctly different cases, only one of which provides verification 
to the theory. It should also be noted that the case studies in this dissertation have played only 
a supplementary role to the main analysis derived through logistic regression. While during 
some cases the role of some of the indicators was able to be verified, in others it was concluded 
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that they were not as effective as suggested and thus alternative explanations were able to be 
presented for the outcome.  
 Overall, this study has attempted to avoid the conception in social sciences that a single 
research method should be chosen over the others. Accordingly, it approaches quantitative and 
qualitative research as being complementary as opposed to rivals. Todd Jick (1979) encourages 
social scientists to use multiple methods, so long as they can justify the need and effectiveness 
of the particular combination of methods. Moreover, the prominent work of Walter (2002) on 
the subject argues similarly about the necessity of multiple research methods. Accordingly, 
Walter puts forward that, with the help of statistical analysis, researches can compare many 
cases at once and thus examine patterns that would not be revealed by the mere observation of 
a small number of cases. This, in return, helps researchers make meaningful generalizations. 
However, Walter (2002) also draws attention to the limitations of statistical analysis. As such, 
statistical analysis is not helpful for explaining the causality of the relationship between 
independent and dependent variables. Further, it cannot explain why some cases act in an 
unpredicted way in comparison to that suggested by the theory. In this dissertation, this is where 
case studies contribute and assist in understanding how historical events and cultural issues 
have affected the decision to negotiate or fight.   
3.2. Population and Sample 
In this study, the unit of analysis is the “dyad-year,” which stands for a government 
group and an insurgent group being in conflict with one another in a given year. Dyadic forms 
carry some advantages over alternatives such as country-year. First of all, while country-year 
analysis is solely focused on the country and state characteristics (such as the level of 
development, regime type, and ethnic constellation), they tend to ignore the attributes of 
various insurgent groups as if they are out there ready to negotiate when the other conditions 
are present. However, this dissertation derives from the notion put forward by Cunningham, et 
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al. (2009), that “it takes two” to negotiate. Similarly, Salehyan, et al. (2008), argue that “cross-
national empirical studies of civil war generally ignore the identity of the actors involved in a 
conflict” (Salehyan, et al, 2008, p.2). Accordingly, to understand the negotiation calculation 
from the perspective of both warring parties and to take their characteristics into the 
consideration, the research has been structured as dyad-years.  
To determine what might be considered an armed conflict, this study has relied on the 
definition established by the Armed Conflict Database UCPD/PRIO, being “a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force 
between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 
battle-related deaths in a calendar year” (Gleditsch, et al, 2002). Since the study was designed 
in dyadic form, then, the UCDP/PRIO Dyadic Dataset has been relied upon to determine all 
dyads in intrastate armed conflicts during the same time period.  A dyad consists of a contested 
incompatibility over governance and/or territory between a government and a non-state actor, 
resulting in 25 battle-related deaths during a year (Harbom, et al., 2008). This dataset includes 
all dyads in civil conflicts that fell under the given definition.  
It is important to note that the 25 battle-related death threshold is more encompassing 
than other datasets on armed conflicts, such as the Correlates of War Project (COW) which has 
a 1000 battle-related death threshold for a case to be considered civil war. The 25 battle-related 
death threshold not only allows more cases to be included in the study, but also enables analysis 
of the differences between the conflicts with more than 1000 battle-related deaths (coded as 
major conflicts in the data) and the ones with less than 1000 battle-related deaths (coded as low 
level conflicts in the data). In the end, 991 dyad-years were observed, which included low level 
and major internal armed conflicts between 1989 and 2008 and taking place around the world. 
Time restriction of the data is due to the unavailability of data about all variables outside this 
period.   
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Data Collection 
While this research relies on the Armed Conflict Database UCDP/PRIO as the main 
data source, it combines a variety of datasets in order to accommodate for all the variables 
(Gleditsch, et al., 2002). These datasets are the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset 
(NSA) introduced by Cunningham and his colleagues (2013), the Reputation of Terror Groups 
dataset (RTG) by Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu (2016), International Military Intervention 
dataset (IMI) of Pearson and Baumann (1988) and updated by Pickering and Kisangani (2009), 
and the CIRI Human Rights Data Project designed by Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay (2014).  
The choice of combining these datasets in this study lies in the theoretical and 
methodological choice of the research. These datasets are well suited for the dissertation in 
comparison to the alternatives covering this subject matter. In the next section their limitations 
and strengths will be explained as well as why they have been preferred over other datasets.   
The UCDP Dataset. 
 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is one of the main data sources on 
organized violence, having been started at Uppsala University in Sweden during the 1980s 
(Sousa, 2014). Since 1993, data on armed conflicts produced by the UCDP has been published 
in the Journal of Peace Research. Although there other data sources on armed conflicts are 
available, this data program carries some advantages over others such as the Correlates of War 
Project (COW) and the Minority at Risk Research (MAR). First, the main difference between 
the COW and UCDP datasets is their inclusion of cases; while the COW has a 1000 battle-
related death threshold for a conflict to be categorized as civil war, the UCDP lowers this 
threshold to 25 and allows researchers to analyze low intensity conflicts (less than 1000 deaths) 
and civil wars (more than 1000 deaths). Since one of the interests of this study is to explain the 
difference between low-level conflicts and major conflicts when it comes to the decision to 
engage in negotiations, the choice was made to use the UCDP data. This distinction was 
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included in the analysis by coding conflicts which do not reach the 1000 battle-related death 
threshold as minor conflicts and conflict with more than 1000 battle-related deaths as wars. 
Second, while the MAR provides detailed information about ethnic groups, its scope of area is 
limited to Middle Eastern and African countries. Therefore, the UCDP data allowed broader 
coverage of conflicts around the world. Another aspect of the dataset that made itself suitable 
for the research was its compatibility with the other datasets that were combined.   
 The collection of the UCDP data is performed in four stages. Searching words related 
to organized violence in the online Factiva Global News Database, which has a global coverage 
monitoring newspapers, newswires, and other sources (including Reuters, AFP, Xinhua, EFE, 
and the BBC) initiates the first stage. Then, the gathered information is coded according to the 
criterion of the UCDP coding system and categorization. In the second stage, the coders 
continue their search of online databases for organized violence published in books, case 
studies, articles, journals (i.e. Africa Research Bulletin and Africa Confidential), and NGO 
publications (such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International). This information is 
also coded manually according to the UCDP coding system, and if there is a change identified 
since the previous information it is updated according to the new information. In the third stage 
the coders turn to the UCDP`s broad network of regional experts to assist in clarifying the 
information if anything is missing such as why an actor is fighting, the number of deaths, or 
other factors regarding the conflict. The data collected is then checked by the UCDP`s project 
managers and directors in the last stage.  
The Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA). 
 The Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset was developed by Cunningham, 
Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013). This dataset contains information about the non-state 
organizations included in the UCDP Dyadic dataset. Therefore, The UCDP and NSA datasets 
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are compatible with each other because the NSA provides detailed information about state-
rebel group dyads included in the UCDP and relies on the same definitions and coding system.  
 Data provided in this dissertation from the NSA offered a significant ability to 
understand the insurgent groups. While the literature`s extreme focus on the country-level 
characteristics of the conflicts typically ignores the roles of non-state actors, this dissertation 
was able to grasp the negotiation calculation while taking the characteristics of the insurgent 
groups into account as well. Accordingly, the data offered information on the conflict such as 
rebel strengths, territorial control of insurgent groups, organizational structures, and external 
supports, as well as other attributes of non-state actors (Cunningham, et al., 2013).  
 In the data collection process, the authors relied mostly on the UCDP Conflict 
Encyclopedia, which is a reliable and invaluable source of information on the number of troops 
which governments and insurgents have and the presence of external support to both sides 
(Cunningham, 2013). Since the UCDP data is limited to the time period after 1975, the authors 
relied on other sources in order to expand the data back to 1945, their main sources being 
“Keesing’s Record of World Events, news reports found through searches in Lexis–Nexis 
academic and secondary academic sources about individual conflicts and countries” 
(Cunningham, et al., 2013, p.521).   
It is crucial to note that the NSA data played a major role in this research. One of its 
contributions was to allow dyadic research to be conducted because it provided information 
about insurgent groups. This was its primary contribution to the study. Based on this data, this 
dissertation argues that a thorough understanding of a negotiation can be acquired through the 
understanding of every single actor involved, a simple premise that somehow has yet been 
missing in peace research. Another advantage of the database is that it uses an ordinal scale to 
measure its variables, which gives the researcher more variance to observe. For instance, the 
variable which shows whether the insurgent group has control over the country`s territory is 
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coded as being either low, medium, or high. On the other hand, one disadvantage of the data 
for this research may be that it is not structured as annual observations like the data used by the 
UCDP. However, its conversion to annual forms was possible, and shows the changes in 
insurgent group characteristics over time.  
The Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset (RTG). 
 The Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset (RTG) introduced by Tokdemir and 
Akcinaroglu (2016) measures the reputation terror groups hold with their constituency and 
target audience based on their activities. Built on the Global Terrorism Dataset (GTD), this 
dataset covers all terrorist activities around the world from 1970 through 2016 (START, 2017). 
It has an extensive sample size covering all terrorist groups in the years between 1980 and 
2011, making up 443 terror groups and a total of 2641 observations. RTG data excludes 
terrorist groups which have less than five terrorist activities between 1980 and 2011 in order to 
narrow its focus to the reputation of groups that have been able to survive over some time 
(Tokdemir & Akcinaroglu, 2016).  
 One of the major advantages of RTG is that this has been the first attempt to measure 
the popularity of terrorist groups. While most studies on terrorism assume all terrorist activities 
cause similar ends, this data shows how different activities of terrorists may build positive or 
negative reputations for them. Therefore, the data allows the researcher to compare different 
terrorist groups. In this study, the reputation of a terrorist group was used to understand its 
effect on the negotiation calculus of the government.  
The data provided an ordinal measure of the positive and negative reputations of 
terrorist groups, ranging between 0 and 3. When it comes to the validity of indicators of 
reputation in the data, the authors used factor analysis with the principal components factor 
method so as to make sure they used the appropriate variable for each index (Tokdemir & 
Akcinaroglu, 2016). However, one limitation of the data may be how it treats the missing data. 
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Accordingly, when there was missing information in a year, it was filled based on the 
information about the last data point. For instance, if the information about a terrorist group`s 
media outlet was present in 2003, 2004, and 2006, while 2005 was missing, RTG filled 2005 
with the same information in 2006 on the assumption that the media continued in that year as 
well (Tokdemir & Akcinaroglu, 2016).   
International Military Intervention Dataset (IMI). 
 International Military Intervention Dataset was first introduced by Pearson and 
Baumann (1993), and covers military intervention from 1946 through 1989. Then, Pickering 
and Kisangani (2009) updated the data through 2005.  
 While collecting the data used in the updating process, the authors used eight main 
sources, six of which were news wire sources while another two were major newspapers. 
Namely, these sources were the AP, UPI, Reuters, Agence France Press, Interfax (a Russian 
NGO news service), Xinhua (official press agency of China), the New York Times, and Le 
Monde. The Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe was used to conduct a search through these 
sources. To secure the reliability of the data, a team consisting of five advanced undergraduate 
and four graduate students was assembled and each student and principle investigator 
independently complied information on interventions through these eight sources. The PIs then 
analyzed all the information gathered by the students and had the final determination about 
inclusion of the data. To rule out any possible biases which may harm the reliability of the data-
collection, the authors developed a standardized data-collection procedure for the students 
monitor. Further, they conducted a set of tests for inter-coder reliability. As for the concern 
over validity, the authors asked a number of outside scholars to independently examine their 
materials and codebook (Pickering & Kisangani, 2009).  
 For this dissertation, the IMI data has some advantages over its alternatives. First, while 
the other datasets commonly used in the literature [such as the Militarized Interstate Disputes 
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(MID), Military Intervention by Powerful States (MIPS), and Tillema`s (1989) military 
intervention data] solely focus on hostile military intervention against state actors, the IMI data 
covers every intervention regardless of its purpose. Moreover, while the IMI data is more 
inclusive, it codes the interventions as opposing the government, supporting the government, 
or neutral (Pickering & Kisangani, 2009). On the other hand, MIPS data provides information 
only about major-scale power interventions by five permanent members of the UN. However, 
the IMI data contains information about both minor and major intervention actions of the five 
members as well as interventions launched by non-major powers. With these advantages of the 
data, it fit perfectly with the dyadic nature of this dissertation allowing an understanding of 
how the presence and purpose of interventions played a role in the negotiation calculation of 
parties involved in civil conflict.  
The CIRI Human Rights Data Project. 
The CIRI Human Rights Data project provides information about the extent 
governments respect human rights for almost every country around the world. In addition it 
includes fifteen internationally recognized human right activities [including Political and 
Other Extrajudicial Killings (or defined as Arbitrary or Unlawful - Deprivation of Life), 
Disappearance, Torture, Political Imprisonment, Freedom of Speech and Press, Freedom of 
Religion, Freedom of Domestic Movement, Freedom of Foreign Movement and Travel, 
Freedom of Assembly and Association, Electoral Self-Determination, Worker Rights, Women’s 
Political Rights, Women’s Economic Rights, Independent Judiciary, and Women’s Social 
Rights] to measure each government`s respect for human rights across 195 countries between 
1981 and 2011 (Cingranelli & Richards, 2014).   
The CIRI project argues it is a non-governmental organization which is independent of 
the influence of any governments, not accepting funds from government institutions or 
formulating contracts between them, therefore, it does not serve as an extension of any 
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government (Cingranelli & Richards, 2010). The data, for all of its variables, rely on the US 
State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and Amnesty International`s 
Annual Reports. When there is a contradiction between these two sources, coders use the latter 
for rendering their final decision. Moreover, coders turn to other reliable news sources (such 
as the New York Times, BBC, Washington Post, LA Times, Reuters, AP, and Agence France-
Presse) to confirm the collected information (Cingranelli & Richards, 2014).  
In the data, units are coded in the country-year format. CIRI data code only government 
violations of human rights against its own citizens and within their own country`s borders. 
Therefore, government violations of human rights for non-citizens and outside the country`s 
borders are not included in the data. Further, the data are not concerned about the geographic 
concentration of the violations within the country, focusing only on the overall number of 
occurrences in each country. In addition the CIRI data set codes only human rights practices 
of governments without concerning the overall human rights condition in the country or its 
human rights policies. This means that the data codes only human rights practices of 
governments and its agencies. However, the condition of human rights in a country may be 
influenced by other factors such as the presence of foreign companies and non-state actors.  
Therefore, the overall human rights condition in the country is not taken into consideration. 
Similarly, human rights policies (such as legislation and incorporation in the constitution of a 
country) may be different from their actual practice. For this reason, the data is not concerned 
about the human rights policies of a country (Cingranell & Richards, 2014). 
Wood and Gibney (2010) criticized the CIRI data from three main perspectives. First, 
the authors argued that the CIRI data set uses an arbitrary threshold to create ordinal scales. As 
such, the CIRI codes zero violations as “2” (full respect); 1-49 violations as “1” (moderate 
respect); and more than 50 violations as “0” (no respect). The authors continue to argue that 
this, in turn, causes a country with 3001 violations and a country with 51 violations to receive 
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the same score in respect to human rights violations. Lastly, the authors criticized the data for 
not giving countries like Canada and New Zealand, which are known for their respect of human 
rights, perfect CIRI index scores.   
On the other hand, Cingranelli and Richards (2010) explain the quality of the coding 
procedure and reliability of the CIRI data by responding to all of these criticisms. The authors 
acknowledge that the threshold they placed to measure their ordinal scales are arbitrary 
numbers; however, they are based on the years of reading reports available to them. They also 
gave the example of the 1000 battle-related deaths threshold used in the Correlates of War 
project data, which has shaped war and peace research for use and was also derived arbitrarily 
yet based on expertise in the field. Moreover, when it comes to the second criticism of the data, 
they accept this limitation yet continued to argue that this issue does not pertain to the CIRI 
data per se, but the problem of all datasets. Lastly, about not giving a perfect score to the 
countries known as “best,” the authors argued that they do not consider relative respect of 
countries but rather they rank countries according to an absolute standard of behaviors.  For 
instance, Cingranelli and Richards (2010) state that due to Amnesty International`s report of 
police and guard brutality in the United States, such as “prison rapes (torture); the 
imprisonment of suspected terrorists without access to lawyers or the right to a trial (political 
imprisonment); and the continued use of tasers by police….,” (p.409), the US receives a low 
score on these human rights practices. What is more, the authors report that they found a 0.94 
Krippendorff`s r-bar intercoder reliability test score in the data in 2004, which is considered 
very high given the fact that 0 represents “no reliability” and 1 represents “perfect relaibilty” 
(Cingranelli & Richards, 2010). 
3.3. Data Analysis 
 The central goal of this study is to provide a better understanding of negotiations during 
civil conflicts and the conditions leading to the warring parties’ willingness to negotiate. In 
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addition to testing the proposed hypotheses by using overall aggregate data analysis, 
supplementary comparative case studies have also been included to illustrate pitfalls that the 
logistic regression analysis has failed to explain. Further, to explain the relationship between 
mediation and negotiation, a subset analysis has been conducted by relying on mediation and 
negotiation events in internal armed conflicts data which is built on the UCDP dataset 
(Svensson, 2007).  
Logistic Analysis Research Design 
In order to explain the relationship between the costs and benefits of negotiation and 
the occurrences of negotiation, all civil conflicts occurring from 1989 to 2008 have been 
identified by using the Armed Conflict Database UCDP/PRIO.  These years have been chosen 
since the dependent variable (negotiation) acquired from the UCDP Database Categorical 
Variables is only available for the conflicts occurring in this time period (Gleditsch, et al, 2002). 
Then, for the dyadic form, the UCDP/PRIO Dyadic Dataset was relied upon (Harbom, et al, 
2008). Also, the data were combined with the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict (NSA), 
Reputation of Terror Groups dataset (RTG), and International Military Intervention (IMI) 
datasets to accommodate for, respectively, the characteristics of the insurgent groups, terrorist 
events, and foreign military intervention variables. In addition, the CIRI Human Rights Data 
Project was utilized to account for the government`s respect for human rights.  
To test the hypotheses in this dissertation, the overall aggregate data consisting of 991 
units of dyad-years in a time period from 1989 through 2008 is relied upon, and a logistic 
regression analysis of various models where all indicators are tested separately and in 
combinations, and one final model including all indicators, is included in the study.  
In addition to these models, a subset Chi-square analysis was conducted in order to see 
the relationship between third party mediation efforts and a negotiation outcome. For this 
subset analysis, the dataset on mediation and negotiation events presented by Svensson (2007), 
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which is also built on the UCDP dataset, was utilized. There were several reasons for 
conducting a subset analysis. First, this study`s main dataset is not suited to testing the effect 
of mediation properly. Second, Svenssons`s data provide detailed information about mediation 
and third parties. However, one downside of the MIC data is that they are limited to the years 
between 1989 and 2003. 
Case Study Research Design  
For a better understanding of the negotiation process during civil conflicts, it is 
important to support the identified conditions needed for negotiation with as many cases as 
possible in order to provide soundness to the proposed theory. As Pearson and Lounsbery 
(2009) noted, “no matter how compelling a theory may seem, if we, as a field of conflict 
resolution researchers, have not provided evidence to support theory, we run the risk of 
misleading practitioners, students, and scholars alike” (p.71). In the end, every conflict has its 
own cultural and psychological dynamics. Findings should be confirmed with case studies. 
Stedman (1991) stresses that more case studies are needed to give additional insights into 
conflict resolution so that applicable theories can be developed.  
To respond to the call of scholars for this necessity of integrating applicable case 
studies, this dissertation has examined four conflict dyads in detail. Moreover, how this 
dissertation has structured the case study analyses presents two major advantages. First, four 
cases were divided into two pairs of cases in which dyads were considered similar between 
them in terms of negotiation probability (high and low). Second, the selection of cases was 
chosen dependent on the results of the logistic regression analysis. To avoid a biased 
interpretation of cases, particular attention was paid to the warning of Most and Starr (1982) 
that scholars should focus on all possibilities of both independent and dependent variables, 
which means including cases with the occurrence (X) and nonoccurrence (-X) of some 
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independent variables and the occurrence (Y) and nonoccurrence (-Y) of some dependent 
variables. Therefore, representative cases in an analysis should include “X, -X, Y, -Y”.  
Accordingly, since logistic regression provides researchers with the probabilities of an 
outcome, based on the logistic results, the decision was made to select: (1) one case with the 
highest probability of negotiation which has experienced negotiation in fact; (2) one case with 
the highest probability of negotiation which has not experienced negotiation; (3) one case with 
the lowest probability of negotiation which has experienced negotiation; (4) one case with the 
lowest probability of negotiation which has not experienced negotiation. According to 
Flyvbjerg`s (2006) categorization of the strategies for selecting cases, this system may be 
considered information-oriented selection, which aims to maximize the utility of information 
from small samples. Accordingly, “cases are selected on the basis of expectations about their 
information content” (Flybvbjerg, 2006, p.230). Moreover, it is necessary to note that not all 
negotiations discuss the same matters. While some may lead to peace agreements, others 
discuss prisoner exchanges, ceasefires, or similar agreements. Therefore, this study has paid 
attention to the negotiation matter in cases while simultaneously comparing them. By doing so, 
the dissertation provides a comprehensive explanation across both similar and different dyads 
and is able to explain what kinds of unpredicted conditions have played a role in favor of or 
against negotiation. Moreover, case studies provided a better understanding of the cultural, 
historical, and group dynamics supporting the discovered explanations.  
Operationalization of Variables for the Logistic Regression 
Table 1 below summarizes the operationalization of the variables in logistic regression. 
Accordingly, the table includes the description of variables, their roles in the research (i.e. 
dependent variable, independent variable, and control variable), how they are measured, and 
from what dataset they were derived. 
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Table 3.1.Variables, Descriptions, Level of Measurement, Sources of Data: Logistic 
Regression 
Variables  Description Level of Measurement Data 
Source 
Dependent Variable 
Negotiation The Presence of any talks 
involving both parties to the 
conflict and concerning 
conflict-related issues 
Dummy (0=no negotiation, 
1=negotiation)  
UCDP  
Control Variables (Representing the Cost of War Theory) 
Battle-related 
Deaths  
The number of battle-related 
deaths in the conflict in a given 
year 
Logged UCDP  
Duration Measure of how many years 
have passed since the first start 
date of the conflict, measured 
in years 
Integral UCDP  
Stalemate Measure of whether the 
government and insurgent`s 
military capacity is at parity 
Dummy (0=no stalemate, 
1=stalemate) 
NSA  
Territory Control Measure of insurgent group`s 
territorial control in the 
country 
Dummy (0=no control, 
1=control) 
NSA 
Independent Variables - Hypotheses (Representing the Costs/Benefits of Negotiation) 
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Variables  Description Level of Measurement Data 
Source 
Reputation 
Hypothesis 
The number of insurgent 
groups fighting with the 
government in a given year  
Integral UCDP  
Legitimacy 
Hypothesis 
The presence of the insurgent`s 
link to a political party 
Dummy (0=no link,  
1=link) 
NSA 
Valid Spokesman 
Hypothesis 
Measure of whether there is a 
central leadership 
Nominal (1=low, 
2=moderate, 3=high) 
NSA 
External 
Pressure 
Hypotheses 
 
  a-Transnational 
Constituency 
 
  b-Outside 
Pressure 
 
 
 
 
1-whether the insurgent group 
has a transnational link 
 
2-whether the insurgent group 
receives military support from 
an external state and/or a non-
state actor 
 
 
 
 
1-Dummy (0=no 
transnational link, 1= 
transnational link) 
2-a. Dummy (0=no external 
state support, 1=external 
state support) 
 
    b.  Dummy (0=no non-
state actor support, 1=non-
state actor support) 
 
 
 
 
NSA 
 
 
NSA 
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Variables  Description Level of Measurement Data 
Source 
Terrorism 1-Positive Constituency 
Reputation of the Terrorist 
Organizations 
 
2-Negative Constituency 
Reputation of the Terrorist 
Organization 
 
3-Target Audience Reputation 
of the Terrorist Organization 
1-ordinal scale (ranges from 
0 to 3) 
 
 
2-ordinal scale (ranges from 
0 to 3) 
 
 
3-ordinal scale (ranges from 
0 to 2) 
RTG  
Third Party 
Intervention 
Measure of whether there is a 
biased foreign military 
intervention to the conflict by 
another state 
Dummy (0=unbiased 
intervention, 1=biased 
intervention) 
IMI  
Human Rights 
Hypothesis 
 
   1-Physical 
Integrity Rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1-measure of indicators of 
human right violations 
including torture, extrajudicial 
killing, political imprisonment, 
and disappearance 
 
 
 
1- Physical Right Index - 
ordinal (ranges from 0 
(being no respect four these 
four rights) to 8 (being full 
 
 
 
CIRI  
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Variables  Description Level of Measurement Data 
Source 
 
 
 2-Empowerment 
Rights 
 
 
2-measure of indicators of 
human rights violations 
including the Freedom of 
Movement, Freedom of 
Speech, Workers’ Rights, 
Political Participation, and 
Freedom of Religion indicators 
respect for these four 
rights).  
2-Empowerment Rights 
Index – ordinal (ranges 
from 0 (being no respect 
four these four rights) to 14 
(being full respect for these 
four rights). 
 
 
CIRI 
Control Variables (Representing Types of the Conflict) 
Incompatibility Describes the issue that the 
conflict is fought over 
Dummy (0=governance, 
1=territory) 
UCDP  
The intensity of 
Conflict 
 
Describes the magnitude of the 
conflict in terms of number of 
deaths  
Dummy (0=minor conflict, 
1=major conflict) 
UCDP 
The actors 
involved 
Describes whether there is 
other states involved in the 
conflict.   
Dummy 
(0=internationalized, 
1=internal) 
UCDP 
Data Sources: UCDP (the Uppsala Conflict Dataset Project), NSA (Non-State Actor Dataset), 
IMI (International Military Intervention Dataset), RTG (Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset), 
CIRI (The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Project) 
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Dependent Variable. 
 The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of negotiation, which takes values of 
one if there were any negotiations in the dyad during year and zero otherwise. In the analysis, 
any talks involving both parties to the conflict and concerning conflict-related issues such as 
ceasefires, exchanges of prisoners, or the creation of humanitarian zones, are considered to be 
negotiations.   
Independent Variables. 
The costs and benefits of negotiation were measured by several indicators. To test the 
reputation hypothesis, a simple measure of the number of insurgent groups fighting with the 
government was created, simply counting the number of insurgent groups fighting with the 
same government in a given year.  
To test the legitimacy hypothesis, a measure adopted from the NSA dataset was utilized. 
Accordingly, a dichotomous measure which takes a value of one if the insurgent group has a 
political link but otherwise zero was included.  
To test the valid spokesman hypothesis, an ordinal measure was constructed by relying 
on the NSA dataset, which indicates the strength of central leadership in the insurgent group 
as low, moderate, and high. This hypothesis assumes that if the insurgent has a high level of 
centralized leadership, the government would know whom to speak with and the occurrence of 
negotiation thus becomes more likely.  
As for the effect of outside actors on talks between governments and insurgent groups, 
two hypotheses have been proposed: transnational constituency and outside support. To test 
outside support, two dichotomous variables have been included which indicate whether the 
insurgent group receives military support from an external state and/or non-state actor. By 
doing so, the study helps to differentiate between the effects of different source of support for 
insurgent groups on the occurrence of negotiation. A value of one is given to the non-state actor 
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support variable if the insurgent group is supported by at least one non-state actor in a different 
country, otherwise remaining zero. The external state support variable takes the value of one if 
the insurgent group receives military support from at least one external state. To test the 
transnational constituency hypothesis, a dichotomous variable created by the NSA dataset has 
been adopted. The measure of transnational constituency of an insurgent group takes the value 
of one if the insurgent group has a transnational link to and/or is supported in a non-military 
manner by another non-state actor in other states, otherwise remaining zero. 
To test the terrorism hypothesis, positive and negative constituency reputation as well 
as target audience reputation scales used for the Reputation of Terrorist Groups datasets (RTG) 
introduced by Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu (2016) have been adopted. The dataset includes all 
terrorist organizations listed in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD Advisory Board, 2017). 
These scales of positive and negative constituency reputation are ordinal variables, taking a 
value between 0 and 3. To measure the positive constituency of terrorist groups, the dataset 
uses an additive index that includes public good provision, media power, and political 
existence. To account for the negative reputation of terrorist groups, the dataset uses an additive 
index that includes forced recruitment, child recruitment, and forced funding. Moreover, the 
dataset incorporates another additive index, taking value from 0 to 2, which indicates whether 
the terrorist group conducts extreme violence against civilians and targeting children.     
For the third-party intervention variable, use was made of the International Military 
Intervention dataset (IMI) in order to code third party military intervention(s) for the given 
year. IMI dataset codes all foreign military intervention in civil conflicts from 1989 to 2005 
and provides information about the directions (intentions) of these interventions labeling them 
as neutral, supporting government, supporting rebels, opposing government, and opposing 
rebels. Accordingly, two dichotomous variable were created. One dichotomous measure which 
takes the value of one if there was a foreign military intervention in the country regardless of 
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the intervener`s intention, otherwise remaining zero, was included. Also, another dichotomous 
variable was created to indicate whether the intervention was biased or unbiased. Accordingly, 
the interventions opposing governments or insurgents and the ones supporting either parties 
were coded as biased intervention while neutral interventions (not supporting either parties) 
were coded as unbiased interventions.  
As for the human rights hypothesis, Physical Integrity Rights and Empowerment Rights 
indexes from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project index have been adopted (Cingranelli, et 
al., 2014). The Physical Integrity Right index includes four indicators (torture, extrajudicial 
killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance) and ranges from 0 (being no respect for 
these four rights) to 8 (mainting full respect for these four rights). The latter index consists of 
the Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly & 
Association, Workers’ Rights, Electoral Self-Determination, and Freedom of Religion 
indicators. It ranges from 0 (being no respect for these rights) to 14 (being full respect for these 
rights).  
Control Variables. 
Since the literature places a heavy emphasis on the cost of conflict, this study uses it as 
a control variable. Relying on the extant literature, four indicators have been used to measure 
the cost of the conflict. Accordingly, the first indicator is the number of battle-related deaths in 
a given year. The number of deaths shows much variance across the dyad-years; therefore, it 
is better measured of in terms of ratios than difference. Accordingly, the effect of number of 
deaths on negotiation outcome by one unit increase in death would be meaningless. Therefore, 
a logarithmic value of this variable was included in the analysis. Second, the duration of 
conflict, measured by how many years have passed since the first start of the conflict, was 
included. Third, the most pronounced stalemate hypothesis was controlled for. To measure 
stalemate, a ordinal variable drawn from the NSA dataset (which measures the relative strength 
86 
 
 
 
 
of insurgent group against the government as “much weaker”, “weaker”, “at parity”, 
“stronger”, and “much stronger”) was recoded into a dummy which takes the values of one if 
the military strength of the insurgent group is at parity with the government, otherwise 
remaining zero. The NSA dataset is a reliable one for measuring military stalemate since the 
authors use not only the UCDP encyclopedia but also Keesing`s Record of World Events and 
additional secondary academic sources for collecting information on the military capacity of 
the insurgent group and the government (Cunningham, et al., 2013). Lastly, the NSA dataset`s 
measure of whether the insurgent group controls a territory within the country was adopted. 
Due to the focus in previous scholarship on the types of conflicts, another series of 
control variables was included in order to rule out any biased assessment of negotiations during 
civil conflicts. To decide what issue was at the root of the conflict, one-dummy variables (called 
Territorial Conflicts) were created. While this variable takes a value of one if the conflict is 
fought over a territory, the territorial conflict variable takes a value of zero if the conflict is 
over government control. In addition, another dummy variable was integrated to differentiate 
internal conflicts from internationalized conflicts. Accordingly, the variable takes a value of 
one if the conflict is internal yet takes a value of zero if the conflict is internationalized.  
3.4. Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter has presented the methods and methodology of this research by explaining 
how it relates to the current literature. For the logistic analysis, the necessity and strength of 
the method as well as its weaknesses have been presented. The chapter has explained that the 
case study research strengthens the soundness of this study. In addition, the advantages and 
disadvantages of a case study have been discussed. The chapter, also, has introduced the 
aggregate data, population and sample. Moreover, how the dependent, independent and control 
variables have been operationalized for the sake of this dissertation have been explained in 
details to set the stage for interpretation of the results in the next chapter. Accordingly, the 
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following chapter discusses the results of logistic analysis and discuss them in relation to the 
hypotheses.   
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
This chapter reports the results of logistic regression and interpretations. In addition to 
the results of logistic regression, the chapter also provides descriptive statistics for the 
indicators of costs and benefits of negotiation as well as chi-square analyses for nominal control 
variables. Accordingly, before discussing the main finding of the regression analysis, it starts 
with a number of chi-square analyses. Later, a chi-square analysis, as a subset analysis, was 
conducted to show the association between mediation and negotiation. The chapter continues 
with the summary statistics for the independent variable. Then, it reveals the results of logistic 
regression and offers interpretations accordingly.  
4.1. Descriptive Analysis 
Before discussing further the analyses and results, it is important to give a general 
picture about the units in the study and the dependent variable (negotiation). The collected 
aggregate data includes 991 dyad-years (see Appendix A, for the list of warring dyads). As 
seen from the pie chart below, of those observed dyad-years, negotiation is present at only 
about 28 percent, which is the part painted in blue.   
 
 
Figure 4.1. The Frequencies of Negotiation across 991 Observations 
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Chi-Square Analyses 
In this study, relying on the extant literature, two sets of control variables were used. 
These are namely the cost of war (conflict) and the type of war (conflict) variables. Before 
using these variables in the logistic regression, they were separately put into chi-square tests to 
see their association with the dependent variable (negotiation). This is important because these 
variables reflect the characteristics of conflicts, and they do not show much variation across 
time. Especially, the type of conflicts variables are considered valid indicators of characteristics 
of conflicts. Therefore, it is crucial to determine whether there is a significant association 
various characteristics of conflicts and negotiation outcome. Accordingly, the following tables 
describes the significance of suggested associations and percentages of each outcome.  
First, the association between the variables of type of conflicts (issues of 
incompatibility, type of conflict, and intensity of conflict) and the occurrence of negotiation is 
considered. Accordingly, Table 4.1 shows the association between the issues of incompatibility 
and negotiation. As seen from the table, territorial issues somewhat dominated over 
governmental issues in the occurrence of negotiation. These numbers suggest, though it does 
not prove, that it may be easier for parties to negotiate when the issue at stake is territorial 
instead of negotiating the control of governance or sharing governance. This preliminary 
finding seems to be in line with previous studies (Stedman, 1997; Walter, 2002). Accordingly, 
the numbers show that while about one-third of territorial conflicts-years have observed 
negotiations, one-fifth of governmental conflicts-years have experienced negotiations. From 
another point of view, almost two thirds of total observed negotiation (66 percent, 185/280) 
across dyad-years have occurred in the disputes which are fought over territory, while about 
one third (34 percent, 95/280) of those have emerged from the conflicts over the control over 
governance.   
 
90 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1. Issues of Incompatibility and Occurrence of Negotiation 
Negotiation Government Territory Total  
No (negotiation=0) 338 (78.1%) 373 (66.8%) 711 (71.7%) 
Yes (negotiation=1) 95 (21.9%) 185 (33.2%) 280 (28.3%) 
Total 433 (100%) 558 (100%) 991 (100%) 
2 (1) = 15.125, P = .000 
Table 4.2 illustrates the association between type of conflict and occurrence of 
negotiation. The study categorizes civil conflicts into two types in terms of actors involved, 
namely internationalized and internal conflicts. The table suggests that the association between 
type of conflict and negotiation is significant. This is to say that the type of conflict may involve 
some factors which influence parties` perception of negotiation. It is easily noticed that the 
number of internationalized conflicts is much lower than internal ones. However, it seems that 
while almost 39 percent (44/113) of internationalized conflicts have experienced negotiations, 
about 27 percent (236/642) of internal conflicts have had negotiations. Although this 
illustration suggests that internationalized conflicts may be keener on negotiation comparing 
to internal conflicts, the argument cannot be proved unless other factors are not controlled. 
However, since there is a lack of understanding on what internationalized conflicts hold for 
negotiation, this could be a significant starting point.  
Table 4.2. Type of Conflict and Occurrence of Negotiation 
Negotiation Internal Internationalized Total  
No (negotiation=0) 642 (73.1%) 69 (61.1%) 711 (71.7%) 
Yes (negotiation=1) 236 (26.9%) 44 (38.9%) 280 (28.3%) 
Total 878 (100%) 113 (100%) 991 (100%) 
2 (1) = 7.182, P = .007 
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Table 4.3 demonstrates the association between the intensity of conflicts and 
negotiation. In literature, though arbitrary, there are some suggested thresholds to distinguish 
the intensity of conflict. In this study, 25 battle-related deaths threshold was selected to decide 
whether there is a civil conflict and 1000 battle-related deaths threshold was used to decide 
whether the scale of conflict reached a high level, or namely major conflict. The below table 
suggests that the association between the intensity of conflict and negotiation is significant. 
Looking at the table, it seems that the negotiation talks are slightly easier to initiate for dyads 
in major conflicts than those in minor conflicts. This suggestion is in line with the cost of war 
argument that as the costs of fighting increase, the parties will prefer to negotiate. Presumably, 
the cost of war would be higher in major conflicts comparing to minors given the time, money 
and people invested.   
Table 4.3. Intensity of Conflict and Occurrence of Negotiation 
Negotiation Minor Major Total  
No (negotiation=0) 601 (73.7%) 110 (62.5%) 711 (71.7%) 
Yes (negotiation=1) 214 (26.3%) 66 (37.5%) 280 (28.3%) 
Total 815 (100%) 176 (100%) 991 (100%) 
2 (1) = 9.025, P = .003 
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, below, show the further association between cost of war 
variables and the occurrence of negotiation. Accordingly, Table 4.4 illustrates that there is a 
statistically significant association between insurgents` territorial control and negotiation 
outcome. On the face of it, of the total 384 conflict-years where the insurgent group hold a 
territory within the country, a full 43 percent (165/384) seems to have encompassed some sorts 
of negotiations. On the other hand, of the total 605 conflict-years in which the insurgent group 
does not occupy a territory, a full 81 percent (490/605) have not held any negotiations. As 
another illustration, in about 59 percent (165/280) of negotiation observed in dyad-years, the 
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insurgent group has a control over a territory within the country. Overall, the table below 
suggests that negotiation outcome is more likely if the insurgent group controls a territory in 
the given country.  
Table 4.4. Insurgents` Territorial Control and Occurrence of Negotiation 
Negotiation No Control Control Total  
No (negotiation=0) 490 (81.0%) 219 (57.0%) 709 (71.7%) 
Yes (negotiation=1) 115 (19.0%) 165 (43.0%) 280 (28.3%) 
Total 605 (100%) 384 (100%) 989 (100%) 
2 (1) = 66.446, P = .000 
Lastly, as seen from the Table 4.5, as predicted by Zartman, the association between 
parties` stalemate situation and negotiation is also significant. The suggestion here would be 
that negotiation might be easier to form in dyads whose military power is at parity than in those 
in which one side is stronger than the other. Also, it is obvious from the table that stalemate 
situations are very rare events. Indeed, only 7.2 percent of 991 dyad-years (71/991) includes 
observations where insurgent groups and governments have equal military power. However, 
parties to civil conflicts have initiated talks with each other in a full 50.7 percent (36/71) pf 
such stalemate situations, whereas only 26.6 percent (244/920) of non-stalemate situations 
experienced negotiations. Apparently, these results, by far, verify the much pronounced hurting 
stalemate argument in the literature, though only “military stalemate” aspect of the concept 
was tested. This indicates that when parties to civil conflicts basically cannot escalate the 
conflict further, they somewhat prefer to step outside of it, although the data indicate that this 
is still roughly 50-50 proposition.  
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Table 4.5. Insurgents` Relative Strength to Governments and Occurrence of Negotiation 
 Negotiation No Stalemate Stalemate Total  
No (negotiation=0) 676 (73.5%) 35 (49.3%) 711 (71.7%) 
Yes (negotiation=1) 244 (26.5%) 36 (50.7%) 280 (28.3%) 
Total 920 (100%) 71 (100%) 991 (100%) 
2 (1) = 19.015, P = .000 
The suggestions above deriving from the results of chi-square analyses provided insight 
into the association between various characteristics of conflicts and the occurrence of 
negotiation. All of the tables present statistically significant association between the suggested 
variables and negotiation. Although the suggestions are valuable to examine, it is early to reach 
to some conclusions before conducting more comprehensive analysis and without controlling 
for various factors and other variables.  
A Subset Analysis for the Association between Mediation and Negotiation  
 Due to the literature`s high emphasis on the relationship between negotiation and 
mediation, it is important to take mediation into consideration when studying negotiation. Since 
the data in this study is not suited to test mediation, a subset analysis was condcuted to see the 
association between mediation and negotiation, by relying on Swensson`s (2007) mediation 
dataset.  
The table below shows the results of a chi-square analysis on the association between 
mediation and negotiation. Expectedly, the association is statistically significant. It is clear 
from the table that although relatively small number of cases (21.5 percent - 308/1431) are 
assisted by a mediator, 64.6 percent (199/308) of these mediation attempts result in negotiation, 
whereas only 10 percent of non-mediated dyads experience talks. Table 4.6 fits well to the 
general expectation of the literature on the association between negotiation and mediation.  
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Table 4.6. Mediation and Occurrence of Negotiation 
Negotiation No Mediation Mediation Total  
No (negotiation=0) 1009 (89.8%) 109 (35.4%) 1118 (78.1%) 
Yes (negotiation=1) 114 (10.2%) 199 (64.6%) 313 (27.9%) 
Total 1123 (100%) 308 (100%) 1431 (100%) 
2 (1) = 419.492, P = .000 
Summary Descriptive  
Table 4.7 provides a summary of descriptive statistics for the independent variables by 
the dependent variable. While the percentages by dependent variable are reported for 
categorical variables, the mean values and the standard deviations are included for continuous 
variables. The table provides a bigger picture for the data analysis by enabling a quick 
comparison of mean values and percentages. First thing to look at is that 280 out of 991 cases 
have experienced some sorts of negotiation. It is also crucial to examine how the suggested 
indicators of negotiations vary across the negotiation outcome.  
 The reputation hypothesis, as explained earlier, is measured by the number of insurgent 
groups who are fighting with the same government at the same time. It can be inferred from 
the table that across civil conflict observations there is an average of 3 insurgent groups per 
government in a given year. On the face of it, the mean value of number of actors variable for 
“no negotiation” (3.31) and mean value for “negotiation” (2.26) merely suggest that there are 
more observed negotiations when there are fewer insurgent actors at stake, which is what is 
implied by the reputation hypothesis.   
 The legitimacy hypothesis is measured by whether the insurgent has an alleged or 
acknowledged link to a political party. Therefore, it is seen from the table that about 37 percent 
of insurgent groups had a political link, while the rest (63 percent) were not affiliated with a 
political party. Around 30 percent of negotiated cases included insurgents groups with a 
95 
 
 
 
 
political wing. Although it is hard to tell whether the assumption is statistically significant by 
comparing the mean values when the numbers are close to each other, it seems that having a 
political wing does not lend much of an advantage to insurgent groups for initiating negotiation.   
 The valid spokesman hypothesis indicates the strength of leadership in the insurgent 
group. The data categorize the levels into three categories: low, moderate, and high. High level 
structure leadership is suggested as a significant indicator of a valid spokesman with whom the 
government might negotiate. Therefore, high level dummy is used for control group and not 
shown in the table. According to the table, of all insurgent groups, about 18 percent had a low-
level leadership; 54 percent had moderate; and 28 percent had a high level of hierarchy 
(leadership). On the other hand, when the cases which have experienced negotiations are 
observed, it is seen that in 30 percent of them, insurgent groups have a high structural leadership 
whereas 53 percent moderate and 17 percent low. This may suggest that highly centralized 
leadership might slightly be better indicator of Valid Spokesman success, as suggested by the 
dissertation.  
 The external pressure hypothesis has two propositions. First proposition looks at 
whether the insurgent group has a transnational link. Second proposition examines whether the 
insurgent group any military support from an external actor, and this is measured with two 
variables which show whether it receives any military support from an external state and/or 
from an external non-state actor. It is shown in the table that 36 percent of insurgent groups 
had a transnational constituency while 55 percent of them received military support from a 
state, and 33 percent from a non-state actor. Moreover, about 39 percent of all negotiation cases 
included the insurgent groups with a transnational link; 63 percent of the cases involved the 
insurgent groups receiving military support from an external state, and 27 percent of them 
involved the insurgents who are militarily supported by a non-state actor in another country. 
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Just eyeballing the numbers gives a preliminary idea that military support from both external 
non-state and state actors may influence the negotiation calculation.  
 The table also indicates that around 40 percent of insurgent groups in civil conflicts are 
terrorism-oriented; involving the use of terror-oriented tactics. It is seen that the percentage 
(40.51) for the cases where there is no negotiation and the percentage (38.93) for the cases 
where negotiation takes place is very close to the total percentage (40.06) of terrorist-oriented 
insurgents in all insurgents. This may suggest, though does not prove, that it is not much of an 
importance whether the group is terrorism-oriented or not when it comes to negotiating in civil 
conflicts.  
 As for the number of foreign military interventions in civil conflicts, the table illustrates 
that while only about 30 percent of all cases included an intervention by foreign states, around 
43 percent of all negotiation cases were assisted by these foreign military interventions. It 
seems that foreign military intervention may play an important role to encourage parties to 
negotiate or provide them with a safer ground for talks to begin.  
 Lastly, two indexes are suggested to test the human rights hypothesis. While the first 
index (physical integrity) ranges from 0 to 8, its mean value is 1.55 for “no negotiation” and 
1.60 for “negotiation”. Indeed, this does not go against the conventional wisdom that civil 
conflicts are more likely to take place in the countries where the government`s respect for 
human rights is lower. On the other hand, the other index (empowerment) ranges from 0 to 14, 
and the mean value is 6.44 for “no negotiation” and 6.45 for “negotiation. It seems that 
variation in the scales does not provide much explanation in the occurrence of negotiation. 
 
 
97 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7. Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables by Negotiation 
 Total (negotiation=0) (negotiation=1) 
Variable Mean/% Std Mean/% Std Mean/% Std 
Reputation  3.02 2.477 3.31 2.656 2.28 1.748 
Legitimacy 37.24 - 39.94 - 30.36 - 
Valid Spokesman       
   -Low Central Leadership 18.26 - 18.71 - 17.14 - 
   -Moderate (Leadership) 53.99 - 54.57 - 52.50 - 
External Pressure       
   -Transnational Link 36.63 - 35.58 - 39.29 - 
   -State Support  55.40 - 52.18 - 63.57 - 
   -Non-State Support 33.10 - 35.30 - 27.50 - 
Terrorism 40.06 - 40.51 - 38.93 - 
Military Intervention 29.87 - 24.75 - 42.86 - 
Human Rights       
   -Physical Integrity Index 1.56 1.52 1.55 1.56 1.60 1.43 
   -Empowerment Index 6.44 3.687 6.44 3.613 6.45 3.893 
N 991 711 280 
Note: Due to missing information, N is 899 for Empowerment Index and 895 for Physical 
Integrity index.   
4.2. Results of Logistic Regression 
 Table 4.8 shows the results of logistic analyses examining the each hypothesis 
separately and together in the last model. Overall, the tables demonstrate that the negotiation 
calculation applies to civil conflicts. Specifically, they demonstrate that parties to civil conflicts 
are more likely to negotiate when they perceive negotiation as less costly, or more strategically 
98 
 
 
 
 
beneficial. It should be noted that given that the observations are clustered by dyads, we use 
bootstrap corrected standard errors to obtain unbiased inferential tests.  
 In Table 4.8, each row stands for a variable, and each column represents a model. Total 
of 10 models are presented in the tables separately in the columns. Each model tests one 
hypothesis, and in the last model (10), all variables are tested. The variables for cost of war and 
type of conflict arguments are treated as control variables, and they are placed in the first four 
rows and last three rows, respectively.  
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Table 4.8. Logistic Analysis of the Negotiation Calculation in Civil Conflicts 
Hypothesis Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Cost of War Logged – Number of Deaths 1.097 1.102 1.115** 1.125^ 
 Duration of Conflict .992 .998 .994 .997 
 Stalemate 1.638^ 1.660^ 1.603* 1.437 
 Territorial Control 3.027*** 3.461*** 3.385*** 3.252*** 
Reputation Number of Actors .869***    
Legitimacy Political Link  .585**   
Valid Spokesman Low Level Leadership   .681^  
 Moderate Level Leadership   .909  
External Pressure Transnational Link    1.950*** 
 State Military Support    1.430* 
 Non-State Military Support     .469*** 
Terrorism Terrorist Organization     
 Terror x Negative Rep.     
 Terror x Target Rep.      
Military Interven. Intervention     
 Unbiased Intervention     
Human Rights Physical Integrity Index     
 Empowerment Index     
Type of Conflict Territorial .655* .572*** .551*** .508*** 
 Minor Conflict 1.048 1.085 1.068 1.122 
 Internationalized  1.204 1.288 1.259 1.421 
Exp (B) – odd ratio – values are reported in the table. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<05, ^p<.10. 
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Table 4.8. Logistic Analysis of the Negotiation Calculation in Civil Conflicts (Continued) 
Hypothesis Variable Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Cost of War Logged – Number of Deaths 1.123^ 1.117^ 1.132^ 1.139* 
 Duration of Conflict .994 .991 .994 .993 
 Stalemate 1.684^ 1.705* 1.380 1.475 
 Territorial Control 3.266*** 3.198*** 3.196*** 3.205*** 
Reputation Number of Actors     
Legitimacy Political Link     
Valid Spokesman Low Level Leadership     
 Moderate Level Leadership     
External Pressure Transnational Link     
 State Military Support     
 Non-State Military Support      
Terrorism Terrorist Organization .943 .465   
 Terror x Negative Rep.  1.350*   
 Terror x Target Rep.   .864   
Military Interven. Intervention   1.968*** 1.583* 
 Unbiased Intervention    1.953* 
Human Rights Physical Integrity Index     
 Empowerment Index     
Type of Conflict Territorial .581*** .593*** .600** .621** 
 Minor Conflict 1.045 1.040 1.039 1.029 
 Internationalized  1.239 1.220 1.043 1.105 
Exp (B) – odd ratio – values are reported in the table. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<05, ^p<.10. 
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Table 4.8. Logistic Analysis of the Negotiation Calculation in Civil Conflicts (Continued) 
Hypothesis Variable Model 9 Model 10 Yes/No 
Cost of War Logged – Number of Deaths 1.151^ 1.077 Yes 
 Duration of Conflict .994 .992 No 
 Stalemate 2.035^ 1.129 Yes 
 Territorial Control 3.347*** 3.321*** Yes 
Reputation Number of Actors  .858** Yes 
Legitimacy Political Link  .976 No 
Valid Spokesman Low Level Leadership  .595^ Yes 
 Moderate Level Leadership  .926 Yes 
External Pressure Transnational Link  2.168*** Yes 
 State Military Support  1.931*** No 
 Non-State Military Support   .387*** Yes 
Terrorism Terrorist Organization  .371^ Yes 
 Terror x Negative Rep.  1.550** No 
 Terror x Target Rep.   .843 Yes 
Military Interven. Intervention  1.567* Yes 
 Unbiased Intervention  2.378** Yes 
Human Rights Physical Integrity Index 1.054 1.000 Yes 
 Empowerment Index 1.033 1.087** Yes 
Type of Conflict Territorial .539*** .501*** Yes 
 Minor Conflict 1.016 .967 Yes 
 Internationalized  1.116 1.172 Yes 
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Exp (B) – odd ratio – values are reported in the table. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<05, ^p<.10. 
Note that Exp (B) values are based on bootstrap corrected standard errors, clustered by dyads. 
“Yes” indicates that the result is in the expected direction; “No” means that the result is not in 
the expected direction. The coefficients, standard errors and model summaries are included in 
Appendix B. 
 The odds ratio – Exp (B) – values are presented in the table above for readers to interpret 
the results easily. Accordingly, the interpretation of these values is as following: the values less 
than 1 indicates that the odds of negotiation decreases as the independent variables increase; 
an odds ratio equal to 1 means that the odd of negotiation does not change as the independent 
variables change, meaning no relationship; and the values greater than 1 tell that the odds of 
negotiation increases as the independent variables increase. However, one should be more 
careful interpreting the dichotomous variables. With these variables, the interpretation should 
be made by referencing to the control group, rather than considering the unit of increase or 
decrease in the independent variables since it would cause meaningless interpretations. Also, 
the percentage change in odds can be calculated easily by the equation [Exp(B)-1]*100. 
Throughout all the models, two control variables (Insurgent`s territorial control and 
territorial wars) are statistically significant at the .001 and .01 level, and they are in the expected 
direction. This is to say that the odds of negotiation are higher with insurgent groups who 
control a territory within the country comparing to with those who do not. The tables show that 
the number of deaths variable is significant at .05 and .10 level across the models, except in 
Model 1, 2, and 10, and it is in the suggested direction by cost of war argument that as the cost 
(the number of death, in this case) increases, the likelihood of negotiation goes up. It is 
important to note that logged form of this variable is utilized to get more meaningful findings. 
This is because the number of deaths varies much across the observations; therefore, 
considering the variable in terms of ratio rather than difference provides a better understanding 
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of its effect on negotiation. Moreover, the stalemate argument shows a slightly significant trend 
across the models. Although this is not one of the strongest results of the analysis, this finding, 
in most models, supports the well-known stalemate argument that when parties are stuck in the 
conflict and see no victory in sight, they seek a way out.  
On the other hand, other control variables seem to be not significant across the models. 
However, it may be still valuable to look at the direction of their effects in the regression. 
Specifically, as seen from the tables, the odds of negotiation – Exp (B) values are around .99 
in all models – decrease every additional year of conflicts by around 1 percent. Also, the 
models, though not statistically significant, suggest that internationalized conflicts are more 
likely to experience negotiation comparing to other internal conflicts. As for the comparison 
between minor and major conflicts, the models seem to suggest that minor conflicts could be 
slightly keener on negotiating as opposed to major conflicts.  
Model 1 illustrates that the likelihood of negotiation decreases by 13 percent for every 
additional increase in the number of insurgent groups that the government is fighting. The 
finding is significant at the .001 level and supports the reputation hypothesis that negotiation 
is less likely to happen as the government perceives potential fights with additional insurgent 
groups. 
In the Model 2, the legitimacy hypothesis is tested. The model`s result runs counter to 
the suggested legitimacy hypothesis that the likelihood of negotiation is higher if the insurgent 
has political link. In contrary to the hypothesis, the model suggests that the odds of negotiation 
is more likely with insurgent groups who are not linked to a political party. Indeed, the result 
reveals that the odds of negotiation is less by 50 percent with insurgent with political 
connection comparing to the others.  
Model 3 shows that insurgent groups which have low level of leadership are 10 percent 
less likely to experience negotiation than those with highly structured leadership, and this 
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finding is significant at the .10 level. Also, the models does not point to a significant effect of 
moderate level leadership on negotiation compared to high level leadership. However, although 
the significance is weak, the direction of variables is in the expected way. Accordingly, 
comparing the three levels of strength of leadership in insurgent groups, the results suggest that 
negotiations are more likely in the presence of highly structured insurgent leadership.   
Model 4 tests the effects of external pressure on the occurrence of negotiation. The first 
variable, transnational link, confirms the suggested hypothesis that negotiation is more likely 
if the insurgent group has a transnational link. This dissertation argued that an existing 
transnational link would bring pressure on the government, and that the government would 
want to respond seeing negotiation as beneficial rather than costly. As for the effect of external 
support to insurgents, the model suggests conflicting results to the external pressure hypothesis. 
Accordingly, the hypothesis put forwarded that the insurgent would see negotiation as costly 
and be unwilling to negotiate if there is a potential risk that it can lose the existing support. 
However, the model makes two suggestions. First, the model indicates that the odds of 
negotiation increases by 43 percent when there is an external state support for the insurgents 
comparing to the cases with no support. Second, the odds of negotiation seem to decreases by 
47 percent in the presence of a non-state support for insurgents as opposed to the cases where 
no support exists. Accordingly, while the former is not in the opposite direction of suggested 
hypothesis, the latter confirms it. Moreover, regardless of what directions variables go, they all 
are statistically significant at the .001 level.  
Model 5 does not lend as much significant support to the dissertation`s expectation that 
negotiation is less likely if the insurgent group is terrorism-oriented. However, when the odds 
of negotiation is considered, it still seems that the likelihood of negotiation is slightly lower for 
the terrorism-oriented insurgents comparing to the others. Moreover, Model 6 contributes to 
this discussion by considering the effect of reputation of terrorism-oriented groups on 
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negotiation. The results suggests that the terrorist groups who score higher in the negative 
constituency reputation scale are more likely to hold talks with their respective government 
than those who score higher in the positive scale. Also, the model suggests, though not 
significant, that the odd of negotiation are less likely for the terrorist group who target children 
and civilians, comparing to the groups who have a somewhat more positive reputation.   
The finding of Model 7 is consistent with the foreign military intervention hypothesis 
with significance level at the .001. This suggests that the odds of negotiation are higher if there 
is a military intervention in the conflict, comparing to the conflicts without foreign 
interventions. The dissertation argued that foreign military intervention, especially neutral 
interventions, would decrease the cost of negotiating for parties to civil conflicts, and in turn, 
the likelihood of negotiation would increase. Accordingly, Model 8 confirms that when the 
intervention is unbiased (neutral) instead of biased one, the likelihood of negotiation is much 
higher.  
Model 9 indicates that the government`s respect for human rights, alone, has no 
significant effect on the negotiation prospect. Although, at first glance, the finding seems to be 
the contrary to the human right hypothesis, it would be naïve to expect a significant effect of 
human right variables on negotiation without controlling for more variables.  
Model 10 presents the results of the combination of all variables.  The model lends 
strong support for the reputation, external pressure, and foreign military intervention 
hypotheses. Also, the model finds somewhat partial support for the valid spokesman and 
terrorism hypotheses, while it calls into question the some parts of hypotheses. It is also 
important to take a closer look at human right hypothesis because in the Model 10, one variable 
of the hypothesis (empowerment index) become significant at the .01 level and was in the 
expected direction. Similarly, in model 10, the effects of suggested indicators on negotiation 
become more significant, and all variables except two (negative reputation of terrorist 
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organizations and external state support to insurgents) are in the expected direction. Therefore, 
the model confirm the costs and benefits of negotiation argument. Accordingly, the odds of 
having negotiation gets higher as the existing conditions or characteristics of parties or the 
conflict itself are cost cutting rather than cost increasing.   
4.3. Selection of Case Studies 
 The case studies for qualitative analysis was selected based on the predictions of the 
logistic regression. Accordingly, the logistic regression predicts the probability of occurrence 
of negotiation for each dyad-year in the data. First, with the help of SPSS, the predicted values 
for negotiation was saved for each dyad-year while conducting the last model which includes 
all the independent variable. Later, the residual values, which gives the difference between the 
observed and the predicted values, were found. By the help of these values, the probability of 
negotiation for each dyad-year was reported. While selecting the cases, the probability of 
negotiation was one of the factors taking into consideration. Accordingly, the cases which 
yielded different negotiation outcomes with different probability of negotiation suggested by 
the logistic regression.  
 However, it should be noted that since the quantitative analysis is structured in dyad-
year format, the predicted values of negotiation stand for a specific year in the given conflict. 
Therefore, the regression`s prediction for negotiation in a conflict varies across the conflict 
years. This is to say that while the regression may predict a high probability of negotiation in 
a given year in the conflict, it may predict a higher or lower probability for the preceding or 
following year since the independent variables can change yearly base. While this makes it 
relatively more difficult to select one conflict (dyad) meeting the pre-determined conditions, it 
enables the study to analyze within the conflict setting as well.  On the other hand, to overcome 
the difficulty to select the case, several additional considerations were made. First, the conflicts 
which provided more numbers of observation (dyad-years) in the desired direction were given 
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the priority. Second, other factors, such as the issue of incompatibility, the geographic region 
of conflict, and the type of terminations, were selected diversely.  
 After all the above mentioned factors considered, four dyads were selected: the 
Government of Sudan and the Sudan People`s Liberation Movement / Army (SPLM/A), the 
Government of India and the Kashmir Insurgents, the Government of Colombia and the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Government of Sri Lanka and the 
Liberation Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).   
 It is important to highlight that the probability of negotiation not just varies across the 
conflicts but also within the conflict years. The regression`s prediction of negotiation varies 
over every year of conflict. Every conflict (dyad) has relatively low and high probability of 
negotiation for different years based on the changing conditions (grasped by the independent 
variables). On the other hand, a prediction for negotiation outcome can be made for the entire 
conflict by examining the expectation of regression over years, and this enables to the 
comparison across the conflict settings. Accordingly, the regression`s overall prediction for the 
years of Sudanese civil conflict is high probability of negotiation, and the conflict indeed ends 
with a peace agreement between two sides. As for the Indian and Kashmiri insurgency conflict, 
the regression predicts a low probability of negotiation for most years of the conflict, and the 
conflict still remains disputed. Although the conflict experienced some sorts of negotiation at 
some points, the years in which negotiation took place and did not happen are not well predicted 
by the logistic regression prediction; they stand for anomalies in the data and call for further 
analysis to explain the causes. Indeed, for the civil conflicts in which the government of India 
is involved, the logistic regression predicts relatively low probability of negotiation. This might 
be due to the high number of insurgent groups in the country, which reaches to the number of 
ten and eleven dyads within India in 1990s. Among these conflicts which yields to similar 
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predicted value of negotiation, the Kashmiri conflict was chosen due to its unique characteristic 
as a long-lasting internationally disputed and unresolved conflict.   
The Sri Lankan conflict, on the other hand, stands for an anomaly where negotiation 
mostly occurred in the opposite direction of the regression`s prediction, meaning that 
negotiation happened in the years for which the logistic regression predicts low probability of 
negotiation, while negotiation did not take place in the years for which the logistic regression 
predicts relatively high probability of negotiation. Also, the Sri Lankan was selected over 
alternative cases, which yield to similar predicted value of negotiation, since the conflict ended 
with a one side`s military victory. Among the selected cases, only Sri Lankan civil conflict 
ended with one side`s victory. Lastly, although the regression is powerful to predict 
negotiations in the Colombian civil conflict for some years, in other years it fails to forecast 
negotiations. This case does not stand in the very extreme cases of the regression analysis. 
However, since the predictions of dyad-years for this conflict cluster better comparing to the 
similar cases, it was selected. Also, the Colombian conflict with ELN was another alternative 
for the last case. However, since the government of Colombia and the FARC recently signed a 
peace agreement in 2016, the selection was made toward the conflict with FARC. Moreover, 
this case stands for a unique example for a peaceful resolution to the long-lasting and heavy 
civil war.  
Overall, the selected cases (the Sudanese, Indian, Sri Lankan, and Colombian civil 
conflict dyads) not only show different probability of negotiation for the years of conflict based 
on the logistic regression prediction, but also they yield to different conflict termination, if any, 
(respectively, peace agreement, remained disputed, one side`s victory, and peace agreement); 
they are fought over different issues (the control over territory and/or governance); and they 
take place in different regions (respectively, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, South Asia, and 
South America).    
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4.4. Concluding Remarks 
The chapter has presented the results of the logistic analysis of negotiation calculation 
in civil conflicts. Overall, the models suggest that perceived costs and benefits of negotiation 
by the actors significantly influence the probability of negotiation occurrence in the dyad. 
However, three independent variables need to be further analyzed in the future study because 
they were not in the suggested direction. First, the insurgent`s link to a political party was 
suggested as an indicator for the legitimacy of insurgent group with whom to initiate talks; 
therefore, the expectation was that it would increase the probability of negotiation. However, 
the regression suggests that the insurgent`s political wing decreases the chances of holding a 
negotiation. Conceivably more voices are heard on the question of negotiations with party 
input, or the government may fear for its future with a contending party. Also, it should be 
noted that this variables lost its significance in the last model where all variables are included.  
The further studies might need to look at whether the political group is legal or not as well as 
the strength of the link between the political party and the group. In this way, it can be better 
analyzed what it means for the insurgent group to be linked to a political party so far as the 
probability of negotiation is concerned.  
Second, in the external pressure hypotheses, two measures were included to represent 
the pressure on the insurgent group. It means that when the insurgent group is supported by an 
external actor, it will fear the risk of losing the support if it negotiates with the government. 
The regression shows that while the suggested hypothesis holds true for when the group 
receives military support from a non-state actor, and accordingly it decreases the probability of 
negotiation, it has a different effect on the probability of negotiation if the support comes from 
a state actor. One possible explanation might be that a state`s sponsorship increases the 
insurgent`s military capacity more comparing to the non-state actor support. Accordingly, it 
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might increase the military capacity to a stalemate situation where the parties no longer see a 
military victory as possible.  
Third, the regression suggests that negotiation is more likely to happen with terrorist 
groups who score more on the negative constituency reputation scale comparing to those 
scoring more on the positive constituency reputation scale. This is also in the unexpected 
direction. However, the reason for this result might be explained with the cost of conflict 
argument. On the other hand, future research might aim to categorize negotiation into levels. 
By the same token, negotiation with terrorist groups who have a negative constituency 
reputation might concern a prisoner exchange, ransom, or temporary ceasefire in the face of a 
terrorist act. However, the aggregate data in this study do not allow for such a classification. 
On the other hand, the last model suggests that negotiation is, though slightly, less likely to 
happen with the terrorism-oriented groups comparing to the others.   
Other hypotheses are confirmed by the logistic analysis. Accordingly, the results show 
that governments are concerned about their reputation as concession prone, and negotiation 
seems to become less likely as the number of insurgent group increase within the country. The 
cases studies in the next chapter provides more insight into the reputation hypothesis with the 
specific examples.  
Moreover, the logistic analysis verifies the valid spokesman hypothesis and suggests 
that negotiation is more likely to happen with insurgent group who have a highly structured 
leadership comparing to the ones who have a low level of leadership structure. A highly 
structured perhaps centralized leadership is important for both the government and the 
insurgent in term of cost of negotiation calculation. For insurgent, the leader would feel more 
confidence in a potential talks with the government since the leader can be sure of the internal 
cohesion of the group. By the same token, a high-level of leadership means a valid spokesman 
with whom the government might initiate the talks. On the other hand, the government also 
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perceives that a highly organized insurgent group can follow the commitment of a negotiation 
better than a less organized group; therefore, the negotiation in this case seems to come off as 
less costly for both sides.  
External pressure seems to be the most important factor which brings parties to 
negotiation. This hypothesis suggest two arguments with three measurements. Accordingly, 
the first measure is the transnational constituency of the insurgent group. It is believed that if 
transnational constituency might increase the international community`s awareness on the 
conflict and present the insurgents as “freedom fighters” instead of “terrorists”. This in turn 
might bring the international pressure to the government to listen to the demands of insurgency. 
In that case, the government might want more recognition in the international arena by meeting 
the demand, and consequently, it can perceive a initiating a talk with the insurgent group as 
less costly, even beneficiary. On the other hand, the dissertation suggested that external 
pressure might work in the opposite way, as well. This potential opposite effect was only 
suggested for the insurgent group, though the same argument could be suggested for the 
government, too. Accordingly, the regression illustrates that negotiation is less likely to happen 
when the insurgent group is supported by an external non-state actor, another insurgent group. 
The fear of losing the external support seems to matter for the insurgent group. Although further 
research is need, it could be argued that the insurgent group does not risk losing the external 
support for the negotiation attempts or chances in which the insurgent does not expect a gain 
in prospect.  
The logistic analysis shows that foreign military intervention, especially neutral ones 
comparing to the biased interventions, increase the likelihood of negotiation during civil 
conflicts. This finding supports that the parties to civil conflicts need a third party to overcome 
their security concerns. It can be argued that the parties more confidently negotiate under the 
supervision of a third party. Moreover, they prefer a neutral foreign intervention which does 
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not support either of the parties in conflict. Otherwise, negotiation becomes less likely to 
happen when the third party intervention is perceived as biased by one the warring parties.  
As far as the awareness allows, the human right measurement has been included in the 
literature for the first time in such a study. As seen from the model, while the first suggested 
measure for human rights, physical integrity index, does not have any effect on the occurrence 
of negotiation, the second measure, empowerment index, has a significant effect on 
negotiation. Accordingly, it can be argued that the human rights indicators included in the 
index, such as freedom of movement, freedom of speech, workers’ rights, political 
participation, and freedom of religion, influence the perception of insurgent group on the 
government. This, in turn, shapes the group`s prospective gains and losses from a potential 
negotiation with the government. As a result, negotiation becomes more likely as the 
government`s respect for these rights increases.  
Overall, the finding of the regression asserts that the parties` perception of the conflict 
and negotiation can be explained by some variables, and the suggested indicators, in this sense, 
well grasp their assessment of negotiation during civil conflict. The chapter also mentions the 
need of future research for a better understanding of several variables. Next chapter discusses 
the four case studies which were selected based on the results of logistic analysis. With the 
help of cases, the dissertation provides more insight into the understanding of negotiation in 
civil conflicts and what shapes the actors` perception of cost and benefits of a potential talk.   
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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDIES 
This chapter gives in-depth analysis for four selected cases, relying on secondary data 
sources and scholarly works. Basically, the cases were selected based on the variation of 
occurrence of negotiation expectation from the results of logistic regression. This chapter 
compare the actors` perception on negotiation in relation to the occurrence of talks within the 
same conflict setting and across different conflict settings. The actors` perceptions on and 
willingness to negotiate changes throughout the conflicts along with changing conditions 
within the country. In addition to the suggested and tested measures of costs and benefits of 
negotiation, this chapter aims to give more insight into the unexplained and hidden cost of 
negotiation which might be specific to the conflict or the parties to the conflict. Moreover, since 
the aggregate quantitative analysis was formed in dyad-years structure, the regression`s 
prediction for negotiation for specific years in the dyad,  within-conflict lends the dissertation 
an ability to grasp the conflict as a whole and the negotiation as a process which involves the 
interaction of fighting, talks, and terminations or outcomes..  
On the other hand, the purpose of comparisons across the conflict settings is to provide 
a thorough knowledge of the cost and benefit perception of negotiation, how the actors perceive 
those in different settings and why they occur and do not occur. Overall, the chapter aims to 
analyze how costs and benefits of negotiation theoretical framework can be applied to specific 
cases and in what cases it fails or helps to explain the presence or absence of a negotiation. 
This knowledge will improve the common understanding of negotiation in relation to the 
parties` assessment of specific situations in the protracted civil conflicts, and will be of value 
to scholarly analysts and policy-makers alike in anticipating, setting the stage, or fostering 
productive occasions for talks.  
In the following sections of the chapter, four selected civil conflicts are presented. These 
conflicts are: the dyads of the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People`s Liberation 
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Movement/Army (SPLM/A); the Government of India and the Kashmir Insurgents; the 
Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); and the 
Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Each 
conflict setting is analyzed under four sub-sections. First, the background of conflict is 
introduced to explain the causes of the conflict and the actors involved. Next, the characteristics 
of the parties and the conflict are presented to understand the costs and benefits of a potential 
negotiation. Later, the negotiation period, if any, as well as missed negotiation opportunities 
throughout the conflict are highlighted and analyzed. Lastly, the analysis of each conflict is 
completed with concluding remarks which point to alternative explanations of why negotiation 
occurred or not, what has been the obstacle for the benefit of negotiation, and what might be 
ahead for the conflict in future.   
5.1. The Government of Sudan – Sudan People`s Liberation Movement / Army 
(SPLM/A) 
Background of the Conflict 
Sudan can be considered as a good example of a protracted civil conflict with its over 
five decades long duration which claimed over two million lives and caused millions of 
refugees to the neighboring states and internally displaced people (Deng, 2001). The beginning 
of the conflict dates back to the independence of Sudan from British colonialism in 1956. Since 
then, except for a peace period from the implementation of Addis Ababa agreement in 1972 
through the resumption of grievance and conflict in 1983, the country has experienced on and 
off conflicts (Grawert, 2013). Accordingly, the first Sudanese civil war (1955-1972) was the 
result of grievance against the Khartoum government`s policy, which was seen to favor the 
Muslim-dominated region in the North, and impose Arabic and Islamic culture to the South. 
The clash between the South and North started one year before the independence and lasted in 
the first phase until the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972 which granted regional autonomy to 
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the South. After a decade long silent period, the old conflict flared up again in 1983 when the 
President Ja'far Muhammad Numayri issued a decree to impose Shari`a laws on the public and 
to divide the South into three regions, and it continued until the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in 2005. In this conflict with the North, the South was gathered under the umbrella 
of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudan People's 
Liberation Army (SPLA). SPLM and SPLA were controlled by the same leadership, and 
therefore they are often referred by many as one unit, Sudan People`s Liberation Movement / 
Army (SPLM/A) (Deng, 2001). 
At the heart of the conflict between the North and South were many reasons, including 
internal disunity, economic and social cleavages, accessing the resources (especially oil), 
economic development, inter-ethnic rivalry and insecurity, including the interests of 
marginalized groups (Grawert, 2013). The main manifestation of these factors revolved around 
the religion. Both in the South and North, religion along with Arab or African culture and tribal 
or clan allegiances were taken to define the identity of people. Accordingly, while the North 
was composed of mainly Muslim groups, Christians and traditional African groups and those 
against the imposition of Islam made up the majority in the South3 (Grawert, 2013). 
From the perspective of the North, Islamization and “Arabization” were necessary for 
the unity of the country, and beginning from the independence, the government repeatedly 
attempted to nationalize the norms of Islam and Arabic culture across the country. On the other 
hand, the Southerners struggled for years against the imposition of Arabic language, religion 
                                                 
 
3 The South is believed to compose of 60 major ethnic groups, each has distinct sense of identity. Among these 
groups, Dinka (36%) and Nuer (16%) ethnic groups are the largest, making up more than the half of population. 
The rest of South`s population belongs to smaller ethic groups, including Bari, Zande, Acholi, Madi, Moru, 
Kuku and others (Branch & Mampilly, 2005; The World Factbook, 2017).   
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and culture, and struggled to resist the imposition of Northern norms (English was adopted in 
part as a resistance to Arabic language dominance as well) (Deng, 2001). 
It would, of course, be naïve to think conflict in Sudan only entailed the clash between 
Islam and Christianity. This is partially because Sudan is the largest country in Africa and it 
hosts many divergent ethnic groups, religions, races, and languages. Indeed, there are over 400 
local languages spoken in Sudan (Waba, 1997). Despite the divergence in issues of ethnicity, 
religious, races and languages, what brings the Southerners together against the North is their 
struggle against the imposition of Arab and Islamic culture as well as the often harsh and 
divisive policies of the North. In that sense, SPLM/A served as a glue bringing together 
oppositions to the North regardless of their background (Jok, 2011); indeed after the country’s 
partition into Sudan and South Sudan, many of these simmering rivalries and contention over 
control of resources (oil) broke out within South Sudan itself, while Khartoum’s heavy hand 
could also be seen in the subsequent carnage in Darfur (Grawert, 2013). Therefore, on the face 
of it, the divided civil society due to the divisive policies of the government constituted the 
main reason for civil conflict.   
The SPLA was formed in 1983 by John Garang, who had been an officer in the 
Sudanese Military. SPLM/A brought the scattered rebel groups across the Southern regions 
under one roof. Its 1983 manifesto began by addressing the failure of the government in 
Khartoum on the Addis Ababa Agreement and criticizing the North`s policy on oil resources 
(Grewart, 2013). John Garang aimed to create a “New Sudan” where all excluded and 
marginalized groups could live in equality. In that sense, the SPLM/A has always referred to 
its struggle in secular and democratic lines. Its main goal was iterated as the secession from the 
North. Consequently, the struggle between the government of Sudan and SPLM/A first led to 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, and after an interim period, the South 
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held a referendum in 2011 in which the vast majority of population (99 percent) voted for 
independence (Grewart, 2013).   
Costs and Benefits of Negotiation Framework Applied  
The logistic regression model in this study based on the costs and benefits of 
negotiations predicts a high probability of negotiation for the period of conflict between the 
government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. This is because the characteristic of the parties and the 
conflict itself present a relatively low negotiation cost. Accordingly, although the conflict has 
been extremely bloody and violent, it has experienced numerous negotiations talks and 
attempts, including cease-fire agreements, talks about talks and terms, and the final agreement, 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in 2005, which set the stage for the independence 
referendum in 2011 (Grawert, 2013).  
The reasons the conflict, though it was very violent, is associated with low cost of 
negotiation are multifaceted. First, the number of warring parties were relatively limited in 
Sudan although there were several splits and small groups. Most of the opposition gathered 
under the banner of the SPLM/A against the government. While this gave the SPLM/A a strong 
hand for negotiation, since it represented a large segment of the Southern population, it was 
also beneficial for the government to deal with one counterpart – one voice if you will – as 
compared to multiple voices, which would have required more complications, concessions and 
squabbling for both the government and the SPLM/A. Second, the SPLM/A had a moderate 
level structured leadership, according to this dissertation`s data. This is to say that there was a 
spokesman or a leader of the group with whom government could confidently maintain contact 
to direct its intentions and offers.  
Moreover, external pressure and assistance played a major role in the conflict. SPLM/A 
received military support from neighboring states such as Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda 
especially in the 1990s. These supports were due to these states’ fears that the aggressive and 
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expansionist Political Islam policy of the Sudanese government would spill over their borders 
(Young, 2005). This assistance tended to solidify and give more military power to the SPLM/A, 
bringing it to a military stalemate with the government, and putting pressure on the government 
to be open to discussing the concerns of SPLM/A. Moreover, Ethiopia allowed the SPLM/A 
supporters to open a radio station to report the updates about military campaigns and announce 
their philosophical and ideological views (Wama, 1997).  
On the other hand, Muammar Qadhafi, the leader of Libya was also willing to give 
support to SPLM/A at the beginning due to his opposition to the Numayri government in 
Sudan. Consequently, Garang (the leader of SPLM/A) visited Tripoli in 1984 and secured 
significant military support. However, due to the SPLM/A`s rejection to Qadhafi`s pan-Arab 
political agenda and the overthrown of Numayri government in 1986, the cooperation between 
Qadhafi and SPLM/A broke down. Then, Qadhafi started to support the new coalition 
government on the fight against the SPLM/A (Wama, 1997).   
Egypt, also, consistently sought to bring the SPLM/A and the government to 
negotiation. The SPLM/A urged to establish relations with Egypt due to its significant role in 
both African and Arab world. President Mubarak assisted to arrange a meeting between Garang 
and Sadiq al-Mahdi (Prime Minister of Sudan) at the summit of the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) in 1986 and encouraged further negotiation talks between the SPLM/A and the 
DUP in 1988. Moreover, Egypt kept its insistence on negotiation between two warring parties 
in the subsequent years and attempted to arrange meetings between the military government 
and the SPLM/A (Wama, 1997).  
In this way, the SPLM/A`s political and ideological stance transcended the borders of 
Sudan and reached abroad. That, in turn, helped the struggle of SPLM/A to gain and sustain 
international attention, and it, in a way, tended to legitimize the struggle. Overall, these factors 
above served to lower the parties` perception of the cost of negotiation, somewhat raised the 
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government’s cost in fighting, and prepared the ground for potential talks. The costs and 
benefits of negotiation measures do not stand for sufficient conditions for a negotiation, but 
appear to have been necessary conditions in this case. Other factors, however, also influenced 
the decision to talk. What the factors above provide is that they settled the question of 
legitimacy of insurgent group actor for potential peace talks and the presence of the 
aforementioned conditions shaped the parties` perception of a potential negotiation in a more 
positive way.  
Negotiation Periods/Chances throughout the Conflict 
 As in the expectation of the logistic model, the conflict between Sudan and the SPLM/A 
has embodied various negotiations over the courses of conflict. Although most of them failed 
to bring a peaceful resolution, the conditions at the time, when the talks were held, are 
important to understand and lend great support to our theoretical argument. Accordingly, 
between 1989 and 2005, the parties to civil conflict initiated or held some sort of negotiations 
every year, at least conflict related talks, except in the years 1990, 1991, and 1996, according 
to this dissertation`s data. Accordingly, the government of Sudan started peace feelers and 
informal talks consisting with the SPLM/A beginning in 1986, when a coalition government 
consisting of the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the National Islamic 
Front (NIF), under the leadership of Prime Minister Sadiq Al-Mahdi (affiliated with the Umma 
Party) came to power. The informal peace talks and negotiation attempts started from that year. 
It should be noted that the new coalition government replaced the Numayri Government which 
declared Shari`a law in 1983 causing, in turn, many protests and uprisings both in the South 
and North in the subsequent years. By 1988, the SPLM/A took control of almost 90 percent of 
territory in the South, and large-scale killings on both sides reached a peak (Waba, 1997). 
Consequently, in 1988, the SPLM/A and the DUP came to an agreement on a preliminary plan 
calling freezing Sharia Law, ending the state of emergency and setting a cease-fire. As some 
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sort of negotiation was underway with the government, the intensity of civil conflict did not 
end; however, battle-related deaths increased and the economy deteriorated (Waba, 1997). The 
National Islamic Front, which is known as an Islamist party affiliated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and took part in the coalition government by securing the third largest number of 
seats in the parliamentary elections of 1986, opposed negotiation attempts with SPLM/A from 
the very beginning (Deng, 2001). At first, the Prime Minister Sadiq Al-Mahdi refused the peace 
plan agreed by the SPLM/A and the DUP in 1988, but after an ultimatum from the Army to the 
Prime Minister that he should find a peaceful resolution or be removed, Sadiq Al-Mahdi had 
to approve the peace plan. However, before the peace plan came into existence, a military junta, 
operated by General Umar Hasan al-Bashir, ousted Sadiq Al-Mahdi and took over the 
government control (Grawert, 2013). Although, Bashir initially claimed to be independent from 
the NIF, it was clear that he shared its Islamic agenda. Moreover, it was later revealed that the 
coup d’état was encouraged by Hasan at-Turabi, the leader of NIF (Deng, 2001). It can be 
argued that increasing cost of the conflict led the political parties (the Umma Party, DUP, and 
NIF) in the coalition government of Sudan to find a solution to end the conflict. While the DUP 
sought a negotiated solution with the SPLM/A, the NIF, due to its Islamic agenda, refused 
negotiation and went further to spoil it by using its presence in the Army and eventually 
conducted a coup to take control of the government in 1989.  
Although they neither led to an immediate peace nor stopped the fight, the peace talks 
between the SPLM/A and the government of Sudan started in the relatively early stages of the 
conflict and continued throughout its phases. Accordingly, the SPLM/A held eight sessions of 
peace talks with the government during the conflict, in Addis Ababa and Nairobi (1989), Abuja 
(1992 and 1993), and Nairobi again (1989 to 1995). These talks were mediated by neighboring 
states including Ethiopia, Kenya and Nige (Wama, 1997), and appeared to ease the way toward 
the final agreement about a decade later.  
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Since 1990s, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya have attempted to start a peace 
initiative in Sudan under the sponsorship of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), which is an inter-governmental trading bloc. It finally led to the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in 2005. This peace can best be described as the fruit of repeated negotiation 
attempts starting from 1990s. Also, before reaching the final agreement in 2005, there were 
separately negotiated agreements: the Machakos Protocol in 2002; the Covenant on Security 
Arrangements in 2003; the Covenant on Power Sharing and Wealth-Sharing in 2004; Protocols 
on resolutions of the conflicts in Sourthern Kordofan, Blue Nile States, and Abyei (Adeleke, 
2015).  
Concluding Remarks  
Although it is one of the oldest and bloodiest civil conflicts in Africa, the case of Sudan 
presents a unique example of negotiation because the first negotiation attempts began relatively 
early. Moreover, the conflict ended with a peace agreement which holds an example showing 
that old enemies can come to a settlement. The informal peace plan between the SPLM/A and 
DUP can be seen as a missed opportunity that might have resolved the issue between the North 
and South years earlier. The obstacles standing in the way of a peaceful resolution were the 
country’s weak political institutions and unstable domestic and coalition politics. In the case 
of Sudan, it is readily seen that leadership change in the government changed the negotiating 
stance and further delayed settlement even though negotiations were relatively cost tolerable.  
Moreover, years-long division between Islam – Christianity, and the North – South divide 
turned the conflict into “identity war” and increased the individuals` willingness to fight further 
despite periodic talks. 
This case also illustrates that not every negotiation leads to a peaceful solution. 
However, the case lends support to the argument that when certain conditions which lower the 
parties’ estimated cost of negotiation negotiations are more likely. These conditions shape the 
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parties’ perception of negotiation as well as of each other. Accordingly, it can be argued that 
the government of Sudan had considered the SPLM/A a legitimate and powerful actor, but a 
treacherous and rebellious one. It is, also, important to reiterate that occurrence and the success 
of negotiation are two different matters, and that repeated attempts may be necessary.  
It can easily be noticed that the SPLM/A had been very insistent on talks with the 
government during the conflict periods. To the dissertation`s expectation, the case of Sudan 
seems to support the notion that territorial conflicts are more likely to have negotiations. This 
persistence in favoring and holding talks can be explained with the group`s determination to 
secede from the Sudan and build an independent state for the Southerners, which they finally 
gained in 2011 through a referendum but also having benefited from foreign pressure. 
Moreover, this determination becomes stronger since the SPLM/A spoke for a diverse 
population as the representative of the South, East, the West and Nuba mountains, collecting 
all opposing parties against the government under its leadership. Unfortunately that unity could 
not be sustained post-independence. Accordingly, soon after the South Sudan gained its 
independence, another civil unrest unleashed within the South in 2013 due to a political 
struggle between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar who are from different ethnic groups: the Dinka 
and Nuer (which are the two largest ethnic groups in the country) (Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2018).    
Lastly, the conflict was ended through a negotiation between internal actors under 
international mediation which could be considered as reasonably unbiased. Although the 
parties to civil conflict were often unwilling meet directly with each other, which could be 
perceived as the cost of negotiation, mediators (i.e. IGAD) served to decrease this initial cost 
perceived by the parties and pressed them to resolve their issues through negotiations and 
offered workable agendas including power-sharing, protocols about security issues, economic 
development and so forth. Third parties, when they are neutral, are helpful to overcome the 
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untruthful and war-torn relationship between the parties, although cultural affinity between 
conflict parties and mediators can also build trust (Yassine-Hamdan & Pearson, 2014). This 
calls into question the durability of peace and peacebuilding processes. As supported by the 
dissertation, external factors played a major role in Sudanese negotiations. However, the 
success of the peace initiated by IGAD has been questioned by many because of its top-down 
and elitist approach while ignoring economic conditions, human rights and women status 
(Young, 2005). Indeed the issue of cohesion for South Sudan has come under threat since the 
independence, the border conflicts between Sudan and South Sudan still continues, as well as 
its internal power struggle.   
5.2. The Government of India – The Kashmiri Insurgents 
Background of the Conflict 
The Kashmir conflict is an example of protracted territorial dispute in which interstate 
and intrastate rivalries are entangled (Ganguly & Bajpai, 1994). There are both internal and 
external factors at stake. For the external factors, the long-standing India – Pakistan hostility 
plays the major role (Bose, 1999). Accordingly, the Kashmir region, officially referred as 
Kashmir and Jammu, has been a disputed issue between Pakistan and India since their partition 
from British rule in 1947. However, the civil uprising in Kashmir region for the independence 
did not outbreak until 1989, although Kashmiris` discontent about Indian presence and 
governance was there. One might ask the question of why the civil conflict in Kashmir occurred 
as well as why it did occur after forty-two years of Indian rule and not, for the most part, before 
1989. Ganguly (1996), by citing Samuel Huntington`s (1968) Political Order in Changing 
Societies, points to political mobilization and institutional decay as the major factors which 
prepare the ground for civil unrest. This is to say that political mobilization at the time increased 
with the young generation who became more conscious about their rights, and the 
government`s policy to block any discontent and to respond harshly.  
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To better understand the origin and underlying reasons of the Kashmir insurgency, it 
needs to be traced back to the 1947 partition. Accordingly, India and Pakistan existed as a 
British crown colony in the Indian Union. There were also semi-independent “princely states” 
under the Union, with Kashmir among them. At the partition, while India and Pakistan emerged 
as independent states, the princely states joined either India or Pakistan based on their 
demographic structure and the decision of the ruling prince. Kashmir was given a right to 
accede to either India or Pakistan, although at the time it was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, 
who was a Hindu, despite its majority Muslim population. Therefore, Hari Singh decided to 
remain neutral and did not accede to either country. This, however, was not accepted by 
Pakistani government and it attacked the western part of Kashmir to force the state join 
Pakistan. Hari Singh demanded Indian`s assistance to thwart the Pakistani troops. The Indian 
government agreed to help only if the Kashmir acceded to India. Hari Singh later accepted 
India`s offer; India sent its troops to Kashmir Valley to halt the invasion of Pakistan. However, 
Muslim majority did not welcome the Indian presence in the region, and Sheikh Mohammed 
Abdullah, the leader of a large Muslim community in the Kashmir region, signed an instrument 
of accession to Pakistan and the first war between India and Pakistan erupted in the very same 
year with the partition (Ganguly & Bajpai, 1994).  
In 1948, India requested the involvement of the United Nations in the dispute. The UN 
immediately brokered a ceasefire, demanding Pakistan withdraw its troop and India keep its 
military presence in the region minimal. Also, the UN offered a plebiscite to determine the 
future of Kashmir. However, India refused the plebiscite and Pakistan continued its troop 
presence. Although the violence abated in the region, the UN involvement unleashed further 
unrest in the region (Peace Insight, 2010). 
In 1962, China and India came face to face over a territorial dispute near and within the 
Kashmir region. China objected to the British drawn McMahon border, and occupied territory 
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and claimed the area under its administration, naming it “Aksai Chin” (Hoffmann, 1990). In 
1965 and 1971, there were two other confrontations between India and Pakistan due to the 
increasing tension and unrest in the region. At the end of the third war, the sides signed the 
Simla Agreement and promising to resolve their issues within the UN framework. Also, the 
agreement defined the Line of Control, suggested by the UN in 1949, which demarcates a line 
dividing the region into Indian-administered and Pakistani-administered Kashmir (Mathur, 
2014). However, the unrest in the region never disappeared. On the contrary, the increasing 
unrest brought the sides to the brink of a nuclear war in the Kargil crisis in 1999 (Tellis, Fair, 
& Medby, 2002). Therefore, the Kashmir region can be defined as a very critical and highly 
militarized area with three contesting nuclear powers (China, India and Pakistan) (Ganguly & 
Bajpai, 1994). 
 Thus, to an even greater extent than Sudan, the Kashmir insurgency has both internal 
and international aspects. International aspects can be summarized in the interest of India and 
Pakistan in the territory as well as the role of China. To put it simply, for the Indians, it is 
unacceptable to give land which they consider as integral to India. For Pakistan, Kashmir, with 
its majority Muslim population cannot live under the control of India and should be belong to 
Pakistan. Furthermore, when India aided the breakaway Bangladesh insurgency in the early 
1970s it left more bitterness in Islamabad, which has perhaps spawned the use of terror tactics 
against Indian targets in the aftermath. 
As for the internal Kashmiri aspects, already the increasing discontent of the Muslim 
population against the Indian government deteriorated after 1965 due to the Indian 
government`s heavy-handed measures to repress dissidents, thus paving the way for the 
Muslim Kashmiri uprising in 1989 against Indian control. The insurgency has caused more 
than fifty thousand deaths and many more injured civilians, militants and security personnel 
(Yusuf & Najam, 2009).  
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Although there was another ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan in 2003, 
claiming both sides would be respected to the line of control, the conflict in the region has 
never come to a resolution. It is still a critical region which is regarded as a safe haven for 
religious terrorists and human rights are under constant attack.   
Costs and Benefits of Negotiation Framework Applied 
 Based on the estimate of the logistic regression, the cost of negotiation is found high 
for the conflict between the Kashmiri insurgency and the government of India. For India, even 
the granting of legitimacy to talks with the insurgents would imply that the status of the Indian 
portion of Kashmir might be questionable or negotiable. This finding comes up against the 
Indian “bottom line,” and therefore the conflict has seen a bare minimum of direct or mediated 
government-insurgent negotiation, except for one ceasefire agreement and sporadic talks 
between the governments of India and Pakistan.  
There are several other factors which increase the negotiation cost for the parties. First, 
although the Kashmiri insurgency demands a secession from India, it is not united as one voice 
within itself. There are people who want an independent state for Kashmiri and those who seek 
to accede to Pakistan, as well as a small group who prefer to stay within India (Tavares, 2008). 
The Kashmiri insurgency itself is much fractionalized, as there are different militant outfits in 
the region (Cunningham et al, 2013). While JKLM was the dominant group in 1990s, multiple 
groups presented a low level of leadership coherence in the model.  This multiplies the costs 
and burdens of negotiation for both the insurgency and the government. As such, neither the 
government nor the insurgency find a valid spokesman for the insurgent side to give voice to 
the grievance of Kashmiri people. Once the government negotiates with one group, the others 
may act as spoilers or demand the same privileges.  
In view of the fractionalized insurgency,  it is not very fruitful for one group to initiate 
talks with the government because there is a good chance negotiations will be fruitless unless 
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other groups join in; thus inter-group understandings, and conceivably consultation with 
Pakistan must precede outreach to the Indian government.  The Kashmiri insurgency began in 
1989 with a single dominant insurgent group, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 
(JKLF), but by 1990, there were about 40 different militant outfits (Cunningham et al, 2013). 
Among these groups, while many were determined to gain a secession from India, there were 
also religious foreign militants who sought to wage a jihad to create a theocratic state, which 
further complicates the already complex war situation (Tavares, 2008). Additionally, the 
Kashmiri insurgent groups do not have a unified political wing to raise their concerns and 
demands in the political forums.  
 Pakistan’s role adds to these complications, as for New Delhi the Kashmiri insurgency 
is seen as more of an international dispute with Pakistan than an internal uprising. India may 
believe that it could put down this rebellion quite easily were it not for outside interference. 
Pakistan’s involvement is well known, though Pakistan generally denies it (Cunningham et al, 
2013). Accordingly, as Pakistan uses the Kashmiri dispute as a way to fight India, the long 
term value of negotiation with insurgents is rather doubtful for the Indians. 
 Overall, with the high influence of Pakistan, Kashmir is seen as a proxy war between 
India and Pakistan rather than an internal dispute. This, along with their multiplicity and 
military dependence on Pakistan, harms the legitimacy of insurgent groups as reliable partners 
since it seems obvious to India that the Kashmiri insurgency cannot speak without Pakistan`s 
consent. Moreover, any concessions on the disputed region, Kashmir, may be perceived as a 
damage to the reputation of India in the South Asia. These reputational and legitimacy factors 
thus raise India’s perceived cost of negotiation, while the insurgency itself, despite its 
generations long duration, is nowhere near “hurting stalemate.”   
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Negotiation Periods/Chances Considered throughout the Conflict  
 Since 1989 the Kashmiri insurgency has claimed more than 70,000 lives, with 8,000 
missing (Peace Insight, 2010), and it reached at its peak in 1990s which is considered full-scale 
civil conflict with more than 1000 battle related deaths over the years, according to the UCDP 
data (Allansson, Marie, Melander & Wallenstein, 2017). In 2000, it was believed that there was 
some sort of covert negotiations among the Kashmiri insurgent groups, resulting in the 
declaration of a unilateral ceasefire against the Indian forces by the Hizb`ul – Mujahedeen, the 
largest insurgent group. The insurgents aimed to bring India to three-party negotiations for the 
disputed territory involving India, Pakistan and the insurgents. However, this overture was not 
met by India, and the ceasefire collapsed immediately (Peace Insight, 2010).   
Later, in 2003, the Indian and Pakistani governments signed a ceasefire agreement 
concerning the de facto “Line of Control.” The ceasefire, along with an exchange of hundreds 
of prisoners between the two countries, came after the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee`s visit 
to Srinagar in 2003 where he announced a “healing touch” (Taraves, 2008). Moreover, the 
leaders of India and Pakistan pledged to seek negotiated terms for the long-lasting international 
dispute in 2007 at the Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in New 
Delhi. With the ceasefire in 2003, the level of conflict between two countries gradually had 
scaled down, though it never ended completely. These two events can be considered as the 
gestures of good-will from the sides to build confidence in their much-damaged relationship 
and to proceed to negotiation (Taraves, 2008). However, the progress made between 2003 and 
2008 proved void after the Mumbai attacks in 2008, which Pakistan admitted were launched 
and partly planned from Pakistan (Peace Insight, 2010). Therefore, retrospectively speaking, 
India and Pakistan missed somewhat ripe moments in the period between 2003 and 2008 where 
a negotiated settlement might have been a case with the inclusion of Kashmiri people in the 
process as well.  
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 On the other hand, the rhetoric of the newly elected Prime Minister of India, in 2014, 
pledged a hard-line policy toward Pakistan (BBC News, 2016). Moreover, from 2010 till to 
present, there have been on and off clashes between the Kashmiri insurgents and the Indian 
Army as well as exchanges of border fire between Pakistan and India. In the summer of 2016, 
India imposed a curfew for two months upon a violent street protest by the Kashmiri militants. 
During this period, it is believed that 68 civilians and two Indian army personnel died and more 
than 9,000 people were injured. In 2017, the Kashmiri militants conducted their most 
aggressive move since 2000 by attacking Hindu pilgrims and killing at least 7 while injuring 
16 (BBC, 2017) The situation, today, still remains unresolved and is regarded as one of the 
longest international disputes in the world.   
Concluding Remarks 
 The Kashmir issue can only be understood as a multidimensional conflict wherein India 
and Pakistan fight proxy wars and the Kashmiri Insurgents campaign for self-determination. 
Also, within the Kashmir region, there is no single insurgent voice; while some want to accede 
to Pakistan, a substantial portion of Kashmiri view favor the idea of independent state (Ganguly 
& Bajpai, 1994). What makes the situation even more complicated is that the region has 
become the backstage of foreign extremist fighters who aim to conduct a war of jihad (Clark, 
2001). Therefore, without resolving the Kashmir issue, it is naïve to expect a political stability 
in South Asia, or a Kashmir region free from transnational terrorism. 
 Although the level of conflict is lower compared to the 1990s, there is a risk of falling 
back in the same violent cycle. In addition to Pakistan`s policy to support the insurgency which 
it perceives an easy and effective way of balancing the power asymmetry in the region, India`s 
repressive, hardline policies and use of violence against the insurgency leaves the younger 
generations with little perceived choice but to take arms. While territorial disputes, even if 
more complicated to resolve than governmental power sharing, were found in the Chapter 4 to 
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result in significantly more negotiations, it seems that due to the complications noted in this 
case, there is no end in sight and little prospect for government-insurgent talks unless India and 
Pakistan themselves give up on their existing policies and turn to negotiation.  Moreover, any 
talks concerning the region should also include Kashmiri people. Last but not the least, based 
on the relationship between the two countries in the last six decades, the importance of 
international mediation may have to be recognized particularly as for the human rights are 
concerned in Kashmir (Mathur, 2014; Yusuf & Najam, 2009; Habibullah, 2009; Tavares, 
2008), and the splintered opposition groups must themselves come to terms. 
5.3. The Government of Colombia - the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) 
Background of the Conflict 
Colombia has experienced a half-century long conflict between the government of 
Colombia and the leftist guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), which is the country`s largest insurgent group. To date, the conflict is estimated to 
have claimed more than 220,000 lives and caused more than six million people displaced 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2017). However, it has also recently reached a stage of 
negotiated settlement, albeit with some setbacks in Colombian politics. 
Unlike many other civil conflicts, there is little religious or ethnic divergence in the 
country, although the rights of indigenous groups have been reflected in the FARC campaigns. 
Moreover, the country is regarded as one of the oldest democracies in Latin America, and 
despite severe narco-trafficking threats over time, has remained one of the most stable political 
systems in the region (Holmes, Gutiérrez De Piñeres & Curtin, 2007).  
However, the conflict has been risen along the lines of class division, and it is depicted 
as a contest for political power rather than secession (Restrepo, Spagat & Vargas, 2004). 
Colombia has evolved as a highly segregated society which presents a large gap between rich 
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and poor. While rich families, mostly Spanish descent, make up a small portion of the society, 
poor Colombians are the vast majority (Leech, 2011). The distinction has led to the long periods 
of political polarization and violence between Liberals and Conservatives, as well as to political 
exclusions (Restrepo et al., 2004).  
The origin of the conflict between the FARC and the government dates back 1960s 
which came after the period of “La Violencia” (1948-1958) (Restrepo et al., 2004). The La 
Violencia was a period of civil war between Liberals and Conservatives after the assassination 
of popular charismatic leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán Ayala in 1948, which is believed to have 
cost more than 200,000 lives (Peace Insight, 2009). In 1964, in line with world-wide rebel and 
“national liberation” struggles, a group of 50 guerrillas, which mostly consisted of communist 
self-defense peasant groups, under the leadership of Manuel Marulanda, took up arms against 
the government and began the FARC insurgency. By the 1980s, FARC had become more 
prominent with its increasing military power and the association with the control of major drug 
trafficking (Leech, 2011). 
In 1965, another leftist insurgent group, called the National Liberation Army (known 
by its Spanish acronym, ELN), also emerged in opposition to the government. The Cuban 
Revolution served as a model for other uprisings in various countries, including El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Colombia. Accordingly, the ELN was formed to replicate the Cuban 
revolution, and its constituency was largely composed of leftist students and intellectuals. Both 
insurgent groups, which are known as two largest rebel groups in Colombia, have kept up the 
conflict with the Colombian government to date. However, the ELN is believed to be more 
ideological than the FARC. Unlike the ELN which, like many other revolutionary insurgent 
groups, was formed by middle-class intellectuals to attract the masses, FARC was founded by 
peasants and its leaders have come from peasantry. With this feature, the FARC “is unique 
among contemporary guerrilla organizations in Latin America” (Leech, 2011, p.22). Moreover, 
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although the insurgent groups fought with the same enemy, they cooperated in some regions 
and conflicted in other parts. Both group have been designated as foreign terrorist organizations 
by the US State Department (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).  
As opposition to FARC and ELN, a right-wing group, called United Self-Defence 
Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC), emerged in 1980s to protect 
landowners and local businessman from kidnappings and attacks by insurgent groups (Peace 
Insight, 2009). AUC also has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the US 
State Department until it was removed from the list in 2014 after formally declaring  that it had 
disbanded in 2006 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).  
The FARC adopted violence, kidnappings and extortions to gain recognition and 
financial support. The FARC`s high-profile activities include the abduction of presidential 
candidate Ingrid Betancourt in 2002, the assassination of a former culture minister in 2001 and 
the hijacking of a domestic flight in 2002 by which they held a senator hostage (Leech, 2011). 
The FARC is believed to have kidnapped more than 25,000 people during the insurgency 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2017). 
FARC`s revenue largely relied on drug trafficking, which included production and 
distribution of cocaine. Colombia reportedly has supplied up to 90 percent of the total cocaine 
in the world (Peceny & Durnan, 2006). According to ae US government report in 2009, FARC 
controlled 60 percent of cocaine exported to the US (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).  
 The United States launched a program, called Plan Colombia, in 2000 to halt this 
trafficking. Following the initiation of the Plan, the US sent financial, military and intelligence 
support to Colombia to fight the FARC (Peceny & Durnan, 2006). Also, Alvaro Uribe, elected 
as the president of Colombia in 2002, adopted a harsh policy toward the insurgency. 
Nevertheless, in 2012, Uribe’s successor, Juan Manuel Santos, initiated peace talks with the 
FARC with the bilateral declaration of ceasefire (Zuleta et al, 2013).  In 2016, the sides signed 
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a peace deal which put an end to the five decades long conflict, although Uribe came out 
strongly critical of its terms (particularly regarding FARC’s criminal record, legitimation and 
reintegration into Colombian politics), and influenced the peace referendum to reject the initial 
agreement and force its revision (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).   
Costs and Benefits of Negotiation Framework Applied 
 While the logistic regression calculates relatively low cost of negotiation in the case of 
Sudanese conflict and high cost of negotiation in the Kashmiri insurgency, the calculation 
shows a moderate level of negotiation cost in the Colombian conflict compared to the other 
cases. The occurrence of negotiations during the conflict periods were not always in the same 
line with the logit model prediction. The parties` perception of negotiation cost can be 
understood through the critical junctures and political events unfolding in the country that have 
shaped the parties` perception of the conflict process. 
Throughout the five decade-long conflict, the factors associated with both low and high 
cost of negotiation appear and vary across time. First, there were four leading insurgent groups 
formed in 1960s, namely the FARC, the Popular Liberation Army (EPN), the National 
Liberation Army (ELN), and the Movement of April 19 (M-19). After 1992, and following 
many years of US assisted anti-insurgency efforts, only the FARC and ELN remained active 
in the conflict (Cunningham et al, 2013). Therefore, short of actually eliminating all insurgent 
groups, negotiating with the FARC after 1992, in the presence of two active insurgent groups, 
posed only moderate cost on the government`s side. 
Second, the FARC did not form a political movement for a long time after its founding. 
However, ultimately it did form a political wing, the Patriotic Union, in 1984, and the members 
of the party competed in elections (Cunningham et al, 2013). This dissertation asserts that 
having a political wing lends the group more legitimacy and makes the initiation of talks, at 
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least back-channel talks, easier. Thus, the government may perceive less political cost in 
talking with the leader of a political party than the leader of insurgents.  
 However, what increased the cost of negotiation in the eye of the Colombian 
government was the FARC`s reliance on terrorist, criminal and violent acts including extortion, 
kidnapping, assassinations and the association with drug trafficking. FARC has conducted high 
profile assassinations and kidnappings targeting ministers, politicians and foreign diplomats. 
While the group might have utilized these acts to display their power, the government and 
segments of the population saw them as wanton acts of terror and unacceptable. Consequently, 
negotiations were retarded as government leaders characterized the FARC as unreliable 
negotiating partners; under these conditions negotiation attempts may seem to entail a cost 
harming the government`s reputation by giving in to terrorism. (Leech, 2011).  
Negotiation Periods/Chances Considered throughout the Conflict  
 The Colombian government and FARC have gone through several negotiation 
processes with varying results while the last negotiation peace process initiated in 2012 ended 
with a comprehensive peace agreement in 2016 seemingly putting a peaceful end to the long-
lasting hostilities. Until 2012, however, two sides had missed various opportunities for peaceful 
resolution due to the lack of trust between the parties as well as perceived negotiation costs and 
continued violence from both sides.  
 First negotiation attempts between the Colombian government and the FARC date back 
to the early 1980s. These attempts ended in amnesty and ceasefire. Although the ceasefires 
were initially respected by both sides, the members of the Patriotic Union (UP) party were 
subject to constant attacks and assassinations conducted by paramilitary groups and Army 
officers. In addition, guerrilla conflict remained active in rural areas. All these violent activities, 
regardless of whether initiated by FARC or its counterparts, caused the collapse of ceasefires 
and damaged the trust between the parties (Zuleta, Villaveces & Andonova, 2013). 
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 With the end of Cold War, the government of Colombia attempted to take advantage of 
the peace environment unfolding in El Salvador and Guatemala and negotiate with the rebel 
groups. While several groups such as M-19 and EPL ended the armed struggle and came to the 
terms with the government, the FARC did not take part in negotiations (Cunningham, 2013). 
Accordingly, the Colombian government offered unilateral peace proposal to the M-19 by 
demanding the demobilization of group. In exchange, M-19 demanded amnesty and political 
inclusion. As a result, the M-19 disbanded and established a political party, the Democratic 
Alliance M-19, in 1989 (Zuleta et al, 2013). The successful agreement between M-19 and the 
government, and M-19`s newly established political party running in elections with a 
reasonable popular support brought about new perspectives for insurgents, with the 
possibilities of amnesty and reincorporation into society. Consequently, other small groups 
such as EPL and PRT accepted to demobilize when offered similar peace proposals, as offered 
to M-19, by the government (Zuleta et al, 2013). On the other hand, the unwillingness of the 
FARC to negotiate might have come from the lack of trust due to the failed negotiation process 
in the previous years.  
 Further peace talks commenced in 1998 and resulted in creation of a demilitarized zone 
in the FARC controlled territories with the withdrawal of the Colombian forces until 2002, 
when the peace talks collapsed again (Saab & Taylor, 2009). During this period, FARC 
appeared as unwilling to bargain and asserted “its demands in such a strong way that the 
government had to fulfill them if it wanted to negotiate” (Zuleta et al, 2013, p.112). Also, 
FARC did not trust the international mediators. The US Plan Colombia was considered as 
international participation in the talks. However, the FARC was skeptical about the neutrality 
of the international community and believed that the foreign elements, particularly from or 
influenced by North America, were on the side of the Colombian government. Therefore, the 
FARC decided to stay out of negotiations. Yet, in 2001, they accepted the offer that 
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international participation in negotiation talks would be under the leadership of a “Facilitating 
Group” whose main goal was to maintain the security of the negotiating zone and guarantee 
that there would be no military intervention in the zone. However, FARC`s kidnapping of the 
head of Colombian Senate`s Peace Commission by hijacking an airplane spoiled the peace 
process (Zuleta et al, 2013). On the other hand, the Plan Colombia might also be considered 
another obstacle to peace talks during these periods because the US`s involvement, though 
considered as international participation, was perceived by the FARC as biased and aimed not 
at a negotiated settlement but rather toward the Colombian government’s military victory 
(Zuleta et al, 2013). It appears that international involvement in Colombia did not complicate 
talks as much as in Kashmir, but more than in Sudan. 
 Another round of peace talks between the government and FARC in Norway and Cuba 
began in 2012, with the attendance of Norwegian representatives, Venezuela, Chile and Cuba 
(Zuleta et al, 2013). This constituted a two-year pre-negotiation phase, with one and half years 
of discreet interactions to build confidence between the parties and six months of secret talks, 
preceding the formal negotiation process (Haspeslagh, 2015). This process led to the 
declaration of bilateral ceasefire in mid-2016 and the signing of a peace treaty by the Prime 
Minister Santos and the FARC leader Rodrigo Londoño in September 2016. However, 
Colombians rejected the peace deal a week later in a national referendum. The public`s main 
concern was that the justice process would treat the rebel too softly, based on the agreement. 
Santos and FARC leaders announced that the ceasefire would remain active while they resumed 
and revised the talks. In December 2016, Colombia`s Congress approved the revised peace 
agreement, and it was not brought into another referendum. The revised agreement better 
defined the punishments of the former FARC members. After the congressional approval on 
the agreement, the Constitutional Court ruled that the government can plan to implement the 
agreement (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017). 
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Concluding Remarks  
The peace agreement between the FARC and the Colombian government is a unique 
example of a negotiated solution to an intractable conflict. Although the guarantors (Cuba and 
Norway) in the peace process have played a major role in keeping the parties on track during 
the critical moments in the talks, the biggest credit should be given to the country itself with 
the determination in the process on both sides.  
The decision toward negotiated settlement in the conflict can best be explained by the 
parties’ changing perceptions about negotiation along the lines of the increasing cost of 
conflict. Accordingly, as the cost of conflict increased, the parties, especially the FARC, 
perceived negotiating as relatively beneficial. There are various factors which have shaped the 
actors’ perception of actor from resistance toward negotiation. First, between 2002 and 2010, 
the Colombian government tightened its hard policies against the insurgency. With the support 
of Plan Colombia, the government increased its military spending from 3.6% in 1999 to 6.1% 
in 2007 (Zuleta et al, 2013). Moreover, the US`s policy “war on drugs” turned into “war on 
terror” in Colombia which put the FARC on the front lines, and this tipped the balance of power 
in the conflict toward the Colombian government (Peceny & Durnan, 2006). Although US 
support ultimately strengthened the Colombian government`s hand in the fight, the government 
did not see a military victory in sight because the FARC still controlled a large territory within 
the country and continued using guerrilla tactics. That brought the conflict to a perceived 
stalemate neither side could win. That, coupled with FARC’s relatively well- developed 
leadership and political wing, along with the removal of two rival insurgent groups from the 
field, provided a reasonably coherent partner for talks.  
On the other hand, the law passed by the parliament in 2012 aiming to bring a 
transitional justice mechanism to the agents of State, called “Legal Framework for Peace”, 
could have been seen as a sign of “good will” on the part of the government (Zuleta et al, 2013). 
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With the law, the government aimed to prioritize the prosecution of “most responsible” actors 
who planned and conducted for the most serious crimes and to forgive others with minimal 
punishments or without prosecution if they cooperates with the peace process. Also, the law 
asserted that even the “most responsible” actors, when they cooperated, would be given 
reduced sentences and alternative punishments (Human Rights Watch, 2012). This would make 
the benefits of negotiation more salient for the insurgent group because they would know that 
once they ended the conflict, their rights would conceivably be secured by the government. 
This move as a sign of good will changes the insurgents` perception of negotiation in positive 
way.  
Lastly, Venezuela played an important balancing (countering the US) role in the 
negotiation process as a facilitator and guarantor for both the government and the FARC 
(Zuleta et al, 2013). For the government of Colombia, Venezuela was a key trade partner in 
Latin America. From the FARC`s perspective, Venezuela under Hugo Chavez refused to label 
FARC as a terrorist organization. Therefore, Venezuela had some level of influence on both 
parties; until her own post-Chavez economic demise, she could aid the Colombian economy or 
support the insurgents; she could condemn the government or label FARC as a terrorist group 
(Yilmaz, 2001). As argued in the dissertation, when the parties perceive the facilitator as a 
neutral party, the cost of negotiation for them gradually diminishes.  
All in all, there are important conclusions that can be drawn from the historical peace 
agreement in Colombia. As often highlighted, there is a trust issue between the parties to civil 
conflict. However, this issue can be overcome by the sign of good will from the parties or the 
active participation of neutral third parties. Accordingly, as seen in the case of Colombia, 
declaring a unilateral ceasefire or the laws passed by the parliament can be seen as the sign of 
good will and change the parties’ perception of negotiation. Moreover, the international 
community can play a major role in dealing with the trust and commitment issue because 
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outside actors make the parties more aware of the costs associated with conflict while making 
more salient the gains the negotiation might provide to them (Rettberg, 2007). As such, while 
the FARC refused to negotiate in 1999 when it perceived international community as favoring 
the government, the group accepted negotiations in 2012 when it perceived the facilitators as 
neutral actors and its own resources as perhaps waning. Last but not the least, the dissertation 
mentioned the importance of back-channel and covert talks to test the waters without making 
it public. However, in most cases, it is not possible to analyze these moments due to unavailable 
data. The reason these talks are known for the Colombian case is that the Colombian 
government, after the discreet contacts, announced that they had held secret talks with the 
FARC. It is known that these talks paved the way for legitimation and a formal agreement, 
helping the parties overcome trust issue and making sure of each other’s intention toward a 
negotiated solution, with the help of neutral or balancing mediators.   
5.4. The Government of Sri Lanka – the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) 
Background of the Conflict  
The conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was a three-decade long fight which caused about 84,000 deaths and 
hundreds of thousands displaced people (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2012). The main 
reason of the conflict resided in the demand of the LTTE for an independent state for the Tamil 
ethnic group (Lindberg & Orjuela, 2011).  
The origin of the conflict dates back to Sri Lanka’s independence (formerly known as 
Ceylon) from the British rule in 1948. After independence, ethnic tension between the majority 
Buddhist Sinhalese and the minority Hindu Tamils rose due to the government`s policies 
favoring the Sinhalese while excluding the Tamils (Lindberg & Orjuela, 2011; Lounsbery, 
2003). Among these policies, the major ones included changing the name of country from 
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Ceylon to Sri Lanka, making Buddhism the state`s religion, and the Sinhala language, which 
is spoken by the majority of Sri Lankans, the official language (Council on Foreign Relations, 
2009). These policies increasingly disenfranchised and marginalized the Tamils Moreover. 
Moreover, the Tamils became the targets of various terrible violence in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1979 
and 1981 which is believed to have been initiated by the Sinhalese authorities (Braithwaite & 
D'Costa, 2016)  
In 1976, Velupillai Prabhakaran formed the LTTE to mobilize and encourage the 
Tamils to seek an independent state, called Tamil Eelam, for them in northern and eastern Sri 
Lanka, where they predominantly lived. The LTTE was formed as a political party with 
military wings including the Tigers (armed infantry), Sea Tigers (navy), Air Tigers (air force) 
and Black Tigers (terrorism-oriented) (Braithwaite & D'Costa, 2016).  
In 1983, the LTTE conducted its first attack to the Sri Lankan Army by ambushing an 
army convoy and killed thirteen soldiers. The attack started an uprising in the country, where 
three thousand Tamils were killed and more than 150,000 became homeless. This uprising, 
known as “Black July” marked the beginning of three decades of civil conflict (Braithwaite & 
D'Costa, 2016). 
In the subsequent years, the LTTE continued its attacks by escalating the level of 
violence, recruiting children and women, becoming known for its suicide bombings among 
other terrorist organizations around the world, and gaining the control of the Jaffna Peninsula  
in the Northeast side of the Island. Women played a major role in the military wing of the 
LTTE. Accordingly, four thousand women, with over one hundred engaged in suicide attacks, 
are believed to have been killed in the fight with the government between 1987 and 2002. 
Moreover, following Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s ill-fated attempted peacemaking 
military intervention, in 1991, LTTE women were believed to have been responsible for his 
assassination (Braithwaite & D'Costa, 2016). The assassination of political leaders and suicide 
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bombings became a common strategy of the LTTE as it raised its voice about the discrimination 
against the Tamils and the government`s abuse of human rights through the diaspora in Europe 
and the United States, and funding its campaign largely through their remittances. (Vijayasin, 
1999). 
Although there were several peace talks and ceasefire agreements between two sides, 
especially brokered by Norway, they did not last long and broke down sometimes due to 
changes of government in Colombo. Starting from 2007, the Sri Lankan government launched 
a large-scale military campaign against the LTTE to permanently wipe out the insurgency, 
causing large numbers of civilian deaths. During this time, LTTE also continued to carry out 
deadly suicidal attacks compounding the civilian deaths. Although the international community 
and the United Nations called on the sides to deescalate the conflict, the tension continued to 
rise (Braithwaite & D'Costa, 2016). In 2009, the Sri Lankan government officially declared 
that it had defeated the LTTE and liberated the occupied region (Council on Foreign Relations, 
2009). There are credible allegations showing that war crimes against humanity were 
committed by both the government and the LTTE in the final stage of the conflict, leaving 
40,000 civilian deaths and 6,000 disappeared people (UN Report, 2011).  
Costs and Benefits of Negotiation Framework Applied 
 Although there were some ripe moments, where the cost of negotiation was predicted 
relatively low based on the logistic regression, there were only two main periods of 
comprehensive talks and ceasefires.  Conditions which raised the actors’ cost perception 
regarding negotiation and factors which rendered negotiation less costly for the parties have 
existed side-by-side in this case. 
 First, in the early 1980s, several insurgent groups emerged to challenge the government 
of Sri Lanka. However, by the late 1980s, while many insurgent groups dissolved, the LTTE 
became the single insurgent group and the main representative of Tamil struggle (Cunningham 
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et al, 2013). Also, under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the LTTE had a very 
hierarchical and centralized structure. Although it did not have a political party which 
represented the group in national elections, it functioned as a government in the area it 
controlled. Moreover, the LTTE established strong and directive relations with Tamil diaspora 
groups around the world. Through the large diaspora activity, the LTTE gained both financial 
support and international public attention over years (Weiberg-Salzmann, 2015). These factors 
strengthened its hand as a legitimate and powerful actor in a potential negotiation, but these 
talks did not always materialize or persist. 
On the other hand, despite having considerable territorial control, the group`s high 
reliance on terrorism activities damaged its reputation within its constituency and in the eye of 
international community and the Sri Lankan government.  The LTTE used assassinations, 
forced funding and recruitment, and suicide bombing as the means of fighting with the 
government. It conducted high-profile assassinations, including the assassination of Indian 
prime minister in 1991, the president of Sri Lanka in 1993, and the foreign minister of Sri 
Lanka in 2005 (The Guardian News, 2009). Also, after the 9/11 terrorist event, the international 
funding and recognition of the group gradually declined, and it was no longer seen as “freedom 
fighter” by the outsiders (Weiberg-Salzmann, 2015). This weakens the legitimacy of the group 
and, though perhaps raising its own willingness to negotiate, as with FARC in Colombia, raised 
the perceived cost of negotiating with them. 
Negotiation Periods/Chances Considered throughout the Conflict  
 Throughout the conflict, different external actors tried to bring the parties to 
negotiation, but none of them were very successful. First, Indian military intervention between 
1987 and 1989 did not go in the expected direction. Since there are linguistic, cultural and 
religious links between the Sri Lankan Tamils and Tamils in India, the Indian government 
perceived the conflict as a regional issue and aimed to settle it without its getting out of control. 
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In 1985, the Indian government attempted to initiate some talks with both the Sri Lankan 
government and various Tamil insurgent groups. However, the talks did not proceed further. 
Then, in 1987, the Indian and Sri Lankan governments signed the Indo-Sri Lanka accord which 
concerned the devolution of power by providing a system of provincial councils as a central 
structure of administration in Sri Lanka (Loganathan, 1996). The accord also required the 
disarmament of insurgent groups. Upon signing the accord, India sent about 75,000 to 100,000 
soldiers to Sri Lanka under the name of Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) to monitor the 
implementation of the accord (De Silva, 1998). The Sri Lankan government perceived the 
Indian intervention as a threat to its sovereignty, but the government believed the insurgent 
groups would disarm to the IPKF. However, conflict between the LTTE and the IPKF broke 
due to the LTTE`s unwillingness to disarm. Because of the increasing tension in the country, 
the Sri Lankan government demanded to negotiate with the LTTE on the issue of how to get 
rid of Indian intervention. After the talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, 
the IPKF had to end its intervention in 1990 (Åkebo, 2016). It can be considered as a missed 
opportunity for a comprehensive potential peace accord. However, the parties to civil conflict, 
even while recognizing each other as negotiating partners,   often become less willing to sustain 
or build agreements  because they perceive improved prospects of or more benefits in military 
victory,  or they think they can achieve more through struggle.  
After a period of deadly warfare between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, a 
new opportunity for peace initiatives emerged in the mid-1990s. The People`s Alliance (PA), 
an opposition party to the ruling party, came into the power in 1994, with the promise to end 
the long-lasting conflict. By 1994, the LTTE had gained a significant military power and 
territorial gains in the northern areas. After taking office, the newly elected Prime Minister 
Kumaratunga sent a message to the LTTE which showed the government`s readiness to 
negotiate.  Later, it was announced that the talks would be held in October. However, weeks 
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before the start of talks, the LTTE attacked a Sri Lankan Navy patrol vessel. Although this 
raised opposition voices in the Sri Lankan government against the upcoming talks with the 
LTTE, the prime minister insisted on the continuation of the planned talks (Höglund, 2004).  
Starting from the dialogues in 1994, the government and the LTTE exchanged forty 
letters and held four bilateral talks. Although there were disagreements along the way, it led to 
the mutually agreed ceasefire in 1995. The main goal of the agreement was to deescalate the 
conflict and prevent the parties from carrying out hostile actions including attacks, 
assassinations, abductions, and intimidations. Although the violence abated in the following 
period, incidents continued to occur across the country (Åkebo, 2016).  
With increasing violation of the ceasefire by both sides, the parties started losing their 
faith in the process, and developed different opinions on how it should proceed. From the 
LTTE`s perspective, the government was preparing for war under the ceasefire. In the 
meantime, the government thought that the LTTE`s goal was to weaken the presence of the 
military in Jaffna. As a result, the ceasefire agreement did not proceed to a more 
comprehensible negotiation concerning the conflict related issue and collapsed in a short time; 
the parties turned back to the armed conflict (Balasingham, 2004).  
After the earlier talks in 1994 and 1995 failed, the cost of conflict had become a heavy 
burden on both sides where neither side could apparently achieve a military victory. In 2001, a 
new prime minister, Wickremasinghe, was elected on the promise once more to initiate 
negotiations with the LTTE. In 2002, a ceasefire agreement, brokered by Norway, was signed, 
and the parties accepted further negotiations. This was considered internationally as a 
breakthrough move for peace. In the beginning of the talks in 2002, Norway played a major 
role as facilitator and increased the hopes of peace negotiation on both sides. However, by 
2003, the lack of trust in each other`s commitment and mutual disappointments in the process 
eroded the momentum for peace, although third parties constantly pressured the parties to be 
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committed to the talks. (Schiff, 2014). As the talks proceeded, the LTTE felt that the 
international community and the Sri Lankan government were working together and ignoring 
its demands. Accordingly, while a federal system was being offered in the talks by international 
mediators and the government, seeking to preserve the country’s unity, the LTTE insisted on 
an independent state for Tamils, a goal similar to the developments in Sudan. The LTTE`s 
perception was that international mediators were siding with the government on many issues, 
and therefore, the group declared an end to the negotiation process in 2003 (Weiberg-
Salzmann, 2015).  
Then, the conflict escalated again. In 2006, the LTTE launched several heavy attacks 
on the Sri Lankan Army. Although under the auspices of Norway, there were several back and 
forth informal negotiation offers between the parties, each time they failed to meet the other 
side`s concern and demand and the negotiations did not occur.  In late 2006, and after an elected 
change of government, the Sri Lankan leadership determined to root out the LTTE completely 
and closed all negotiation channels (Weiberg-Salzmann, 2015). Although the LTTE later sent 
informal messages to restart the ceasefire process, the government response was: “it is useless 
talking to them now”, the cabinet spokesman and media minister, Anura Yapa (The Guardian 
News, 2008). After a long period of military operations against the LTTE, the Sri Lankan 
government officially declared the defeat of the insurgent group and fully reoccupied their 
territory in 2009. 
Concluding Remarks 
In the case of Sri Lankan civil war, both parties sought at various times to negotiate or 
to reach a military victory and ultimately were unwilling to give meaningful concessions. 
Although federal status was briefly discussed it is remarkable how little attention was paid to 
the issues such as language, cultural and economic rights that divided the parties as the conflict 
devolved into a fully secessionist movement. Ultimately they were also unable to take the steps 
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for partition that were taken in Sudan, despite a coherent insurgent leadership and international 
pressure for settlement. Even the periods of ceasefire were taken as opportunities for them to 
prepare for war, at least as they perceived the other side`s intention in that way. The lack of 
trust was a main obstacle in the way of negotiation.  
The two periods of talks in the mid-1990s and 2002 were opportunities for potential 
breakthrough negotiations. However, as highlighted in this study, not all opportunities are 
grasped by the parties, and not all ceasefires are in the intention of peace talks; some are for 
gaining time to recover or gain legitimacy. Accordingly, what brought the parties to ceasefire 
agreement in 2002 was appeared to be the external pressure, not their readiness for a 
negotiation. Due to the international pressure, not negotiating was an additional cost to their 
already existing cost of conflict. As such, although the LTTE had gained military victories 
against the Sri Lankan Army in 2000 and 2001, after the 9/11 terrorist attack in the US, the 
group had difficulty in receiving international support and recognition. The LTTE`s 
expectation from the ceasefire was to gain legitimacy and recognition. On the other hand, the 
Sri Lankan government`s economy had been devastated by the conflict, and it had been 
pressured by international community to end the conflict. Therefore, the government also 
aimed to meet the international community`s expectation and gained legitimacy in the 
international area (Weiberg-Salzmann, 2015). As in Colombia, however, political infighting in 
the regime added to the inconsistency in backing away from previous ceasefire agreements.   
The end of the Sri Lankan civil war has come at cost of thousands of civilians’ lives, 
human rights violations and refugees. In last two years of the conflict, the government 
strengthened its military operation and did not hear the calls of the UN and other states to end 
the conflict. Also, any opposition and media had been silenced (Weiberg-Salzmann, 2015). As 
Galtung (1969) asserts, the end of conflict does not mean a total peace and harmony for people 
affected by the conflict unless it deals with the grassroots and structural issues of the conflict. 
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Therefore, many unresolved issues including political, economic, cultural, and psychological 
aspects of the society affected by the conflict and violations of human rights lie ahead if the Sri 
Lankan government is to build the peace. Otherwise, the end of one conflict might be the 
beginning of another.    
5.5. Conclusion 
 The chapter analyzed four protracted civil conflict from different parts of the world and 
showed negotiation periods. While two conflicts (the Colombian and Sudanese) ended with a 
peace agreement, one conflict (the Sri Lankan) ended with the government`s military victory, 
and one conflict, Kashmir, remained unresolved. Within-conflict analysis showed that some 
conditions prepared the ground for negotiation, while others led to the escalation of conflict. It 
is seen that suggested indicators for costs and benefits of negotiation can be applicable to 
specific cases, and they indeed do matter in the actors` assessment of the conflict.  
Within-case comparison showed that the parties` willingness to negotiate might change 
over years based on the conditions. Accordingly, all four cases suggest that negotiation is more 
likely to happen in the presence of a neutral third party. This can be understood from the 
Colombian case where the FARC did not perceive the international mediators as neutral during 
the talks they refused to attend in 2000, but later in 2001, with the emergence of Venezuela and 
when they believed the mediators were not biased, they accepted talks. Similarly, the LTTE is 
believed to have ended the peace talks in 2003 since they believed that the facilitators were 
favoring the government and ignoring its demands.  
On the other hand, even if negotiation is predicted well with suggested indicators such 
as coherent insurgent leadership (Colombia, Sri Lanka, Sudan) and territorial control 
(Colombia, Sudan, Sri Lanka), the actual initiation, durability and success of a negotiation can 
vary due to extenuating circumstances.  Accordingly, even when parties hold talks, they often 
fail. While the cases lent support the dissertation`s reputation, legitimacy, valid spokesman, 
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third party intervention, external pressure, and terrorism hypotheses, in many aspects, these 
cases carried the arguments further and gave a better understanding of the variables which were 
not included or suggested in the quantitative analysis. Comparison across conflicts, settings, 
and circumstances reveals many important nuances accounting for the approach or refusal of 
negotiation. 
 One of the common implication of all four cases seems to be the need of good-will 
signs from at least one actor to initiate the talks. As often suggested, there is a trust issue 
between the parties in civil conflict, and while they may afford a modicum of legitimacy to 
each other, they may remain unsure of each other’s sincerity or intentions, at least initially. 
However, some actions or signals might be sent as signs of good-will. The Colombian 
government`s declaration of a unilateral ceasefire and the laws concerning post-conflict 
situation passed by the parliament can be given as examples of good-will gestures by the 
government which pronounce its willingness and readiness to negotiate, despite later reneging 
which could negate such gestures in subsequent phases. Similarly, in the Sri Lankan case, the 
newly elected Prime Minister Kumaratunga made clear her intention for potential talks with 
the LTTE during her campaign, just as her opponents later reversed these positions.  In both 
cases, the good-will gestures were reciprocated by the other side and at least led to the initiation 
of talks between the parties.  
 Another way to overcome the trust issue seems to be through third party participation 
as mediators, or perhaps more importantly, guarantors. In all four cases, most of the talks 
between the parties to civil conflict happened in the presence of a third party. Moreover, it 
seems to be that more neutral the third party comes off and more influential it is over the parties, 
the more likely negotiation is to happen between the parties. In the Colombian case, Venezuela 
emerged as both a neutral and influential party and source of major assistance to the parties in 
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the negotiation process. On the other hand in Sri Lanka, India’s involvement was seen as 
insufficiently non-partisan. 
 Political changes, on the other hand, seem to affect in what the direction the conflict or 
the talks will go because newly elected or influential parties come with their own agenda, and 
often they are elected or selected because of their rhetoric on the conflict. Accordingly, the 
newly elected Prime Minister of India in 2014 pledged a hard stand against Pakistan and the 
dispute region of Kashmir although clashes between Indian Army and Pakistan-backed 
Kashmiri insurgency had been relatively low since 2003 when India and Pakistan signed a 
ceasefire along the Line of Control. Similarly, when the Uribe administration came to power 
in Colombia in 2002, he pledged a hardline policy on counter-insurgency operations, gaining 
American assistance, and the military operations were on rise until 2010 when a new 
administration was elected. However, it should be mentioned that the rhetoric of the parties is 
not independent of the public opinion toward the conflict and the actions of the insurgent 
groups. Accordingly, Uribe`s administration`s rhetoric came after the FARC`s terrorist action 
in hijacking a plane and scuttled the talks initiated in 1999 between the government of 
Colombia and the FARC. Similarly, in Kashmir, there had been on and off clashes between the 
insurgent groups and Indian Army until 2014 when the Prime Minister announced a hard stand 
on the issue.  Such rhetorical or military reversals also have been seen in many other countries, 
and may be interpreted as strategies to manipulate or gain public support.  
 Although it is expected and known that the parties to civil conflict may hold secret talks 
preceding formal talks or during negotiation processes, it is often difficult to assess the impact 
of these events due to unavailable data. However, the government of Colombia announced that 
they held secret talks with the FARC members for two years before they sat down for formal 
negotiations in 2012. In the Colombian case, it was to test the water for negotiations before 
they formally began. There can be various reasons for covert talks. First, the parties are not 
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sure of other side`s tendency toward a negotiation. Since the leaders are concerned about their 
reputation, they may find secret talks safer in case the talks are to fail. Second, whenever a 
peace process starts, there are, most of the times, spoilers who oppose them. The spoilers may 
come from within the insurgent group or the government and threaten the cohesion or survival 
of the leadership. This was the case in Sri Lanka in 1994 when the newly elected Prime Minister 
Kumaratunga made public her intention for peaceful resolution to the long-lasting conflict. 
Accordingly, many critical voices were raised both within the military and the opposition 
political parties.  
On the other hand, while focusing too much on the perceived costs and benefits of 
negotiation, the cost of conflict cannot be ignored. This is because in civil conflicts it mostly 
takes years, if not decades, before the parties take a break from the conflict and initiate or agree 
to talks with the opposition. In that sense, as Zartman predicts, military stalemate seems to be 
an important factor preceding negotiation. This is because when the parties are overwhelmed 
by the conflict and have no victory in sight, they seek to find other means. Accordingly, in the 
Sri Lankan civil conflict, the parties agreed to a ceasefire agreement brokered by Norway in 
2002, and at that time, the cost of conflict was too high for both parties due to economic factors, 
territorial losses, and armed fighting (Weiberg-Salzmann, 2015). After the ceasefire collapsed, 
Sri Lankan government increased its military operation against the LTTE and made territorial 
gains. When the balance of power was tilted toward the government forces, the insurgents 
demanded a ceasefire through third parties; however, since the government`s expectation of a 
military victory increased in the meantime, it refused the offer and aimed to root out the 
insurgency.  
It can be argued that once the one sides gains the upper hand in the conflict, they are 
more motivated to fight than to talk. However, the tactic that the Sri Lankan government used 
might not be generalized to other conflicts because the military victory came at the heavy cost 
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of civilian lives and human rights violations, and not all governments can ignore the call of the 
international community to end the conflict and secure the safety of civilians. For instance, 
although the Colombian government gained the upper hand in the conflict by 2010 with its 
increasingly hard-stand in counter insurgency policy and military operations, it decided to 
negotiate with the FARC for a more comprehensive and inclusive conflict resolution.  
Overall, in this chapter, many conclusions have been drawn based on the sweep of years 
in four selected protracted civil conflicts. Some of them might be generalized to other conflicts 
while the others might be specific to the dyad, only. However, how the actors perceive 
negotiation and what they see in prospective negotiations influence their decision to hold and 
persist in talks. To understand the success of these talks requires another set of questions and 
another analysis, on the other hand. The next chapter gives a bigger picture on the conclusions 
drawn from both regression and case study analysis, as well as giving direction to further 
research.    
152 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 This chapter presents an overview of the research undertaken to complete this 
dissertation. It also provides preliminary discussions on the theoretical, as well as applied 
implications of the findings. Third, the chapter outlines the most significant limitations 
circumventing the generalizability of results uncovered by this research. Finally, the chapter 
supplies stakeholders with a set of recommendations aiding their systems of decision-making 
with respect to negotiations. 
6.1. Overview of the Study 
 This research investigated the magnitude of costs associated with entering negotiations 
in civil wars. This question is central to the conceptualization of negotiations since many 
models cast doubt on the significant costs of negotiations concluding that such an act is 
costless. On the other hand, a number of political scientists noted that negotiations carry a wide 
range of costs including concerns about reputation, communication, legitimacy, as well as 
political (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2001; Ghosn, 2010; Kaplow, 2015). Further, this study 
empirically tested the link between actors’ perceptions of various aspects related to 
negotiations and the likelihood of entering negotiations in civil wars, a neglected relationship 
in the scholarship on negotiations. 
This research extends the work of Kaplow (2015) who attempted to generate the 
benefits and costs of negotiations in civil war. To do this, this research proposed and tested 
eight hypotheses concerning the potential benefits and costs of negotiations on the likelihood 
to negotiate in civil conflicts using new set of measurements. The dissertation did not only 
utilized the power of multivariate statistical techniques, but also the rich in-depth evidence 
based on real case studies supported by the results of the quantitative analysis. Using logistic 
regression, the research tested the effects of reputation, legitimacy, valid spokesman, external 
pressure, terrorism, foreign military intervention, and human rights on negotiations. The data 
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for the research included 991 units of intrastate dyad-years. Case-study analysis was conducted 
on four conflict dyads: the Sudanese Government and the SPLM/A; the Indian Government 
and the Kashmir Insurgency; the Colombian Government and the FARC; the Sri Lankan 
Government and the LTTE.  
Based on the findings of the research, this dissertation proposed a new perspective on 
the understanding of negotiations during civil conflicts referred to as the Negotiation 
Calculation. The Negotiation Calculation suggested in this research grasps how the parties to 
civil conflict assess prospect of a potential negotiation. More specifically, the calculation, 
which lies in the actors` perception, reveals whether a potential negotiation comes off as a cost 
or benefit to them. In this sense, the main assumption here is that negotiation will become more 
likely to happen as the perceived cost of negotiation by the actors decreases, or as the parties 
find it beneficial. This view blends existing understandings of negotiations occurrence in the 
international relations and peace studies literatures on the subject. The basic assumption of the 
proposed explanation begins with asking two queries. First, what are the barriers to negotiations 
in civil conflicts? Second, who decides to negotiate? These two questions, though seem simple, 
their answers are complex and require an in-depth analysis, the work of this dissertation. The 
first question represents the negotiations puzzles in the Negotiation Calculation logic. The 
puzzle, described in Chapter 1, indicates that negotiations in civil conflicts are rare events 
because civil conflicts can last years without reaching a peaceful agreement (Zartman, 1993); 
the actors do not recognize each other as a reliable and legitimate negotiating partner (Iklé, 
1971; Pillar, 1983; Zartman, 1995; Walter, 2002); the issues at stake are undividable (Pillar, 
1983; Walter, 2002), the parties see victory as a better option during the early years of conflicts 
(Bapat, 2005); the parties perceive losses more salient than gains in a prospect of negotiation 
(McDermott, 2009). Therefore, reputation, legitimacy, valid spokesman, external pressure, and 
terrorism were suggested as potential factors explaining negotiations occurrence. One the other 
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hand, seeking to answer the second question turned the dissertation’s perspective to a dyadic 
analysis since it takes two to negotiate (Cunningham et al, 2009). The decision of negotiating 
is a two-sided choice. Therefore, both sides` perspectives should be grasped for a better 
analysis. Accordingly, foreign military intervention, mediation, and human rights were 
suggested as potential determinants of negotiations in civil conflicts. Overall, the findings of 
this dissertation supports the Negations Calculation perspective. 
6.2. Discussion 
Findings of this research suggested that negotiation becomes less likely to happen as 
the number of insurgent groups fighting the central government simultaneously increases. In 
this analysis, the number of insurgent groups was used as a measure testing the reputation 
hypothesis. The idea here was that the government would be less likely to negotiate with an 
insurgent group if there were multiple groups involved in the civil conflict because it perceives 
any talks with a group as a concession tainting its reputation. This finding is consistent with 
previous research conclusions (Kaplow, 2015; Findley, 2013). Although one measure was 
suggested to capture the reputation variable in this study, a qualitative reading into case studies 
affirm this finding. As in the case of the Columbian government, there were secret talks 
between government of Colombian and the FARC for two years prior to the initiation of formal 
peace negotiation in 2012. This suggested that both sides wanted to ensure the other side`s 
willingness and readiness for a negotiation before announcing it publicly because they were 
concerned about their reputation within their constituency.  
Moreover, the fractionalization of leadership in insurgent groups shape the 
government`s perception on negotiations. Conventional wisdom suggests that finding a 
representative of a group is a prerequisite for initiating a negotiation episode (Zartman, 1995). 
The findings of logistic analysis showed that negotiation is more likely to happen with the 
insurgent groups that have highly structured leadership compared to less structured groups. In 
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highly structured groups, the government would find a valid spokesman to initiate the talks 
with. Therefore, a spokesman who can speak for the insurgent group is believed to decrease 
the cost of negotiations on the government`s side. In Kaplow`s study (2015), this was named 
as transaction cost. Moreover, as seen in the Sudanese civil conflict, the SPLM/A, which has a 
highly hierarchical organizational structure, has emerged as a dominant insurgent group within 
the country who speaks for a large segment of the Southern population which encompasses 
various groups with different ethnic, cultural and religious background. Accordingly, this 
decreases the transaction cost of negotiation, although other costs of negotiation for both sides 
were present in the conflict.  
The findings also indicated that external pressure has a significant effect on the 
occurrence of negotiation during civil conflicts. External pressure was considered from both 
governments` and insurgents` perspectives and was suggested in two different directions. First, 
from the insurgent`s point of view, it was argued that the insurgent group would be less willing 
to negotiate if it received military support from an external actor (either a state or a non-state 
actor) since the group would perceive a potential negotiation as a risk to lose the existing 
support. The assumption here was that the external sponsors would encourage the insurgent 
group to continue to fight. However, the results showed that while negotiation is less likely to 
happen if the insurgent group receives military support from a non-state actor, negotiation is 
more likely to happen if the group receives the support from a state actor. One possible 
explanation to this unexpected finding is due to the increased military power of the insurgent 
group raising the probability of a stalemate leading to a better ground for negotiations escaping 
the deadly stalemate between the government and the dominant insurgent group.   Another 
explanation suggests that there might be other unobservable factors which cannot be captured 
by the data. For instance, when there is an explicit military support from an external state to 
the insurgent group, the conflict might be carried into an interstate confrontation and might 
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lead to some sort of temporary negotiations, such as ceasefire agreements, even if it does not 
lead to a peace agreement, as in the example of Pakistan-backed Kashmiri insurgency. 
Although the conflict has been unresolved for decades, it has experienced some negotiations 
between India and Pakistan which mostly include ceasefire agreements. 
 Second, from the government`s perspective, external pressure was suggested in a way 
to prompt the probability of negotiation in civil conflicts. This means that if the insurgent group 
has a transnational constituency, this will increase the international attention and awareness on 
the conflict and will bring pressure on the government to negotiate. This argument was 
supported by the findings of logistic analysis.  
The effect of foreign military interventions on negotiation in civil conflicts emerged as 
one of the strongest findings of this research. The results indicated that foreign military 
interventions increase the likelihood of a negotiation in the conflict. Moreover, the findings 
showed that the effect and significance of the neutral/unbiased foreign military interventions 
on the occurrence of negotiation are stronger than those which are biased either against the 
government or the insurgent, or both. This is because the security is among the biggest concerns 
of the parties in civil conflict due to lack of trust and war-torn relationship. However, a foreign 
military intervention, especially a neutral one, might change the perception of parties by 
making the benefits of negotiation more salient than the costs of negotiation. In addition to 
foreign military intervention, findings lent support to the effect of mediation, which is one of 
the most-pronounced indicators in the literature (Walter, 2002; Bercovitch & DeRouen, 2005; 
Greig & Regan, 2008). As found in neutral military intervention, findings showed that 
mediations and mediators which are perceived as neutral by the parties to civil conflict are 
more likely to increase the probability of negotiation. Moreover, most negotiations in many 
conflicts are moderated by a third state or multiple states and international organizations. The 
four case studies show that most negotiation attempts and period in these conflicts were 
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mediated by a third neutral party. Indeed, as in the example of Sri Lankan conflict and 
Colombian conflict, the insurgent groups refused to take part in negotiations or cancelled the 
talks since they perceived the international mediators to be biased against them.  
Human right hypothesis was suggested to capture the negotiation calculation from the 
insurgent`s perspective. Accordingly, two human rights indexes (physical integrity index and 
empowerment index) were used as a measure of this hypothesis. However, while the former 
was not found influential on negotiation outcome, the latter showed significant and positive 
effect. This could be interpreted as that the insurgent`s prospect of post-conflict situation can 
be partially shaped by the government`s respect for specific human rights, including freedom 
of movement, freedom of speech, workers’ rights, political participation, and freedom of 
religion. Therefore, this hypothesis might be truer for the conflicts which are fought over the 
governance than those waged for territorial interests. The logic here is that as the government 
is perceived more respectful for these rights, the insurgent group`s cost perception of a 
negotiation gradually decreases in case a mutual agreement, i.e. sharing government, is 
reached. Since this hypothesis has not been included as an indicator of negotiation in civil 
conflict setting before in the literature, this marks one of the slightest contributions of the 
dissertation to the field and call for improvement in future studies.  
The results indicated that the occurrence of negotiation does not significantly vary 
between terrorist-oriented groups and other insurgents. However, findings showed that 
negotiation is, though slightly, less likely to happen with the group who are recognized as 
terrorist organizations comparing to the others. However, the dissertation did not find support 
to the argument in relation to positive and negative reputation of terrorist organizations. In 
contrast, it was found that negotiation is more likely to happen with the terrorist group who has 
negative constituency reputation comparing to those who has positive reputation. This finding 
seems to support Thomas`s (2014) argument that terrorist activities in civil war increases the 
158 
 
 
 
 
likelihood of concessions and negotiation by decreasing the state`s “power to hurt” since state 
cannot “target those directly responsible for violence” (p.816). Although an alternative 
explanation was raised in the conclusion of Chapter 4 to make sense of the finding, further 
research is needed to better understand the underlying reason. Regardless, terrorism hypothesis 
stands as another contribution to the literature by giving a way to compare the terrorist 
organizations within themselves and with other insurgent groups on the perspective of 
negotiation outcome.  
Moreover, the dissertation did not find support for the argument that negotiation will 
be more likely to happen if the insurgent group has a political wing since it will grant the group 
somewhat more legitimacy as a negotiation partner. The results pointed that it is the other way 
around. As discussed in the conclusion part of Chapter 4, other factors, such as whether the 
political party is legal and the degree to which the party and the insurgent group are linked, 
should be included to argue that a political wing may grant legitimacy to the group. However, 
the lack of data might be an obstacle for such research.  
In this analysis, the case studies did not only serve as a complimentary to the logistic 
analysis to understand the costs and benefits of negotiation, but also gave more insight into the 
understanding of the actors` perception of negotiation and negotiation periods in civil conflicts. 
Accordingly, several important conclusions can be drawn from the cases. First, the cases 
showed that gesture of good-will is a catalysis for negotiation because the intention of parties 
is often overshadowed by hostility and mistrust between the actors in civil conflicts. As seen 
from the cases, one of the most common signs of good-will seems to be the unilateral ceasefire 
declaration. This is often reciprocated by the other side although there are exemptions to it. 
Second, not all ceasefire agreements are intended to seek to negotiate the conflict related issues, 
but some are intended to buy time to recover or to gain legitimacy. This was the case in Sri 
Lankan civil conflict. Accordingly, when Norway brokered a ceasefire agreement between two 
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sides in 2002, the parties` interests were to gain legitimacy in the eye of international 
community (Weiberg-Salzmann, 2015). Third, there might be secret and back-channeled talks 
preceding to formal negotiation in civil conflict. Last but not the least, leadership and political 
changes within governments and insurgent groups might stand for critical junctures in conflicts. 
The leader`s fear to lose the constituency support leads to risk-averse decisions toward 
negotiation. A political leader might lose the public support in the face of failed negotiation or 
even initiating a negotiation with the “terrorists”. On the other hand, as seen from the cases, 
some administrations come to power on the promise to find a peaceful resolution to the long-
lasting conflict. This shows that negotiation might be a risky choice for political leaders in 
terms of their hold on to power. The same logic can be applied to the leaders of insurgent 
groups. Accordingly, they can be also concerned about the internal cohesion of the group and 
potential splits and critical voices. Therefore, this perception adds a cost to the perception of 
negotiation for the leaders of parties.   
This dissertation, by no means, attempted to invalidate the cost of conflict explanation.   
On the contrary, it found strong support for the effect of insurgent`s territorial control within 
the country on the occurrence of negotiation. The findings suggested that negotiation is more 
likely to happen in the dyad-years in which the insurgent groups controls a territory comparing 
to those where no land is administered or occupied by the insurgents. However, the findings 
did not support much the well-known stalemate argument. Although the stalemate hypothesis 
was in the expected direction, it lost its significance over the models of logistic analysis when 
the other variables were controlled. This finding might be explained by Findley`s (2013) study 
in which the author finds mixed effects of stalemate on the different levels of negotiation 
process. 
On the other hand, the findings showed that some conflicts are more prone to 
negotiation comparing to others. Accordingly, the results indicated that the probability of 
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having a negotiation is higher in territorial conflicts than in the conflicts over the governance. 
This finding adds more insight into the literature which suffers from the mixed results in which 
some studies find territorial conflicts are easier to resolve (Mason, 1996; Stedman, 1997), 
others asserts territorial goals have a negative impact on the resolution of conflicts (Walter, 
2002; Dukalskis, 2015).   
Last but not the least, the data created can be considered as one of the significant 
contributions of this dissertation. The data was collected by merging four different data sources. 
First, although the NSA data were not initially in annual observation format, they were 
converted into dyad-years format for this study. Second, although not all the sources had both 
dyad id (identification number for dyads) and cow id variables both the COW ID (identification 
for countries) at the beginning, both IDs were included in the data by using several resources 
and crosschecking the information. By this way, the data merged for this study allows 
researchers to conduct analysis at both dyadic and country levels. Moreover, the collected data 
provides researchers with knowledge on the characteristics of the government and insurgent 
group as well as the conflict itself. Moreover, it includes the reputation scales of terrorist 
organizations in civil conflicts as well as other variables in terrorism research such as 
information about the terrorism events, and human rights indexes for countries.   
6.3. Research Limitations and Recommendations for Future Studies 
 This dissertation attempted to measure the costs and benefits of negotiation in the eyes 
of the parties to civil conflicts. However, negotiation was taken as a static concept rather than 
dynamic. This research did not differentiate between low, medium or high negotiations or any 
other typologies of negotiations limiting the scope of its generalizability. Therefore, future 
studies might consider seeking the effects of given costs and benefits on various levels of 
negotiation, such as talks, prisoner`s exchanges, ceasefire agreement, and peace agreements.  
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 On the other hand, this research was designed to explain the initiations of negotiation; 
therefore, it does not provide any insight into the durability and success of negotiation under 
the costs and benefits of negotiation. This gap should be filled in future research since it can 
provide the policymakers and scholars with more practical implications for conflict resolutions. 
Future studies should utilize measures of duration, durability and success of negotiations to 
better aid stakeholders in their work on the international level creating better conditions for 
peacemaking.  
 Third, given the sudden nature of negotiations and its rarity, more refined analysis of 
the event should occur in shorter periods of time. This analysis was limited by the availability 
of data, which only provided annual measures of conflicts. Monthly or quarterly analyses 
should be conducted in future research to provide better refined results. Nevertheless, such a 
research might be difficult to pursue in a cross-sectional data covering all civil conflict periods 
around the world due the unavailability of data. This indicates a further need for in-depth case 
studies and comparative studies using mixed research designs rather than solely relying on the 
quantitative paradigm.    
 This dissertation relied on dichotomous variables to measure the suggested hypotheses. 
This loses the continuity of constructs that are hypothesized to influence negotiations limiting 
the ability of the research to generalize its claims. Future studies should use interval/ratio 
measures to see whether the effect on negotiation vary across the levels of suggested indicators. 
Also, more variables might be needed to grasp the hypotheses better. As such, in this study, the 
insurgent`s political wing was a dichotomous measure, and the hypothesis was not supported 
by the findings. This might be due to the use of a dummy variable. Therefore, future research 
should include more measures to test this hypothesis, such as whether the political party is legal 
and the strength of link between the insurgent group and political part.   
162 
 
 
 
 
  Lastly, based on the cases studies, ceasefire agreements or unilateral ceasefire 
declaration emerge as critical points during civil conflicts. While some of them lead to more 
comprehensible agreements between the parties, others collapse in a matter of time. Therefore, 
ceasefire agreements may hold several aspects during the conflict in terms of negotiation. As 
understood from the cases, not all ceasefire agreements are done in good faith, rather, some are 
in pursuit of taking a break from the conflict to recover or to gain legitimacy in the eye of 
international community. On the other hand, unilateral ceasefire declaration is often perceived 
as the sign of good-will by the parties to negotiate. Therefore, future studies should analyze 
different types of ceasefire agreements under various condition and their effects on the conflict 
resolution to see whether it is a pre-condition for negotiations.  
The study uncovered the set of conditions under which negotiations occur during civil 
conflicts. Note that the success and durability of negotiations was of no concern of this study. 
Therefore, every contact between the parties concerning the conflict was considered as a 
negotiation point (let it be a ceasefire agreement, decision to exchange prisoners, bilateral talks 
about conflict zones, or a peace agreement). Regardless of the implementation of the mentioned 
issues, the study analyzed negotiations points during the period under study attempting to 
explain what brought the parties to negotiations table. It is also noteworthy to note that the 
dissertation was merely an attempt to verify previously tested hypotheses and test newly 
proposed relationships concerning occurrence of negotiations during civil conflicts at a 
theoretical level.  
6.4. Summary 
This chapter outlined the conclusions of this dissertation by discussing the results, 
pointing to the limitations of study and making suggestions for future research. The chief 
findings of this work lie in the fact that our understanding of contemporary civil conflicts and 
peace is inadequate without a thorough understanding of costs and benefits of negotiation. The 
163 
 
 
 
 
parties` perception of negotiation as a cost or benefit determines the decision to negotiate 
during civil conflicts. The dissertation attempted to conceptualize the Negotiation Calculation 
of insurgent groups and government in civil conflicts, aiming to provide the extant literature 
with a new perspective on conflict resolution. Future research should implement rigorous 
research designs and include additional measurements to analyze the costs and benefits of 
negotiation more thoroughly. The most important recommendation of this research is for 
international community to pay attention not only the cost of war, but also the cost of 
negotiation for the parties to civil conflict and aim to decrease the parties` perception of the 
costs while making the benefits more salient. Future researcher are encouraged to reshuffle the 
literature`s knowledge on what constitute a cost and what does not to the parties in civil 
conflicts.   
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APPENDIX A: THE LIST OF WARRING DYADS IN CIVIL CONFLICTS, 1989-2008 
No Dyad Name Dyad Id COW Id 
1 Government of Algeria - FIS (AIS) 1 615 
2 Government of Algeria - Takfir wa'l Hijra / Exile and 
Redemption 
2 615 
3 Government of Algeria - GIA 3 615 
4 Government of Algeria - AQIM 4 615 
5 Government of Angola - UNITA 7 540 
6 Government of Burundi - Palipehutu 11 516 
7 Government of Burundi - CNDD 12 516 
8 Government of Burundi - Frolina 13 516 
9 Government of Burundi - CNDD–FDD 14 516 
10 Government of Burundi - Palipehutu–FNL 15 516 
11 Government of Central African Republic - Military faction 
(forces of André Kolingba) 
17 482 
12 Government of Chad - Revolutionary Forces of 1 April 18 483 
13 Government of Chad - Mosanat 19 483 
14 Government of Chad - Islamic Legion 20 483 
15 Government of Chad - CSNPD 21 483 
16 Government of Chad - CNR 22 483 
17 Government of Chad - MPS 23 483 
18 Government of Chad - FNT 24 483 
19 Government of Chad - MDD 25 483 
20 Government of Chad - FARF 26 483 
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No Dyad Name Dyad Id COW Id 
21 Government of Chad - MDJT 27 483 
22 Government of the Comoros - MPA/Republic of Anjouan 35 581 
23 Government of Congo - Ninjas 36 484 
24 Government of Congo - Cocoyes 37 484 
25 Government of Congo - Ntsiloulous 38 484 
26 Government of Democratic Republic of Congo - RCD 40 490 
27 Government of Democratic Republic of Congo - MLC 41 490 
28 Government of Djibouti - FRUD 43 522 
29 Government of Djibouti - FRUD – AD 44 522 
30 Government of Ethiopia - EPRDF 48 530 
31 Government of Ethiopia - Military faction (forces of Amsha 
Desta and Merid Negusie) 
49 530 
32 Government of Ethiopia - ARDUF 52 530 
33 Government of Ethiopia - EPLF 53 530 
34 Government of Ethiopia - ONLF 54 530 
35 Government of Ethiopia - OLF 55 530 
36 Government of Guinea - RFDG 57 438 
37 Government of Guinea Bissau - Military Junta for the 
Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice 
58 404 
38 Government of Cote D’Ivoire - MPCI 89 437 
39 Government of Cote D’Ivoire - MPIGO 91 437 
40 Government of Lesotho - Military faction 92 570 
41 Government of Liberia - NPFL 93 450 
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No Dyad Name Dyad Id COW Id 
42 Government of Liberia - INPFL 94 450 
43 Government of Liberia - LURD 95 450 
44 Government of Mali - MPA 96 432 
45 Government of Mali - FIAA 97 432 
46 Government of Morocco - Polisario 98 600 
47 Government of Mozambique - Renamo 99 541 
48 Government of Niger - CRA 111 436 
49 Government of Niger - FDR 113 436 
50 Government of Rwanda - FPR 127 517 
51 Government of Rwanda - FDLR 128 517 
52 Government of Senegal - MFDC 129 433 
53 Government of Sierra Leone - RUF 130 451 
54 Government of Sierra Leone - AFRC 131 451 
55 Government of Sierra Leone - Kamajors 132 451 
56 Government of Uganda - UPA 148 500 
57 Government of Uganda - LRA 151 500 
58 Government of Uganda - WNBF 152 500 
59 Government of Uganda - ADF 153 500 
60 Government of the Comoros - Presidential Guard 158 581 
61 Government of Congo - Cobras 189 484 
62 Government of Angola - FLEC–FAC 190 540 
63 Government of Angola - FLEC–R 191 540 
64 Government of Somalia - SNM 207 520 
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No Dyad Name Dyad Id COW Id 
65 Government of Somalia - SPM 208 520 
66 Government of Somalia - USC 210 520 
67 Government of Somalia - USC/SNA 211 520 
68 Government of Somalia - SRRC 212 520 
69 Government of United Kingdom - IRA 216 200 
70 Government of Philippines - CPP 217 840 
71 Government of Trinidad and Tobago - Jamaat al-Muslimeen 219 52 
72 Government of Philippines - Military faction (forces of 
Honasan, Abenina & Zumel) 
220 840 
73 Government of Bangladesh - JSS/SB 223 771 
74 Government of El Salvador - FMLN 225 92 
75 Government of Guatemala - URNG 228 90 
76 Government of Mexico - EZLN 230 70 
77 Government of Nicaragua - Contras/FDN 231 93 
78 Government of Peru - Sendero Luminoso 235 135 
79 Government of Colombia - FARC 237 100 
80 Government of Georgia - Anti-government alliance 239 372 
81 Government of Egypt - al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya 241 651 
82 Government of Philippines - MILF 242 840 
83 Government of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) - LTTE 243 780 
84 Government of Haiti - Military faction (Forces of Himmler 
Rebu and Guy Francois) 
244 41 
85 Government of Cote D’Ivoire - MJP 245 437 
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No Dyad Name Dyad Id COW Id 
86 Government of Iran (Persia) - MEK 246 630 
87 Government of Philippines - MNLF 247 840 
88 Government of United Kingdom - RIRA 248 200 
89 Government of Philippines - ASG 249 840 
90 Government of Haiti - Military faction (Forces of Raoul 
Cédras) 
251 41 
91 Government of Philippines - MNLF – NM 252 840 
92 Government of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) - JVP 256 780 
93 Government of Georgia - Republic of Abkhazia 259 372 
94 Government of Iran (Persia) - KDPI 260 630 
95 Government of India - ATTF 262 750 
96 Government of India - NLFT 269 750 
97 Government of Yugoslavia (Serbia) - Republic of Croatia 272 345 
98 Government of Yugoslavia (Serbia) - Croatian irregulars 273 345 
99 Government of Iraq - KDP 279 645 
100 Government of Yugoslavia (Serbia) - Republic of Slovenia 281 345 
101 Government of Iraq - PUK 285 645 
102 Government of India - NSCN – IM 286 750 
103 Government of Central African Republic - Forces of 
Francois Bozize 
287 482 
104 Government of Georgia - Zviadists 289 372 
105 Government of Croatia - Serbian irregulars 291 344 
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No Dyad Name Dyad Id COW Id 
106 Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Serbian Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
292 346 
107 Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Croatian Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
293 346 
108 Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Autonomous Province 
of Western Bosnia 
294 346 
109 Government of Yugoslavia (Serbia) - UCK 295 345 
110 Government of India - ULFA 296 750 
111 Government of Georgia - Republic of South Ossetia 297 372 
112 Government of Iraq - SCIRI 298 645 
113 Government of Mexico - EPR 299 70 
114 Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Serbian irregulars 300 346 
115 Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Croatian irregulars 301 346 
116 Government of Croatia - Serbian Republic of Krajina 303 344 
117 Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KIO 304 775 
118 Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU 306 775 
119 Government of Myanmar (Burma) - SSA/s 307 775 
120 Government of Myanmar (Burma) - MTA 308 775 
121 Government of India - ABSU 309 750 
122 Government of Myanmar (Burma) - NMSP 310 775 
123 Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNPP 311 775 
124 Government of Myanmar (Burma) - RSO 312 775 
125 Government of India - NDFB 313 750 
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No Dyad Name Dyad Id COW Id 
126 Government of Myanmar (Burma) - God´s Army 314 775 
127 Government of Peru - MRTA 319 135 
128 Government of Myanmar (Burma) - UWSA 321 775 
129 Government of Myanmar (Burma) - ABSDF 322 775 
130 Government of Myanmar (Burma) - ARIF 323 775 
131 Government of India - PLA 325 750 
132 Government of Myanmar (Burma) - BMA 326 775 
133 Government of Afghanistan - Taleban 327 700 
134 Government of Turkey/Ottoman Empire - Devrimci Sol 330 640 
135 Government of Turkey/Ottoman Empire - PKK 333 640 
136 Government of India - UNLF 336 750 
137 Government of Papua New Guinea - BRA 337 910 
138 Government of Pakistan - MQM 340 770 
139 Government of Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of) - 
UCK 
341 343 
140 Government of Colombia - ELN 342 100 
141 Government of Colombia - EPL 343 100 
142 Government of Indonesia - FRETILIN 344 850 
143 Government of Indonesia - GAM 347 850 
144 Government of Russia (Soviet Union) - Chechen Republic 
of Ichkeria 
348 365 
145 Government of Nepal - CPN-M 349 790 
146 Government of Russia (Soviet Union) - Parliamentary forces 350 365 
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No Dyad Name Dyad Id COW Id 
147 Government of Liberia - MODEL 352 450 
148 Government of Tajikistan - UTO 353 702 
149 Government of India - Kashmir insurgents 355 750 
150 Government of Romania - NSF 357 360 
151 Government of United States of America - al-Qaida 360 2 
152 Government of Azerbaijan - Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh 361 373 
153 Government of Azerbaijan - Military faction (Forces of 
Suret Husseinov) 
362 373 
154 Government of Uzbekistan - IMU 363 704 
155 Government of Cambodia (Kampuchea) - KR 364 811 
156 Government of Spain - ETA 366 230 
157 Government of Moldova - Dniestr Republic 367 359 
158 Government of Russia (Soviet Union) - Wahhabi movement 
of the Buinaksk district 
368 365 
159 Government of Russia (Soviet Union) - Republic of 
Armenia 
370 365 
160 Government of Russia (Soviet Union) - APF 373 365 
161 Government of Yemen (Arab Republic of Yemen) - 
Democratic Republic of Yemen 
375 678 
162 Government of Lebanon - Lebanese Army (Aoun) 376 660 
163 Government of Israel - Fatah 377 666 
164 Government of Cambodia (Kampuchea) - KPNLF 378 811 
165 Government of Cambodia (Kampuchea) - FUNCINPEC 379 811 
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No Dyad Name Dyad Id COW Id 
166 Government of Israel - Palestinian Islamic Jihad 380 666 
167 Government of Israel - Hamas 381 666 
168 Government of Laos - LRM 382 812 
169 Government of Lebanon - Lebanese Forces 383 660 
170 Government of India - Sikh insurgents 387 750 
171 Government of India - PWG 405 750 
172 Government of India - MCC 406 750 
173 Government of Azerbaijan - OPON forces 407 373 
174 Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi 
Afghanistan 
411 700 
175 Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan 412 700 
176 Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat 413 700 
177 Government of Tajikistan - Movement for Peace in 
Tajikistan 
415 702 
178 Government of Israel - PFLP 419 666 
179 Government of Afghanistan - Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami 422 700 
180 Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA 423 700 
181 Government of Israel - AMB 426 666 
182 Government of Israel - PNA 427 666 
183 Government of Israel - PFLP-GC 428 666 
184 Government of Uganda - UNRF II 431 500 
185 Government of Sudan - SLM/A 433 625 
186 Government of Sudan - JEM 434 625 
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No Dyad Name Dyad Id COW Id 
187 Government of Eritrea - EIJM – AS 435 531 
188 Government of Cote D’Ivoire - FN 439 437 
189 Government of Haiti - FLRN 440 41 
190 Government of Haiti - OP Lavalas (Chimères) 441 41 
191 Government of Iraq - Al-Mahdi Army 442 645 
192 Government of Iraq - Ansar al-Islam 443 645 
193 Government of Uzbekistan - JIG 444 704 
194 Government of Nigeria - Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa 446 475 
195 Government of Iraq - ISI 448 645 
196 Government of India - CPI (Maoist) 451 750 
197 Government of India - NSCN – K 453 750 
198 Government of Chad - FUCD 455 483 
199 Government of Turkey/Ottoman Empire - MKP 457 640 
200 Government of Iran (Persia) - PJAK 459 630 
201 Government of Panama - Military faction (forces of Moisés 
Giroldi) 
461 95 
202 Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents 472 800 
203 Government of Nigeria - NDPVF 473 475 
204 Government of Paraguay - Military faction (forces of 
General Rodriguez) 
474 150 
205 Government of Venezuela - Military Faction (forces of 
Hugo Chávez) 
475 101 
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No Dyad Name Dyad Id COW Id 
206 Government of Afghanistan - Military faction (forces of 
Shahnawaz Tanay) 
476 700 
207 Government of Iraq - RJF 578 645 
208 Government of Central African Republic - UFDR 628 482 
209 Government of Israel - PRC 629 666 
210 Government of Sudan - NRF 630 625 
211 Government of Sudan - SLM/A (MM) 631 625 
212 Government of Somalia - ARS/UIC 632 520 
213 Government of Chad - RAFD 633 483 
214 Government of Chad - UFDD 634 483 
215 Government of Pakistan - Baluch Ittehad 638 770 
216 Government of Pakistan - BLA 639 770 
217 Government of Iran (Persia) - Jondollah 640 630 
218 Government of Sudan - SPLM/A 641 625 
219 Government of Israel - Hezbollah 643 666 
220 Government of Sudan - NDA 645 625 
221 Government of Democratic Republic of Congo - CNDP 646 490 
222 Government of Philippines - MNLF – HM 647 840 
223 Government of Sudan - SLM/A-Unity 648 625 
224 Government of Mali - ATNMC 650 432 
225 Government of Congo, Democratic Republic of (Zaire) - 
BDK 
651 490 
226 Government of Sierra Leone - WSB 714 451 
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No Dyad Name Dyad Id COW Id 
227 Government of Niger - MNJ 749 436 
228 Government of Niger - FLAA 761 436 
229 Government of Niger - UFRA 762 436 
230 Government of India - KCP 764 750 
231 Government of India - DHD-Black Widow faction 765 750 
232 Government of India - PREPAK 766 750 
233 Government of Chad - AN 767 483 
234 Government of Pakistan - TTP 768 770 
235 Government of Somalia - Al-Shabaab 770 520 
236 Government of Somalia - Harakat Ras Kamboni 771 520 
237 Government of India - PULF 772 750 
238 Government of Russia (Soviet Union) - Forces of the 
Caucasus Emirate 
773 365 
239 Government of Pakistan - BRA 774 770 
240 Government of Chad - Military faction (forces of Maldoum 
Bada Abbas) 
777 483 
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APPENDIX B: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS  
Hypothesis Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Cost of War Logged – Number of 
Deaths 
.093 
(.066) 
.097 
(.066) 
.109 
(.066) 
.118 
(.067) 
 Duration of Conflict -.008 
(.008) 
-.002 
(.008) 
-.006 
(.008) 
-.003 
(.008) 
 Stalemate .493 
(.268) 
.507 
(.269) 
.472 
(.271) 
.363 
(.278) 
 Territorial Control 1.108 
(.165) 
1.242 
(.166) 
1.219 
(.166) 
1.179 
(.171) 
Reputation Number of Actors -.141 
(.041) 
   
Legitimacy Political Link  -.535 
(.169)  
  
Valid Spokesman Low Level Leadership   -.384 
(.237) 
 
 Moderate Level 
Leadership 
  -.095 
(.178) 
 
External Pressure Transnational Link    .668 
(.198) 
 State Military Support    .358 
(.162) 
 Non-State Military 
Support  
   -.757 
(.197) 
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Terrorism Terrorist Organization     
 Terror x Negative Rep.     
 Terror x Target Rep.      
Military 
Intervention 
Intervention     
 Intervention x unbiased     
Human Rights Physical Integrity Index     
 Empowerment Index     
Type of Conflict Territorial -.423 
(.166) 
-.558 
(.163) 
-.596 
(.167) 
-.678 
(.171) 
 Minor Conflict .047 
(.248) 
.081 
(.248) 
.065 
(.248) 
.115 
(.253) 
 Internationalized  .186 
(.233) 
.253 
(.235) 
.230 
(.235) 
.352 
(.240) 
Constant -1.406 
(.528) 
-1.713 
(.514) 
-1.760 
(.538) 
-2.161 
(.523) 
MODEL SUMMARY     
Chi-Square (Change in – 2 log likelihood) *** 114.243 111.542 103.980 124.802 
Cox-Snell R-Square .109 .107 .100 .119 
Nagelkerke R-Square .157 .154 .144 .171 
N (Number of Observations)  988 988 988 988 
Note: Coefficients and standard errors are presented in the first and second rows, 
respectively.  
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Hypothesis Variable Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Cost of War Logged – Number of 
Deaths 
.116 
(.065) 
.110 
(.066) 
.124 
(.066) 
.131 
(.066) 
 Duration of Conflict -.006 
(.008) 
-.009 
(.008) 
-.006 
(.008) 
-.007 
(.008) 
 Stalemate .521 
(.269) 
.534 
(.271) 
.322 
(.277) 
.388 
(.279) 
 Territorial Control 1.184 
(.164) 
1.162 
(.165) 
1.162 
(.165) 
1.165 
(.166) 
Reputation Number of Actors     
Legitimacy Political Link     
Valid Spokesman Low Level Leadership     
 Moderate Level 
Leadership 
    
External Pressure Transnational Link     
 State Military Support     
 Non-State Military 
Support  
    
Terrorism Terrorist Organization -.058 
(.163) 
-.766 
(.544) 
  
 Terror x Negative Rep.  .300 
(.134) 
  
 Terror x Target Rep.   -.146 
(.187) 
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Military 
Intervention 
Intervention   .677 
(.164) 
.459 
(.191) 
 Intervention x unbiased    .669 
(.283) 
Human Rights Physical Integrity Index     
 Empowerment Index     
Type of Conflict Territorial -.544 
(.162) 
-.523 
(.162) 
-.512 
(.163) 
-.476 
(.165) 
 Minor Conflict .044 
(.247) 
.040 
(.250) 
.039 
(.248) 
.028 
(.249) 
 Internationalized  .215 
(.234) 
.198 
(236) 
.042 
(.242) 
.100 
(.243) 
Constant -1.879 
(.512) 
-1.828 
(.516) 
-2.135 
(.518) 
-2.172 
(.520) 
MODEL SUMMARY     
Chi-Square (Change in – 2 log likelihood) 
*** 
101.302 106.901 117.908 123.521 
Cox-Snell R-Square .097 .103 .112 .118 
Nagelkerke R-Square .140 .148 .162 .169 
N (number of observations)  988 988 988 988 
Note: Coefficients and standard errors are presented in the first and second rows, 
respectively. 
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Hypothesis Variable Model 9 Model 10 
Cost of War Logged – Number of Deaths .141 (.004) .074 (082) 
 Duration of Conflict -.006 (.000) -.008 (.010) 
 Stalemate .711 (-.008) .122 (.457) 
 Territorial Control 1.208 (.009) 1.200 (.204) 
Reputation Number of Actors  -.154 (.049) 
Legitimacy Political Link  -.024 (.201) 
Valid Spokesman Low Level Leadership  -.519 (.288) 
 Moderate Level Leadership  -.077 (.208) 
External Pressure Transnational Link  .774 (.232) 
 State Military Support  .658 (.194) 
 Non-State Military Support   -.949 (.233) 
Terrorism Terrorist Organization  -.990 (.614) 
 Terror x Negative Rep.  .438 (.155) 
 Terror x Target Rep.   -.171 (.205) 
Military 
Intervention 
Intervention 
 .449 (.225) 
 Intervention x unbiased  .866 (.323) 
Human Rights Physical Integrity Index .052 (.000) .000 (.065) 
 Empowerment Index .032 (.001) .083 (.026) 
Type of Conflict Territorial -.618 (-.008) -.692 (.212) 
 Minor Conflict .016 (.004) -.034 (.305) 
 Internationalized  .109 (-.010) .159 (.306) 
Constant -2.296 (-.037) -2.172(.715) 
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MODEL SUMMARY   
Chi-Square (Change in – 2 log likelihood) *** 89.991 167.850 
Cox-Snell R-Square .096 .172 
Nagelkerke R-Square .140 .251 
N (number of observations)  892 892 
Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are presented in the table.  
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 Since the end of Cold War, more civil conflicts have been settled by negotiated 
settlements, as compared to previous eras. While the extant literature has offered various 
explanations of this trend by examining the costs and types of war, scholars’ primary focus has 
been on researching the determinants of conflict resolution. Yet, what brings the parties of civil 
conflicts to the negotiation table in the first place has remained largely unexplored. In 
particular, previous scholarship has failed to grasp negotiation as a process and costly choice 
in itself. This dissertation lays out the conditions paving the way for negotiations in civil 
conflicts, by offering a better understanding of the costs and benefits of negotiations to the 
parties. By rejecting the assumption from the previous literature that negotiation is a costless 
choice, this dissertation explains how the leaders of both government and insurgent groups 
perceive the negotiation process as the cost-benefit calculus.  The study relies on a logistic 
regression analysis of the occurrence of negotiations in civil conflicts that occurred during 1989 
- 2008, as well as four case studies, including conflicts between the Sudanese Government and 
the Sudan People`s Liberation Movement / Army (SPLM/A); the Indian Government and the 
Kashmir Insurgency; the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC); the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Tamil 
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Eelam (LTTE). Both quantitative and qualitative analyses support the argument that 
negotiations are a risky choice and they bare some costs and benefits to the parties in civil 
conflicts. Accordingly, the negotiation calculation includes the assessment of prospective gains 
and losses in terms of parties’ reputation, legitimacy, and status quo. Among others, the study 
found strong support for the role of third parties in predicting the negotiation likelihood. The 
dissertation presents a coherent theoretical framework that offers novel ways of 
conceptualizing the negotiation process. It also offers substantive recommendations for future 
research, to further improve scholarly understanding of the costs and benefits of negotiations 
in civil conflicts.  
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